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ABSTRACT 
 
In this dissertation, I analyze cross-border marriages between South Korean men and 
Vietnamese women within the framework of social reproduction. The volume of 
Vietnamese cross-border marriages has increased dramatically with the emergence of the 
commercial marriage brokerages industry in the late 1990s. While NGOs have raised 
concerns about the commodification of Vietnamese women, the South Korean 
government has actively supported cross-border marriages through legislations. Why and 
how cross-border marriages have increased in South Korea at this moment and gained so 
much attention in the policy arena are the primary questions addressed in this 
dissertation. 
 
The practice of cross-border marriage between Korean men and foreign women started as 
a response to widespread concern over the inability of large numbers of rural bachelors to 
find marriage partners in the 1980s. The “rural bachelors problem” arose in the context of 
growing concerns over the sustainability of rural communities that arose as a result of the 
policy of export-oriented industrialization that began in the 1960s. The increase in rural 
to urban migration and women’s labor force participation, and the decline in fertility and 
marriage rates continued during this period and contributed to changing family patterns 
and the dismantling of the family as a key institution for care provision. By the mid 
2000s, low fertility and a “care deficit” became national concerns and a series of 
legislative correctives, including the Framework Act on Healthy Families were 
implemented.  Growing attention was paid to the “Multicultural Family,” which is the 
government’s official term for unions arising through cross-border marriage.   
  
 
While much of the discussion surrounding cross-border marriage focuses on individual 
marriage migrants’ experiences, this dissertation focuses on the structural changes that 
accompany cross-border marriage. I use social reproduction as a framework within which 
to discuss both the demographic and the political economic context within which the 
practice has grown, including changes in migration patterns, women’s labor force 
participation and their role in care provision, and the contexts of the welfare regime and 
notions of citizenship.  I take the family, in particular the multicultural family, as a site 
through which to explore how these contexts and processes.  . 
 
Care provision has become increasingly important in the current global political 
economy.  Recent research on the global care chain and the feminization of labor 
migration has articulated how the pressure to reduce the cost of care provision in the 
context of the decline of the welfare state has contributed to affect female labor 
migration. In a similar vein, I have found that the increase in marriage migration 
coincides with the population and care crisis, which has resulted from the decrease in 
fertility and marriage rates, changes in family patterns, and the increase in women’s labor 
force participation that has occurred since the industrialization period.  Women have been 
primarily responsible for care provision within the family in South Korea. The 
pronounced care crisis at the moment cannot be separated from changes that have taken 
place in family patterns and women’s roles. While the Korean government has increased 
the social expenditures, efforts to restore the family as central to care provision continue. 
  
I argue that the recent increase in marriage migration in South Korea is one manifestation 
of social reproduction in this context.  
 
As of 2009, cross-border marriage became more than a rural phenomenon, as more than 
50 percent of Vietnamese marriage migrants to Korea were living in urban areas. The 
data show that most are marry into low income families and nearly half of them live with 
in-laws, which is ten times higher than the rate among Korean-Korean families. Marriage 
migration helps address the population and care crisis in South Korea by contributing to 
the formation of families and providing care for children and elderly in the low income 
families. Lastly, it is worth noting that multicultural families are indispensible in the 
current making of “Multicultural Korea”. Marriage migrants and their low income 
families are mobilized in the celebration of “Multicultural Korea,” yet their marginalized 
socio-economic status is hardly recognized in this process. 
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1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Research Topic: State, Market and Cross-Border Marriage 
This thesis examines the phenomenon of cross-border marriage between Korean men 
and Vietnamese women in political economic context. Cross-border marriage between 
Korean men and foreign women began in the late 1980s as a solution to the “rural 
bachelors’ marriage” problem in South Korea.1 Rural bachelors’ marriage became a 
national issue in the context of questions concerning the sustainability of rural 
communities in the 1990s. The number of cross-border marriages has increased 
considerably overtime. As of 2009, 167,090 marriage migrants were living in Korea, 
89.7% of whom were women (Ministry of Administration and Security, 2009).2 In 
addition, 86.8 % of all female marriage migrants were living in cities. In other words, 
the impact of cross-border marriage now extends beyond rural areas. 
Beginning in the mid-2000s, the discourse of the “multicultural society” gained 
currency in the policy and media arena, as shown in newspaper article titles: “1 
million foreigners, Korea is heading to multi-cultural society” and “Foreigners occupy 
1% of the population, Multi-cultural society arrives in Korea” (Seoulsinmun, 2005; 
Naeilsinmun, 2005). The group receiving the most attention was marriage migrants, 
despite their small numbers. “Marriage migrants” and “multicultural family”3 have 
                                                 
1 I will use Korea hereafter. 
2 The Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea defines a “marriage migrant” as “a person of foreign 
origin who married a Korean national or is in a married relationship with a Korean national” 
[“immigrant by marriage” is defined as a “non-ethnic Korean who used to have a marital relationship 
with a Korean national and/or is in the middle of a marital relationship with a Korean national” —
official translation]. The classification doesn’t necessarily pay attention to initial visa status, but 
indicates people who have spouse visas (F21 and F13) at the time of the survey. However, this number 
is the sum of those with spouse visas and those with Korean citizenship. 
3 The government’s official term for a family created through cross-border marriage. 
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been buzzwords in the policy arena since the mid-2000s, when a wide range of 
policies for cross-border marriages or multicultural families began to be implemented. 
These policies can be roughly grouped into two kinds: those initiating cross-border 
marriages in rural areas and those supporting “multicultural families.” Until 2007, 
about 24.7% of the municipalities in Korea implemented a bill to support cross-border 
marriages, whereby local governments provide financial support for local bachelors so 
that they can marry foreign women (Choi, 2007, p. 18). In 2006, a nationwide network 
of “Multicultural Family Support Centers” (formerly Marriage Migrants Support 
Centers) was established. As of 2009, 119 local centers at the district and county level 
were in operation4 (http://mfsc.familynet.or.kr/). In 2007, the Act to Regulate 
Marriage Brokerage Agents (Act. No. 8688) was implemented. Finally, the Support 
for Multicultural Families Act (Act. No. 8937) was implemented in 2008. The 
enthusiasm around the issue of cross-border marriage in the public policy arena is 
curious in many ways. Although the number of cross-border marriages increased 
dramatically in a short period of time, the response to this trend seems to be unusually 
passionate. Given the small number of marriage migrants, it even seems to transcend 
the general rational assessment of implementing policies. It is worth exploring the 
conditions and implications of cross-border marriage and the government’s 
engagement around this issue. In this dissertation, I will explore the socio-
demographic changes in the process of economic development in Korea and the 
relevant policies, which corresponds to these change.   
The development of the marriage brokerage industry is indispensible to explain the 
growth of cross-border marriage. For example, cross-border marriages between 
                                                 
4 As of 2008, there were 80 centers. 
3 
Korean rural bachelors and Korean Chinese women were arranged by public figures or 
organizations in the late 1980s and the 1990s.5 However, with the deregulation of the 
marriage brokerage industry in 1999, the origins of women marriage migrants 
diversified and the volume increased dramatically. In particular, the number of 
Vietnamese women increased dramatically, and they became the second biggest group 
of marriage migrants. In 2000, there were 95 marriages between Korean men and 
Vietnamese women, and the number of incoming Vietnamese marriage migrants 
almost doubled each year, peaking at 10,131 in 2006 (National Statistical Office, year 
not listed).6 The total number of Vietnamese women who married Korean men was 
21,513 in 2007 (Ministry of Justice, 2008b).7 Unlike ethnic Korean Chinese, who is 
the biggest marriage migrant group, Vietnamese women do not have ethnic ties to 
Korea. Vietnamese marriage migrants tend to be more associated with the 
development of the commercial marriage brokerage industry because of widespread 
commercial advertisement8 during the 2000s and the sudden increase in marriage 
brokers. In this sense, marriage between Korean men and Vietnamese women is an 
important topic for studying the development of the commercial marriage brokerage 
industry. Exploring the emergence of commercial match making industry in relation to 
the question of how cross-border marriages became important in the policy arena in 
Korea, both in terms of conditions and implications, adds more layers to understand 
the issue of cross-border marriages and leads us to ask bigger questions on economic 
and social changes.  
                                                 
5 A number of newspapers reported that the trip to China was organized for rural bachelors to meet 
Korean Chinese women (Kukminilbo 1990, Hankookilbo 1991, Hankookilbo 1993, Dongailbo 1991, 
Dongailbo 1992). See chapter 5 for more details. 
6 “Marriage by Foreigner’s Nationality by Year.” This statistics are based on vital statistics. 
7 This report also notes that there are 8,145 illegal migrants who came through marriage.  
8 See chapter 4 for more details. 
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1.2 Research Context 
It is worth noting that the trend of cross-border marriage is not limited to Korea. Jones 
and Shen (2008) described the rise of new destinations of marriage migration in East 
Asia as a prominent trend of cross-border marriages within East and Southeast Asia. 
Indeed, Japan, Taiwan, and Singapore have shown similar trends in cross-border 
marriage, even though the time span and periods are different. These destinations 
arguably share common economic development experiences. I do not attempt to 
theorize the causal relations between economic development and cross-border 
marriage. Rather, I pay attention to the historically specific experiences of these 
countries, which contributed to form the conditions of cross-border marriages. 
I examine cross-border marriage in East Asia and its relationship to political, 
economic, social and cultural concerns. Any economic changes have political, social, 
and cultural implications, and vice versa. The rules and culture of a society are often 
articulations of the ways in which production and social reproduction are organized 
(Bakker and Gill, 2003). Furthermore, production and social reproduction cannot be 
separated. In other words, rapid changes in Korea’s economic structure may have 
paralleled the changes in the organization of social reproduction in general. While 
there is a wealth of literature on the economic miracle of East Asia, the arena of social 
reproduction has received little attention. This project specifically attempts to explore 
the processes of the changing organization of social reproduction as it pertains to 
cross-border marriage. Cross-border marriage is grounded in the historical political 
economic changes. One may argue that cross-border marriage has existed ever since 
any form of boundary was first recognized and that the gendered power relations 
within this kind of marriage are universal. I ground this research in recent historical 
time, however. I pay more attention to the historical specificity, which cross-border 
5 
marriage bears, than to the universality. For example, marriages between Vietnamese 
women and French men during the colonial period and marriage between Vietnamese 
women and Korean men today may be similar in terms of power relations, and both 
have been described as unions between women from less powerful or affluent 
countries and men from more powerful or affluent countries. The structural conditions 
that make Korean men prospective bridegrooms at the moment are very different from 
those that made French men enter such unions in the colonial period, however. At a 
minimum, the current dramatic increase of cross-border marriages in Asia reflects 
specific political economic changes in the region. 
1.3 Research Questions 
These stances can be re-articulated in accordance with several theoretical perspectives. 
In this dissertation, I engage in a range of literatures, from cross-border marriage and 
migration, to population dynamics, economic development, social reproduction, 
women’s labor, welfare, and citizenship. I engage in a particular set of theoretical 
questions. The first question is whether marriage migration can be understood in terms 
of current theories of migration that have been developed based on labor migration. 
This question arises from observations surrounding the intensifying feminization of 
labor migration9 that suggest that is a similar process to the growth in marriage 
migration. Although labor-migration theory provides a general framework, this 
framework must be modified to incorporate the different nature of marriage migration 
including its political implications, which are linked to citizenship attainment, and its 
informal economic implications which occur largely in the domestic sphere. 
                                                 
9 There has been debate on whether the notion of the feminization of labor migration is empirically 
applicable (Jorgen Carling 2005). It is applicable when we take into consideration of the increase of 
care work opportunity which induces women’s migration for this opportunity. By feminization of labor 
migration, I mainly refer to “the feminization of migration for care work.”  
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To reiterate, I ask whether the current increase in marriage migration can be 
understood through the lens of the feminization of labor migration. The feminization 
of labor migration is often explained in the context of the decline of the welfare state 
and the privatization of care provision in the global North (Yeats 2005, Hochschild 
2003, Parrenas 2001). The pressure of lowering the cost of public care provision and 
the immobile nature of care services induced female migrant workers to do the care 
work. Although this explanation is plausible, it is limited to societies that have 
experienced a welfare state. The decline of the welfare state indicates changes in the 
mode of social reproduction. If we are to understand similar phenomena in other parts 
of the world, we must pay attention to how production and social reproduction have 
been organized in a society. 
The concern of the organization of production and reproduction in a society brings our 
attention from migration to the welfare regime. In terms of the migration perspective, 
this discussion is about the structural conditions of migration. The welfare regime in 
Asia is known as a “family dependent regime.” As stated in the previous section, 
production and reproduction cannot be separated. The discussion of the welfare 
regimes reflects the concerns of social reproduction. In order to provide a more 
concrete historical context, I narrowed the focus to Korea, despite the general 
commonalities of new destinations of marriage migration in Asia. 
The family has played an important role in care provision and population reproduction 
in Korea. Rapid economic development process has resulted in changes in the 
industrial structure, in population structure and distribution, in family patterns and in 
women’s labor force participation. This has challenged the traditional arrangement of 
care provision and population reproduction. The initial crisis manifested itself in the 
7 
case of “rural bachelor’s marriage,” which reflects the crisis of social reproduction in 
the rural areas in the 1990s, then later shown as the issue of “low fertility” and “care 
crisis” in the 2000s. Based on this context, I argue the following: cross-border 
marriage was prescribed explicitly as a solution for the rural bachelors’ crises, and has 
continued to be used implicitly as a mechanism for dealing with further crises of 
population and care. These crises are largely based on the specific gendered mode of 
the economic development in Korea and will be discussed in greater details later in the 
dissertation. In other words, while the feminization of labor migration has contributed 
to and been induced by the reorganization of social reproduction in some post welfare 
states, the emergence of institutionally supported and commercially organized 
marriage migration has also emerged along with the reorganization of social 
reproduction in East Asia. 
Social reproduction is a key framework to make these arguments possible. Social 
reproduction has three dimensions: biological reproduction, reproduction of labor, and 
reproduction of the totality of the society (Edholm et al., 1978). Each dimension has 
been discussed in different literatures such as population, feminist economics, social 
policies, feminist politics, and Marxist literature. As a result, social reproduction has 
yet to be developed as a coherent theoretical framework. The most concrete discussion 
has grown out of the feminist debate on unpaid domestic labor in the 1970s. It pays 
attention to what is considered "non-economic" in the conventional economic 
discourse such as women's unpaid domestic labor in the family and discuss its 
contribution to the capitalist economic development. This debate offers grounds for 
gendering the conventional theories by unsettling the notions of labor and economy, 
and highlighting the gendered nature of economic structure. For example, it may be 
8 
useful to modify theories of labor migration in order to understand marriage migration 
to a certain extent. 
The strength of the social reproduction framework to date has been that it has shed 
light on the relations among various sets of categories such as economics/politics, 
production/reproduction, public/private, market/nonmarket and gender. While the 
discussion of the feminization of labor migration is largely based on the reproduction 
of labor, that is, the changing mechanisms surrounding care provision in the global 
North, the organized marriage migration in East Asia needs to be discussed based on 
all three dimensions of social reproduction. At the moment, low fertility is a national 
policy concern in all of the new destinations of marriage migration. That an increase in 
cross-border marriage has been observed in the societies of East Asia also raises some 
new questions of national identity. I discuss these matters in greater detail in the pages 
that follow. 
1.4 Research Methods 
This project relies on a historical approach, yet the aim of this project is not to write a 
history. I focus on public policies and socioeconomic indicators in order to describe 
the changes in production and reproduction because “public forms of authority or rule 
may be the primary means through which social coordination and social reproduction 
are articulated” (Bakker and Gill, 2003, p. 23). For example, while I may begin with 
statistical data, which demonstrate the growth in cross-border marriage trend, as well 
as the demographic conditions underlying this trend, this project ultimately attempts to 
connect these trends to other political, economic, and cultural changes and aims to 
understand the phenomenon of cross-border marriage through these changes. 
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As I have said, topics I explore are population, welfare, family, and women’s labor. 
These areas are directly linked to the concerns of social reproduction, in particular 
biological reproduction and the reproduction of labor. My research areas are 
thematically grouped: 1) the emergence of new destinations of marriage migration in 
Asia; 2) the growth of the commercial marriage brokerage industry; 3) the 
relationships between economic development and population structure changes, in 
particular those pertaining the rural population in South Korea; and 4) the current 
articulations of the population and care crises in Korea, and cross-border marriage. I 
investigate these topics through several methods: 1) secondary data analysis; 2) 
archival research; and 3) fieldwork with interviews, focus groups, and participatory 
observation. These data are put into conversation in the historical context. 
1.5 Structure of Chapters 
This dissertation consists of six chapters. The next chapter offers a theoretical 
discussion on cross-border marriage and social reproduction. The third chapter 
discusses my methodology and the details of my fieldwork. The fourth chapter 
outlines the demographic conditions underlying cross-border marriage in Korea and 
Vietnam in relation to political economic changes in the societies. The fifth chapter 
focuses on commercial marriage brokerage and individuals’ experience of this 
process, and I discuss some of the institutional changes that have contributed to the 
development of this industry. The sixth chapter explores the conditions for the 
formation of the commercial international marriage market in Asia. The seventh 
chapter discusses the current population and care crisis in Korea and the role of cross-
border marriage as a mechanism to deal with these problems. 
10 
CHAPTER TWO: 
SOCIAL REPRODUCTION AS A THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Cross-border marriage is located in the intersection of myriad of different discussions 
including migration, marriage, family, population dynamics, economic development 
and social reproduction. Yet, the academic discussion on cross-border marriages 
doesn’t necessarily grasp all these dynamics. This chapter offers a current academic 
discussion on cross-border marriages and discusses the issues around conceptualizing 
cross-border marriage. Taking the discussion on feminization of labor migration as a 
starting point, I attempt to bring marriage migration into this discussion and expand it 
to the discussion on feminization of migration. In doing so, I explore the debates 
around social reproduction starting from the domestic labor debates in the 1970s to the 
discussions on family, welfare regimes, citizenship and population. 
2.1 Studying Cross-Border Marriage and Its Troubles 
2.1.1 Current Literature on Cross-Border Marriage 
“Cross-border marriage” is defined as a union between people who are from different 
national territories. It entails various types of cross-bordering, including across race, 
ethnic, class and other socio-cultural boundaries10. “Cross-border marriage” is not a 
new phenomenon. It may have existed since the first territorial boundary was created. 
In this sense, the discussion of cross-border marriage cannot be divorced from the 
discussion of historical political economic changes.  
                                                 
10 See Constable (2005) 
 
11 
The term tends to be used interchangeably with “international marriage” or 
“transnational marriage” in the literature. In all cases the national border is an 
important element, but there are subtle differences among the concepts. For example, 
“international marriage” signifies the centrality of the national identity of individuals 
who are involved in the cross-border marriage process. As Piper (2003) puts it, “cross 
national marriage is a particularly modern phenomenon, reflecting the emergence of 
the nation-state along with standardization of marriage practices among the wider 
population” (p. 321). In other words, “international marriage” indicates historically 
specific political economic circumstances, in which the nation-state is the primary unit 
of analysis. “Transnational marriage” addresses the continuous financial and cultural 
exchanges between origin and destination as an extension of the discussion of 
“transnational family.”11 In this study, I use the term cross-border marriage, for which 
the focus is border-crossing, because it acknowledges the national border as an 
important distinction and yet allows us to think about ethnic and cultural differences, 
and because this term has greater potential to explore various historical specificities 
such as the formation of the current political economic system in East Asia and the 
embedded structural economic disparity within the Asian region. 
Cross-border marriage recently gained attention in the context of the increase in cross-
border mobility of people, in particular the feminization of migration and the discourse 
of trafficking in women over the last several decades. Nicole Constable (2005) 
describes recent patterns of cross-border marriage as follows: 
a majority of international marriage migrants are women, and most of these 
women move from poorer countries to wealthier ones, from the less developed 
global south to the more industrialized north—from parts of Asia, Latin 
America, Eastern Europe, and the former Soviet Union, to Western Europe, 
                                                 
11 See Lu (2007) 
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North America, Australia, and wealthier regions of East Asia—echoing some 
of the common patterns of women’s labor migration. (p. 4, emphasis added) 
This observation suggests that strong economic elements play a role in the process of 
cross-border marriage and that the conditions and contributing factors of this 
phenomenon may greatly resemble those of labor migration. However, marriage 
migration is distinguishable from labor migration for the following reasons. First, 
there is a direct association between this form of migration and the attainment of 
citizenship and membership in the family, both of which raises a host of political 
questions; second is the importance of intimate relationships that are associated with 
marriage and family; third is the subtlety of the economic transaction in some of this 
form of migration. Some of the economic transactions in marriage migration are 
obvious, as in the remittances, bride price, and payment to commercial marriage 
brokerage agencies.  Others are more subtle, as in women’s unpaid care labor in the 
family and unequal conjugal relationships. There is often an expectation that marriage 
migrant will perform as a housewife and caregiver within the family. Moreover, these 
obvious economic transactions are connected to seemingly noneconomic dimensions 
of family life in many cases. These characteristics of marriage migration do not allow 
for simple adaptation of current theories of migration, which are based on the studies 
of labor migration. Careful attention must be paid to the notion of care labor and 
domestic labor in the family, both of which have often been left out of the economic 
discussion, and to their link to economic processes and political and cultural 
ramifications. 
One common approach to conceptualizing cross-border marriage is through the notion 
of “mail-order bride,” especially in the case of Asian women. Piper (2003) points out 
that “scholarly work on international couples involving Asian women typically 
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revolves around the mail-order bride issues” (p. 458). The mail-order-bride 
perspective suggests that women in poor countries are forced to choose cross-border 
marriage for economic reasons (Constable 2003, 2005; Piper 2003). From this 
perspective, economic disparity among states is a key condition for cross-border 
marriage, but this structural economic factor tends to be automatically translated in 
terms of individual economic benefits. This approach has been criticized because it 
often characterizes women who are involved in cross-border marriage as victims of 
economic structural violence. As a result, there have been corrective efforts made to 
shed light on the agency of women and the complexity of power relations within 
cross-border marriages (Constable 2005). Too often, however, the economic structure 
continues to be seen as a problem without paying adequate attention as to how or why. 
One of the key shortcomings of the mail-order-bride perspective is not the economic 
structural perspective per se, but the simplistic approach to the role of economic 
structures, that is, its assumption that structural economic disparity automatically 
translates into individual economic benefits and that individuals make rational choices. 
What is critical for conceptualizing cross-border marriages is grounding the notion of 
economic structure in the historical context and re-thinking the meaning of “the 
economic” and “labor”, by shedding light on its relation to “the non-economic” 
categories such as family and care.      
2.1.2 Cross-Border Marriage and the Feminization of Migration 
Recent studies on cross-border marriage attempt to conceptualize cross-border 
marriage in the current global context. Constable (2005) asks, “How are such border 
crossings gendered?” (p. 3). Constable (2005) outlines several major areas: “gendered 
pattern of cross-border marriage, gendered cultural expectation and imagination of 
women and men, hypergamy—women marrying up into a higher socioeconomic 
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group—and gendered agency” (p. 15). Conceptually, Constable (2005) relies on 
“gendered mobility,” a concept developed by feminist geographers such as Massey 
(1994) and Pessar and Mahler (2001). Gendered mobility is caused by and contained 
within the “power hierarchies created through historical, political, economic, 
geographic, kinship-based and other socially stratifying factors” (Constable, 2005, p. 
15). These are useful conceptual orientations, yet they are only suggestive. Studying 
gendered patterns of cross-border marriage helps describe the phenomenon of 
gendered mobility, and gendered cultural expectations, hypergamy, and gendered 
agency are important factors that help explain gendered mobility with regard to cross-
border marriage. However, the notion of gendered mobility does not necessarily 
explain much unless it is fully substantiated by the historical process of creating a 
“power hierarchy,” which these factors rely on. In other words, a historically grounded 
political economic research is critical to the concept of gendered mobility. 
The concept of gendered mobility is based on observation of the feminization of labor 
migration. The feminization of labor migration for reproductive labor has been an 
observable trend since the 1970s. Numerous literatures shed light on its conditions and 
consequences. One of the most prominent explanations for this trend is the neoliberal 
restructuring of social services in the Global North (Yeats 2005, Hochschild 2003, 
Parrenas 2001). During the phase of the decline of the welfare state, the public sector 
was substantially privatized. Pressure to lower the cost of public services, in particular 
of care, induced labor migrants into the care sector, which has a high demand for 
female workers. In other words, the recent trend of the feminization of labor migration 
indicates the restructuring of the mechanism of providing care, a narrow aspect of 
social reproduction. If the notion of gendered mobility includes mobility other than 
labor migration, such as marriage migration, what kind of historical process and power 
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hierarchy would be behind? Does the feminized stream of marriage migration in Asia 
also indicate the restructuring of production and social reproduction in some sense?  
Hsia (2004) attempts to conceptualize cross-border marriage in the context of 
capitalist development using a world-system approach to international migration. She 
argues that cross-border marriage serves capitalist development through various 
exchanges among the core, semi-periphery, and periphery: 
For the core and semi-periphery, foreign brides provide unpaid household 
labor, childbearing, and child rearing, thereby stabilizing the reproduction of a 
pool of cheap labor. Foreign brides also serve directly as a new source of 
cheaper laborers in these countries. For peripheral countries, document and 
travel fees as well as remittances collected from women from peripheral 
countries benefit primitive accumulation. In sum, the phenomenon of foreign 
brides brings together men and women who have been marginalized in core, 
semi-peripheral, and peripheral societies by capitalist development in order to 
survive. (Hsia, 2004, p. 193) 
Applying the world-system approach of international migration to cross-border 
marriage helps locate cross-border marriage in the context of current global political 
economic changes. However, simply replacing labor migration for marriage migration 
does not necessarily address the specificity of marriage migration, which is different 
from the labor migration in terms of its political, economic and cultural 
ramifications12. While labor migration can be explained in terms of labor supply and 
demand in the national labor market, marriage migration requires an understanding of 
the overall social reproduction process of a given society. This concern in part 
schematically resembles the early feminist discussion on women’s unpaid labor in the 
                                                 
12 There is another attempt to discuss cross-border marriage in parallel with labor migration. Piper 
(2003) discusses the blurring boundaries between marriage migration and labor migration by focusing 
on the case of Filipina entertainers’ marriages to local Japanese men. This discussion had great potential 
to answer the question of how to theorize cross-border marriage in relation to the feminization of labor; 
however, the focus remains the technical changes in the form of migration. 
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1970s. The point of debate is often summarized as the contribution of women’s unpaid 
labor to capital accumulation. However, what is more important in the debate about 
women’s unpaid labor is acknowledging that family and women’s unpaid labor as 
important part of economic processes and paying attention to the relationship between 
paid and unpaid labor, market and non-market institutions, and production and 
reproduction. Gender is indispensible to understanding these boundaries and any 
changes to them. The reason that Hsia’s argument seems somewhat mechanical is that 
she underestimates the relational aspects of this debate. A detailed theoretical 
discussion follows in the next section. 
2.2 Theoretical Framework: Social Reproduction as a Starting Point for Discussion 
Conceptualizing cross-border marriage in the political economic context is challenging 
because marriage and the family are not necessarily regarded as central part of the 
economic system and yet this phenomenon is surrounded by political and economic 
changes. It exists in the intersection of multiple boundaries such as market and non-
market, public and private, and production and reproduction. It calls for re-visiting 
feminist discussions on social reproduction in the 1970s. In what became known as 
“domestic labor debates”, feminists discussed the role of social reproduction in the 
capitalist production system and its relation to the women’s subordination by focusing 
women’s unpaid labor in the family. It re-conceptualized the notion of labor and the 
family as a social institution in a capitalist political economic system.  
Taking this debate further, I review the discussions on family and state as the domains 
of the social reproduction. I briefly touch upon the discussion of citizenship in relation 
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to the welfare state because the notion of the social contract between the citizen and 
the state in the second half of the 20th century is linked to care provision, which is an 
important mechanism for guaranteeing social reproduction. Furthermore, the recent 
increase in female labor migration to the Global North is closely linked to the question 
of care provision. I raise a question of the mechanism for social reproduction in a 
society where the role of state is relatively small and where family plays a central role. 
I locate the increase in marriage migration in East Asia and I shed light on the issue of 
the citizenship in that context with the influx of marriage migrants.  
Finally, I discuss recent population history and trends as discursive domain of social 
reproduction. There are two layers of discussion on population. First, I will explore 
how the discussion of population has been developed in parallel to that of social 
reproduction historically.  Then I will review how the area of population became 
important in the discourse of economic development in the second half of the 20th 
century. Indeed, population is an important area to address the concerns of social 
reproduction in the economic development plan in Korea. How the concerns of 
population are linked to the concerns of care and welfare is an important question and 
cross-border marriage in Korea is a useful example through which to explore this 
question. Changes in the population structure, accompanied by rapid economic 
development, and changes in family patterns, have all had effects on current care 
provision in Korea.  
 
2.2.1 Reproduction as an Ontological Site for Studying Political Economic Changes 
Social reproduction is important to exploring gender relations in the political, 
economic, and socio-cultural arenas and within the institutions of state, market, and 
family. Edholm et al. (1978) discuss three different types of reproduction—social 
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reproduction, reproduction of labor, and biological reproduction—that correspond to 
three different theoretical questions: 
to what extent women’s position and male-female relations are crucial for the 
reproduction of the social totality, to what extent women’s involvement in this 
sphere is important to an understanding of their position within the society and 
to what extent this varies from one productive regime to another, how 
women’s reproductive capacities are controlled and whether this control 
determines the position they occupy in any given group. (pp. 104–105) 
Each dimension has been discussed in a different body of literature, although the 
different bodies are linked to each other. The discussion on the reproduction of labor is 
directly linked to the domestic labor debate and was developed by feminist 
economists. Later these debates converged with the discussion of welfare regimes and 
care regimes by feminist social-policy analysts (Razavi, 2007). The discussion on 
biological reproduction can be found in the debate on women’s reproductive rights 
and population policy. Finally, the discussion on social reproduction can be found in 
the feminist debates on democracy and citizenship.  
Recent research on social reproduction pays attention to the link between production 
and reproduction and sheds light on the social reproduction as an ontological site for 
understanding political economic changes (Bakker and Gill, 2003; Picchio, 1992). In 
particular, Picchio (1992) discusses how the conceptual separation of production and 
reproduction in the classical political economy in the 19th Century influenced the 
ways in which we imagine the market and other social institutions. She takes the price 
of labor as an example. While earlier theorists such as Ricardo recognized the 
reproduction cost of labor and integrated the cost into wages, the price of labor was 
increasingly perceived to be determined by labor market supply and demand in 
Ricardo’s later work and that of others (Picchio, 1992). This indicates that the 
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concerns of reproduction were externalized from the market. In other words, the labor 
market is inherently insecure because it ignores the cost of reproducing labor. 
However, basic subsistence is essential for the reproduction of labor. Hence, keeping 
reproduction costs low is critical to profit as well as to labor market stability, and 
handling the “surplus” labor in the market is also an important issue.13 
Picchio (1992) suggests that family and state play important roles in maintaining and 
supporting the labor market by providing basic subsistence for labor and for those who 
fail to be hired in the labor market. Picchio (1992) shows that the market has 
disembedded from society through the process of commodifying labor and argues that 
social institutions such as the family and the state have developed in order to handle 
this rupture, which occurs in the process of disembedding.  
Bakker and Gill (2003) articulate three dimensions of reproduction, which are slightly 
different from the three types of reproduction that Edholm et al. (1978) offer:  
1) Biological reproduction of the species, and specifically the conditions and 
social constructions of motherhood in different societies; 2) The reproduction 
of the labor force, which involves not only subsistence but also education and 
training; 3) The reproduction of provisioning and caring needs that may be 
wholly privatized within families, or socialized or, indeed, provided through a 
combination of the two. (p. 32) 
One notable difference is that the third definition is reduced from reproduction of the 
totality of society to care provision, which illuminates the tangible relation between 
social reproduction and the institutions of state and family. This shift did reduce the 
question of social reproduction as an institutional arrangement for providing welfare 
and care. However, Bakker and Gill’s (2003) focus on the institutional arrangement of 
                                                 
13 A more detailed discussion follows later in this chapter. 
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welfare provision is a fair starting point considering that citizenship is central to social 
reproduction, that the provision of welfare is directly linked to citizenship, and that the 
relationship between citizen and state through the medium of welfare provision has 
been challenged by neoliberal restructuring. Bakker and Gill (2003) take social 
reproduction as a site from which to observe the changes in production, economic 
exchange, institutions, social relations, and community. Their strategy provides a more 
solid point of departure; however, the question of how the discussion of each 
dimension of social reproduction is linked to the reproduction of the totality of a 
society in an abstract sense remains unanswered. 
The issue of social reproduction is important not only because it is about producing 
actual people and labor but also because the mechanism of this process is widely 
embedded in the norms and cultures that define a society (Edholm et al., 1978, Bakker 
and Gill, 2003, Mitchell et al., 2003). Yet revealing the links between the biological 
and labor reproduction and the abstract sense of reproduction of society requires a 
thorough examination of how the reproduction of population and labor is organized. 
The merit of the notion of social reproduction is that it sheds light on the changing 
relations between production and reproduction as well as on the relationships among 
different dimensions of social reproduction. However, using the term “social 
reproduction” as a bundle of different dimensions without explaining sufficiently how 
the dimensions of social reproduction are linked may blur the discussion. In this 
regard, I will use the term “social reproduction” when it refers to the general relations 
to production. Otherwise, I will use the specific terms “biological reproduction” and 
“reproduction of labor” when I address these dimensions. In this way, I may be able to 
show how each dimensions of reproduction is linked to each other as I further the 
discussion in this dissertation. 
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2.2.2 Domestic Labor Debate 
Feminist debates on domestic labor in the 1970s offer substantial discussion on social 
reproduction. Molyneux (1979) provides an excellent overview of this debate. 
According to Molyneux (1979), there are two important theses in the debate on 
domestic labor. First, unpaid housework has been regarded as essential to the capitalist 
mode of production by helping generate surplus value through lowering the cost of 
labor. This thesis leads to the further argument that women’s unpaid labor at home 
contributes to the subordination of women in a capitalist society. Second, housework 
is characterized as “non-capitalist” and is regarded as lying outside the sphere of the 
capitalist mode of production.14 For an extreme example, Delphy (1976) suggests that 
there are two distinct and autonomous modes of production: “an industrial mode of 
production defined by capitalist property relations and capitalist exploitation, and a 
patriarchal mode of production defined by patriarchal/familiar relations of production 
and patriarchal exploitation” (p. 6 in Molyneux, 1979). 
However, Molyneux (1979) criticizes the narrow economic approach of the domestic 
labor debate and argues that unpaid housework is not necessarily essential to the 
capitalist mode of production, because the value of labor is not necessarily determined 
by economic calculation alone and the ways in which day-to-day needs are met are 
subject to historical or cultural variation (pp. 9–12). Molyneux (1979) argues that what 
is important in the debate on domestic labor is not “unpaidness” but “wage,” which 
enables women to stay outside of the labor market. For example, the argument on 
women’s subordination and unpaid labor premises the family wage. However, the 
workers’ wages haven’t necessarily supported the reproduction of the family. When 
                                                 
14 I highlighted these two points from Molyneux’s (1979) extensive discussion. Please see Molyneux 
(1979) for the debate on domestic labor for more details.  
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the breadwinner’s wage is below the family wage, the spouse is likely to enter the 
labor market or to find a way of sustaining. 
The second thesis, that domestic labor has non-capitalist characteristics and stays 
outside of the capitalist production system, contradicts the first thesis. Molyneux 
(1979) notes that if domestic labor contributes to lowering the value of labor in the 
labor market, there must be a link between domestic labor and the capitalist mode of 
production. Instead of explaining the relationship, Molyneux (1979) points out that 
domestic labor often has been conceptualized based on the assumption of an 
ahistorical “domestic sphere.” Indeed, while the historical specificity of mode of 
production is well recognized, housework in the domestic sphere tends to be treated as 
a fairly fixed concept. While most scholars in the domestic labor debate highlight the 
universality of domestic labor and its gendered characteristics, Molyneux (1979) 
emphasizes the historical and cultural differences of its modality. Even though the 
labor process of housework looks similar across the different societies, the 
development of technology, the marketization of some of domestic services, and the 
state’s involvement in care provision have changed as changes in the “productive 
sphere” have occurred (Molyneux, 1979).  
Domestic labor debates shed lights on the question of how daily needs are met, the 
domestic sphere where these needs are met, and its link to the productive sphere. 
Domestic service is indispensible for reproducing labor whether it is provided in the 
market or non-market by men or women. Women’s unpaid domestic labor in the 
family is a prominent form of organizing this kind of service. As discussed, it 
contributes to lower the cost of reproducing labor and this form is closely linked to the 
women’s subordination. As Molyneux (1979) noted, domestic sphere, which is often 
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regarded as non-capitalist is very part of the capitalist production system and the ways 
in which daily needs are met in the domestic sphere are subject to the cultural and 
historical conditions. Hence, the role of the family in the market, the form of the 
family, the role of women in the family for providing domestic labor and its relation to 
the women’s labor force participation in the market are important questions.  
Cross-border marriage is one way of forming the family. As noted in the introduction, 
the state is actively at times involved in this process. If we hypothesize cross-border 
marriages as an extension to sustain the mechanism of women’s unpaid domestic labor 
in the family, we need to explore what kind of family this marriage exemplifies and 
what the demographic and economic conditions are for this phenomenon by reviewing 
the changes in family patterns, women’s roles in the family, and women’s labor force 
participation. 
2.3 Domains of Social Reproduction in East Asia 
The question of social reproduction in East Asia and its relation to marriage migration 
requires extensive discussion across the topics of population, family, the welfare state, 
and citizenship. East Asian societies have experienced rapid industrialization and 
sociodemographic changes during the last six decades. The family has been the key 
institution for social reproduction in these societies. Rapid industrialization has led to 
a variety of sociodemographic changes including low fertility and an aging population. 
This is linked not only to population size but also to the care of children and elderly 
people, neither of which belong to the productive labor force. At the same time, it 
raises the question of institutional responsibilities for care provision and overall social 
reproduction. Consequently, the family became a locus of addressing this concern. For 
example, the South Korean government has classified “the functional overload of 
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family,” which has played an important role in biological reproduction and care 
provision, as a “new social danger.” How social reproduction has been managed in 
these societies, how this has changed with the rapid economic and sociodemographic 
changes in recent decades, and how the recent increase in marriage migration is linked 
to the discussion of population reproduction, care provision, and citizenship are 
important questions to explore. 
2.3.1 Family as a Site for Observing Changes in the Mechanism of Social 
Reproduction 
The family is an important site for studying social reproduction. There has been a wide 
range of discussion on the roles and functions of the family in the context of historical 
changes. Although the family has been regarded as an important institution in 
capitalist development, it tends to be treated as an ahistorical entity outside of the 
capitalist system, as Molyneux (1979) points out. The emergence of the modern 
family with a particular form and function in relation to other social institutions needs 
to be accounted for simultaneously with the changes in internal dynamics within the 
family. 
Scholars note that the family was increasingly governed through the legal system and 
that its role and function were increasingly redefined in the nineteenth century in 
Europe as the labor market developed alongside capitalism (Laslett 1977, Zaretsky 
1976, Seccombe 1993). It was during this period that the new hybrid form of the 
public and private was constituted and the repartition of institutional responsibilities 
was established with the rise of the new sociality (Deleuze in Donzelot, 1979). Family 
is the milieu where these changes were operating, and they often occurred around the 
question of labor (Donzelot, 1979). Donzelot (1979) noted that the family transformed 
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in the nineteenth century both internally and externally by “medical, educative and 
relational norm to protect children from the old custom” and by family law (p. xx). 
Family laws helped replace the monolithic authority of the father with a dual regime, 
the system of “tutelage” and “contract”. Under “tutelage” “these families [were] 
stripped of all effective rights and brought into a relation of dependence vis-a-vis 
welfare and educative agents” (p. xxi), and “the contract system corresponds to an 
accelerated liberalization of relations, both within and outside of the family” (p. xxi). 
The relation between family and labor is articulated more explicitly by many feminists 
(Hartmann 1981, Mackintosh 1981, Picchio 1992, Seccombe 1993). According to 
Picchio (1992), the institution of the family is important to dealing with the insecurity 
of reproduction in two ways. First, unpaid housework in the family helps lower the 
cost of reproduction.15 Second, the family absorbs the instability of the labor market. 
The state intervenes through various welfare policies when the stability of the labor 
market is undermined by high unemployment and low wages. However, the state does 
not challenge the existing labor market and social organizations fundamentally; rather 
it reinforces the separation between production and reproduction. In this situation, 
women who have offered unpaid housework are caught in a dilemma. Their unpaid 
reproductive work is not recognized and they are regarded as dependent on male wage 
workers who earn enough to support the family. Thus arises the idea that the male 
breadwinner and the family wage contributed to women’s low wages in the labor 
market (Hartmann, 1981). 
                                                 
15 Later, Picchio (2003) revisits the topic of unpaid labor at home and argues that women’s unpaid labor 
contributes to improving the standard of living. 
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Mackintosh (1981) articulates the family in relation to social reproduction in 
contemporary British society by pointing out that the institution of the marriage-based 
household serves the role of social reproduction and is highly structured by gender. 
She emphasizes the reproduction of labor—“not merely the bearing of children but 
also their care and socialization, and the maintenance of adult individuals through their 
lives, processes which create individuals to fit more or less into the social structure of 
society and so ensure the continuation of that society in the next generation” (p. 11). 
She argues that the activities for reproduction are associated with “natural” women’s 
work, and this gender division of labor between production and reproduction is 
expressed in terms of gender identity—masculinity and femininity; however, this 
particular gender division of labor has never been natural. It has been governed under 
the specific governing structure. The state helps maintain this governing structure 
through various kinds of legislation. For example, social service provisions in Britain 
treat women as dependents of men, and legislation on marriage and divorce dictates 
the allocation of public housing (McIntosh, 1978; Land, 1977 in Mackintosh, 1981, p. 
15). In other words, the state has taken part in managing the mechanism of social 
reproduction, in particular managing the family as we know today, even though the 
gender norms within the family is often regarded as “natural”. 
Seccombe (1993) raised the question of why the discourse of the crisis of the family is 
so widespread in contemporary society. He noted that “families change in response to 
the changes in surrounding society, above all, the shifts in prevailing mode of 
production and the structure of state authority and provision” (Seccombe, 1993, p. 
210). He acknowledged that there have been substantial changes in families through 
fertility decline, rise of divorce, married women’s labor force participation, and the 
improvement of women’s legal rights. However, the sense of crisis is often based on 
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the assumption of an ideal status. Hence, the crisis of the family is the crisis of the 
ideal or traditional family, which is a recent invention, rising to preeminence in the 
nineteenth century. In a way, spreading the discourse of the crisis of the family is a 
process of confirming the traditional family. 
2.3.2 Social Reproduction in the Context of the (Non) Welfare State 
State and family are important institutions in the current discussion of social policy. 
Welfare states have been the most prominent entity in the discussion of how services 
for social reproduction are organized. The emergence and decline of the welfare state 
has been regarded as a major historical event in terms of the organizing of social 
reproduction. The meaning of “welfare” is anchored in various levels. The welfare 
state is one of the mechanisms of distributing the wealth of a society, hence 
guaranteeing the living standard of individuals. A socialist state can be classified as a 
welfare state in this sense, but the notion of the welfare state is particularly attached to 
a social/liberal democratic system and postwar capitalism. The welfare state emerged 
in a particular historical context between the 1930s and the 1960s in Europe (Esping-
Anderson, 1999, p. 33). 
Esping-Anderson (1999) differentiates “welfare regime” from “welfare state” by 
defining a welfare regime as “the combined, interdependent way in which welfare is 
produced and allocated between state, market, and family” (p. 34). He identifies three 
major institutions that constitute a welfare regime—state, market, and family—and 
provides three typologies of welfare regime: “state- biased social democratic regime,” 
“market-biased liberal democratic regime,” and lastly “family-biased conservative 
regime” as a response to the feminist critique. 
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There have been many feminist critiques of Esping-Anderson’s work based on its 
gender-blindness, and yet its schematic structure tends to remain or to be slightly 
modified. Orloff (1993) points out that the gender perspective is absent in this 
mainstream welfare-state theory16 and calls for attention to the impacts of state social 
provision on gender relations. Orloff’s (1993) critique can be summarized as follows: 
1) the discussion on social provisions is limited to relations between the state and the 
market. Hence, the distinction between the public and the private corresponds to that 
between the state and the market. Families, which play an important role in social 
provision, are ignored; and 2) the mainstream welfare-state literature assumes that 
women freely choose to participate in the labor market or to stay at home as 
housewives and that state services are available regardless. Hence, it ignores the 
different situations of men and women workers in terms of care labor and access to 
paid work. Orloff (1993) also suggested that the discussion on welfare state needs to 
include “access to paid work” and “the capacity to form and maintain an autonomous 
household.” (p.307)  These are closely linked to the family wage. Orloff (1993) further 
elaborates that the strategies of the women’s movement to gain economic 
independence can be examples of indicators to form and maintain an autonomous 
household—“1) establishing secure incomes for women who engage in full-time 
domestic work and caring for their children; 2) improving access to paid work and 
establishing services that reduce the burden of caring on individual households”—in 
other words, indicators of whether a family wage is guaranteed for full-time 
housewives and whether the state care provision is offered for married women 
workers. She adds that these efforts should be coupled with women’s political 
participation. Orloff’s (1993) overall critique of the mainstream discussion of welfare 
state is adequate and useful when we consider the welfare regime in Korea where the 
                                                 
16 She calls it the “power resource approach” and deals mainly with Esping-Anderson. 
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family has played an important role and the women’s labor force participation was 
closely linked to the economic structural changes. This will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
How or why a certain welfare regime has emerged as it is under global capitalism 
remains unexplored in the welfare and social policy literature. Orloff (1993) 
acknowledges the emergence of social rights in the capitalist development process, 
noting that “the development of social rights reversed the 19th century separation of 
social protection from citizenship. Along with Marshall (1950), scholars of the welfare 
state and social policy maintain that this critical social transformation took 
institutional form in a move away from poor relief to modern social policies, like 
social insurance and universal benefits based on citizenship” (p. 306); however, this 
account is limited to the European context. The historical differences of other parts of 
the world have hardly been explored. The degree and pace of integration into global 
capitalism varies in each economy. However, this process is not unidirectional; hence 
the experience of this integration is not uniform, even though there may be similarities 
among countries. For example, Britain’s experience of integration into global 
capitalism would be very different from South Korea’s or Vietnam’s. If Korea is 
classified as a family-biased welfare regime, how it emerged as such and how it has 
changed with regard to the recent neoliberal economic restructuring are important 
questions.17 
South Korea can be characterized as a family-dependent welfare regime (Lee, J 2005; 
Ma and Lee, J 2007; Lee, H 1999). It may be close to the familialistic regime of 
                                                 
17 There have been studies on welfare states in East Asia (Aspalter 2002, Holliday and Wilding 2003, 
Mishra 2004) and in Korea (Kwon 1999, Lee 1999). However, the discussion tends to remain within the 
framework of mainstream welfare-state research. 
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Esping-Anderson’s terminology. Esping-Anderson (1999) defined a “familialist 
regime” as that in which “one assigns a maximum of welfare obligations to the 
household” (p. 45). However, he does not specify what is meant by welfare 
obligations. In a similar manner, the term “oikonomic welfare,” that is, that “each 
state’s major concern was a good household management based on the faith in the 
family as a provider of welfare,” was used to describe the welfare state in East Asia 
(Jones, 1990 in Holliday and Wilding 2003, pp. 6–7). In my understanding of a 
family-dependent regime, the wealth of the society is redistributed through wages to 
the individual family household and resources are managed for basic care at the level 
of the family unit. Yoo (2005) noted that “welfare” in Korea depends on workers’ 
wages in the vacuum of other public support, and the redistribution of wealth to 
individual households is made through the wage system18 (in Nam 2008). 
This form of welfare regime has been dismantled with the economic restructuring in 
the 1990s. The Korean government’s welfare expenditure increased sharply beginning 
in 1998 after the financial crisis. The irony is that the percentage of wages in total 
sales in business dropped to before the workers movement. In a way, the state welfare 
expenditure increased dramatically,19 but the wages of workers, which had been the 
major source of individual welfare, decreased. The fact that state responsibility 
                                                 
18 Also in the Korean literature on social policy, such terms as “Individual Family Welfare” and “Social 
Network Welfare” are used to describe the characteristics of the welfare regime in Korea (Nam, 2008). 
Support from the social network was a prevalent characteristic of Korean welfare, and later this was 
transferred to individual family welfare through the expansion of private insurance (Nam, 2008). 
19 This is an interesting topic, because neoliberal structuring usually aims to reduce the welfare burden 
of the state, but the Korean government ended up taking on far more responsibility with the 
restructuring process. Korean scholars have debated whether the Korean welfare state is part of a 
neoliberal project (See Nam [2008] for more details). However, whether the current changes in the 
welfare system should be understood as strengthening the state or subordinating the state under the 
market doesn’t seem to be useful to understanding the meaning of this transformation. In my view, it is 
more important to understand the contexts and the meaning of the implementation of welfare policies at 
two different points of time as well as how the formation of the working class played an important role 
in this process.  
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increased does not necessarily mean that Korea is going to experiment with a 
European-type welfare state in the post–World War era. This is rather an inevitable 
intervention in the process of emerging as a more “free” or flexible labor market and a 
result of the more rigid separation between production and reproduction, which 
Picchio (1992) discussed. It raises the questions of how the welfare regime has been 
re-organized in this period and why the Korean state ended up taking more 
responsibility during the neoliberal economic restructuring. 
2.3.2.1 Changing Care Provision in the Context of the Decline of the Welfare State 
Feminist economists have observed the growth of the informal economy and the 
service industry and the feminization of this arena during the last four decades. 
Although the informal economy and the service industry are not equivalent in terms of 
scale, and the notion of service is very broad, the growth of the care industry can be 
understood alongside with the growth of informal economy and service industry 
(Beneria, 2003). The growth of the care industry is often explained in terms of the 
decline of the welfare state in the developed world as the welfare state is pressured to 
reduce its expenditures for social services. This is an important context for the 
feminization of labor migration in recent decades. Privatization of public services is an 
important feature of the reorganizing of social reproduction from a state-based to a 
market-based system. In order to lower costs, migrant workers for the social-service 
sectors, including care services, have been invited to some countries in the global 
North. Governmental policies such as the foreign domestic-helpers programs and the 
foreign care-workers programs in many countries in the Global North indicate that 
governments engage in this process of lowering the costs of social reproduction in 
both the private and public spheres. There is greater demand for occupations that have 
been dominated by women such as nurses, caregivers, nannies, and domestic workers 
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in the developed world. The migration of care workers from the developing world to 
the developed world has increased dramatically, as the emergence of the global care 
chain20 shows. The immobile nature of these services and the pressure to lower their 
costs have allowed the increase in migration, in particular female migration. 
This explains the current trends of the feminization of labor migration plausibly. 
However, only a handful of societies have experimented with state-based welfare 
regimes; not all of them have dealt with the post-welfare-state welfare regime in a 
similar way. How social reproduction is governed outside of Europe has not been 
explored much, except where a country is directly linked to the recent reorganizing 
process. Most states are integrated into the global economy. The ways in which social 
reproduction is organized in various states would be as diverse as the degree and 
modality of participation in the global economy. How social reproduction in societies 
that did not experience a welfare state has been organized and reorganized in the 
recent neoliberal economic restructuring is an important question. 
2.3.2.2 Citizenship 
As shown in the discussion of the welfare state, citizenship cannot be divorced from 
discussions of gender, labor, and social reproduction. Citizenship has been a universal 
ground for the “struggle for redistribution and struggle for recognition,” in Fraser’s 
(1997, p.16) words, during the post–World War II welfare-state period. However, the 
discussion on citizenship relied on the idea of a functioning nation-state, needed to 
shift as the production system was increasingly globalized and the cross-border 
mobility of people increased. 
                                                 
20 This term describes the global migration circuit for reproduction work (Yeats, 2005). 
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Recent feminist discussion on citizenship21 is interlinked to the discussions on 
mobility, production, reproduction, and gender. Ong (2006) highlights the emergence 
of new entitlements that are not necessarily tied to the membership in a nation-state. 
She argues that “binary oppositions between citizenship and statelessness, and 
between national territory and its absence, are not useful for thinking about emergent 
spaces and novel combinations of globalizing and situated variables” (Ong, 2006, p. 
499). Her earlier work sheds light on how citizenship operates in a differentiated 
manner within a national border in the transnational context in the case of workers in a 
free-trade zone (Ong, 2000). While Ong’s (2000) discussion of citizenship is based on 
the economic structural changes caused by the international division of labor in the 
1960s and 1970s and state–market relations, Lister’s (2007) discussion of citizenship 
is based on various minorities whose identity have yet to be fully recognized. In a 
way, this is a continuation of the critique of universality of citizenship and the attempt 
to reconstitute the universality by theorizing the differentiated form of citizenship in 
inclusive directions. She sees “care” as a site where “the intimate/domestic and the 
global tiers of citizenship” are linked (p. 57). She further notes that “a complex web of 
wage-earning and care is spun by migrant women stretching from the intimate private 
sphere of their citizen employers to their countries of origin, with implications for the 
citizenship of all those connected through the global care chain” (Lister et al., 2007, in 
Lister, 2007, p. 57). 
The discussion of citizenship is even more complicated when it comes to cross-border 
marriage, because marriage migration presumes the attainment of citizenship and 
status as a wife and a mother in the family. The most common ways of problematizing 
                                                 
21 Feminist scholars such as Yuval-Davis (1997) analyze the gendered discourse of national identity and 
citizenship in relation to changes in the structure and state mechanism. However, Ong (2000) and 
Lister’s (2007) work seems to directly respond to the economic structural changes and gender.  
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the citizenship of marriage migrants include addressing the gap between legal 
citizenship and its actual practice, or adding “cultural citizenship”22 to Marshall’s 
framework of citizenship, namely political, economic, and social citizenship. Both 
ideas assume citizenship as a universal ground for claims that can be realized through 
institutional mechanisms and substantial social changes; hence the issue becomes the 
increasing institutional capacity of the state. The influx of immigrants sheds light on 
the “new dimension” of the citizenship discussion and it often deploys the focus of the 
discussion from the structural problem of re-distribution of the society to the 
immigrants. Furthermore, the notion of citizenship seems to have been narrowed to a 
bundle of rights, and the relationship between the citizen and the state seems to be a 
social contractual one based on what each party can offer. It dismisses the notion of 
citizenship as a mechanism that generates the membership in the community and its 
historical constitution in terms of state and market relations. For instance, if the 
citizenship is merely a bundle of rights, the marriage migrants who are legally 
recognized as a citizen would not be a topic of discussion. As I argued in the 
discussion on welfare regimes, it is important to explore how the idea of citizenship or 
its equivalent has been sustained and constituted in different parts of the world. For 
example, cross-border marriage in Asia occurred under circumstances of regional 
economic disparity and the need to solve the specific problems of social reproduction 
of the receiving countries. Put crudely, marriage migrants may perform unpaid care 
labor at home and therefore help address the problems of social reproduction in the 
receiving country. It seems that the starting point of the discussion is often the influx 
of marriage migrants and that the discussion tends to move towards “discovering the 
                                                 
22 This includes “the right to be ‘different,’ to re-value stigmatized identities, to embrace openly and 
legitimately hitherto marginalized lifestyles and to propagate them without hindrance. The national 
community, in other words, is defined not only in formal legal, political, and socioeconomic dimensions, 
but also increasingly in a socio-cultural one. Full citizenship involves a right to full cultural 
participation and undistorted representation” (Pakulski, 1997, p. 83, in Lister, 2007, p. 51) 
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citizenship system” of the receiving society. It dismisses the economic structural 
conditions under which the marriage migration occurred and what citizenship means 
in the receiving society, as well as its importance to the discussion of citizenship. 
Turner (2008) suggests that cross-border marriage can be a site of contradictions 
between state and market, which include “the globalization of the economy, the world- 
wide increase in labor migration, the emergence of international marriages and 
geographically dispersed families, low fertility and ageing populations and changing 
definitions of citizenship and legal entitlement” (p. 53). He focuses on the state’s 
interest in population, that is, “securing and enforcing the historic connection between 
reproduction and citizenship,” by using the term “reproductive citizenship.”23 Turner 
(2008) emphasizes the family as “the social mechanisms for the reproduction of 
society through the birth, maintenance and socialization of offspring” in the 
distribution of citizenship entitlements (p. 48). He argues that “the privileged position 
given to heterosexuality in official discourse is a function of how public policies seek 
to normalize reproduction as the desired outcome of marriage” (p. 47). In the context 
of low fertility as well as high fertility, governments intervene in “the private sphere of 
family, becoming increasingly involved in the management of marriage and 
reproduction” (p. 47). Noting the increase in cross-border marriage and the recent low 
fertility in East Asian countries, he notes that cross-border marriage complicates 
citizenship in modern Asia, where the process of citizenship-building is often found in 
the process of building a national identity. His idea is very relevant to the theorizing of 
cross-border marriage and offers points of discussion, but most of it needs to be 
substantiated with empirical cases. Furthermore, his discussion is mainly based on 
                                                 
23 This is in conversation with recent discussion on “sexual citizenship.” Turner (2007) sees that “sexual 
citizenship concerns the rights of sexual consumptions” (p. 53) and proposes reproductive citizenship to 
capture structural concerns of reproduction. 
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state intervention in biological reproduction, although he mentions the complex 
political economic cultural relations around citizenship regarding the link between 
other dimensions of social reproduction and citizenship eclectically. 
2.3.3 Population: Discursive domain for social reproduction 
2.3.3.1 Perception of Population and Labor in the Process of Separating Production 
and Reproduction 
Population has been relatively marginal in the discussion of social reproduction even 
though population is indispensible to the current discussion of economic changes. 
Population is important because it is linked to the concerns around the labor market, 
for example, the idea of productive labor, surplus labor, and dependent population. In 
a way, the field of population represents the ways in which the concern of social 
reproduction is treated in mainstream economic theory. The most influential 
conceptual change on population is from Malthus in the eighteenth century. Malthus 
changed the focus of discussion of labor in the political economy by putting 
population and food in a numerical equation of the price of labor. He noted that 
We will suppose the means of subsistence in any country just equal to the easy 
support of its inhabitants. The constant effort towards population . . . increases 
the number of people before the means of subsistence are increased. The food, 
therefore, which before supported seven millions must now be divided among 
seven millions and a half or eight millions. The poor consequently must live 
much worse, and many of them be reduced to severe distress. The number of 
laborers also being above the proportion of the work in the market, the price of 
labor must tend toward a decrease, while the price of provisions would at the 
same time tend to rise. (Malthus, 2004, p. 24) 
There are two distinctive ideas in the passage above. One is “overpopulation,” which 
refers to the excessive increase of population rather than the increase of the means of 
subsistence. The other is the ways in which the price of labor is determined. Regarding 
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overpopulation, Marx criticized Malthus for transforming the historically distinct 
relations into an abstract numerical relation. According to Marx, 
overpopulation is a historically determined relation, in no way determined by 
abstract numbers or by the absolute limit of productivity of the necessaries of 
life, but by limits posited rather by specific conditions of production . . . never 
a relation to a non-existent absolute mass of means of subsistence, but rather a 
relation to the conditions of reproduction, of the production of these means, 
including likewise the conditions of reproduction of human beings, of the total 
population, of relative surplus population [matter to define overpopulation] 
(pp. 279–278). 
Despite this criticism, the influence of a Malthusian shift on the labor market is 
important. While Ricardo, a prominent political economist of Malthus’ time, tended to 
see the price of labor as determined by the price of reproduction (natural price), 
Malthus suggested that the price of labor is determined by the supply and demand of 
labor (market price) (Picchio, 1992). According to Malthus’ argument, labor is merely 
a commodity in the labor market and its reproduction cost has been overlooked, 
although Malthus acknowledges that people are raised in families. However, the 
tension between natural price of labor and the idea of market price of labor has not 
disappeared. The key issue behind this tension is that how one becomes a labor and 
who takes care of the reproduction.  
Picchio (1992) argues that a set of mechanisms to release this tension has been 
implemented by the state. For example, the idea of the homogenous family emerged in 
England around the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries with the emergence of the 
capitalist labor market, and it naturalized the family as the basic unit of reproduction 
and the woman as a homemaker (Picchio, 1992). In the legislative arena, a law for 
rescuing the poor was implemented with other social-insurance programs (Picchio, 
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1992). This law evidently showed that the market price of labor failed to deal with 
reproduction of labor and that the labor market required this kind of state intervention. 
2.3.3.2 Population Control as a Global Agenda in the Era of International 
Development24 
The global discussion on population and birth-control campaigns can be traced to 
nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century intellectual currents including eugenics, 
discussions on quantity and quality of population, productivity of land for feeding a 
population, nationalism, imperialism, and so forth. The configuration of the 
intellectual trend and campaign around population has changed over time beginning 
with the early twentieth century, but it was generally a movement toward the neo-
Malthusian idea. There are various ways of periodizing and categorizing the 
population discourses and campaigns around population.25 However, it was during the 
post–World War II period that population discourses and campaigns became more 
closely connected to policy and acquired distinctive characteristics in the United 
States; the international campaign for family planning also began around this time. I 
will focus on the postwar period in particular because it was during this time that the 
Korean government started adopting family-planning programs. 
After World War II, the United States launched a vision of international development 
as the leader of a new world order. The rationale for this vision was as follows: “the 
                                                 
24 The Swedish government initiated a family-planning program in the developing countries in the 
1950s, but this section focuses on the context of U.S. international development because economic 
development and population policy in South Korea are more influenced by the United States.  
25 Hodgson and Watkins (1997) focus on the feminist movement and the Malthusian movement within 
the movement on population and periodize it as –1945, 1945–1965, 1965–1974,1974–1985, and 1985–
1995. Sinding (2007) identifies two major movements on population as the feminist movement and the 
Malthusian movement and periodize them as 1952–1966, 1966–1974, 1974–1984, and 1984–1994. 
Greenhalgh (1996) discusses the development of demography and periodizes it as 1929–1945, 1945–
1955, and 1960–1980. Lee and Walt (1995) deal with global family-planning campaigns from the 
perspective of international relations and periodize them as 1950–1974, 1974–1984, 1984, and 1994.  
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essential fabric which would hold new internationalism together would be a new era of 
world commerce and trade. An advanced form of capitalism would prevail. The 
volatility of the business cycle and imperialist excesses of the past would give way to 
an orderly and humane corporatism based on cooperation and consensus” (Sharpless, 
1997, p. 177). One of the key characteristics of this vision is the idea of economic 
development as national industrialization based on the category of the nation-state, 
respecting the national sovereignty. 
Population control gained prominence in the policy arena in the context of 
international development assistance in the 1960s as the neo-Malthusian argument—
for example, that population growth results in high unemployment, declining incomes, 
and economic stagnation; or that famine, disease, and deprivation can be managed 
through managing population size—gained currency (Sharpless, 1997, p. 178). This 
idea fits in with the concerns of the national labor market, including the number of 
laborers, the level of wages, and the ratio of the dependent population. The United 
States Agency for International Development (USAID) established a population office 
in 1964 (La Cheen 1986 in Koivusalo and Ollila, 1997). Since the 1960s, a sizable 
portion of U.S. nonmilitary foreign aid has been aimed at reducing the fertility of the 
developing world. USAID became the largest donor to the population program (3.9 
billion USD) between 1968 and 1988 (Donaldson and Tsui, 1990). “Population 
control” became an important component of U.S. foreign assistance by the 1970s 
(Sharpless, 1996, p. 195). The construction of the idea of population control indicates 
that population was integrated into the macro political economic concern of 
international economic development and nation-building in the developing world for 
the purposes of “securing the world order” (Sharpless, 1996). 
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There was a dramatic change in population trends in East Asia in the second half of 
the twentieth century. This is not surprising in light of these countries’ rapid 
industrialization. In particular, the decline of fertility and the changes in family 
patterns in East Asian countries were conspicuous. While fertility control was an 
important population-policy agenda during the 1960s and 1970s, by the 1990s and 
2000s low fertility had become a national issue in much of East Asia, including Japan, 
Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore, during the 1990s and 2000s. The decline in 
fertility and family size is closely linked to the concerns of labor and care provision, 
and it helps explain the active state involvement in issues of marriage and family in 
these countries. 
2.4 Summary: Social Reproduction, Gender, and Mobility 
In the beginning of this chapter, I noted that the trends of labor migration and marriage 
migration are similar. I asked whether marriage migration can be explained in terms of 
theories of labor migration. I identified two major differences associated with the 
theorizing of marriage migration: citizenship, and its more subtle economic 
implications. Although current theories of labor migration offer a general framework 
for marriage migration, these two points need to be addressed more explicitly. The 
framework of “social reproduction,” with its three dimensions of biological 
reproduction, reproduction of labor, and reproduction of the totality of a society, offers 
ground for the theorizing of marriage migration. I briefly presented a discussion of 
each dimension on how biological reproduction and labor reproduction link to 
production and reproduction of the totality of a society. Among these discussions, I 
paid particular attention to the feminist discussion on unpaid domestic work / care 
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work as a key work for the reproduction of labor. I saw the current discussion on the 
feminization of labor, the informalization of female labor, and the reorganization of 
welfare regimes as an extension of the feminist debates on social reproduction in the 
1970s. 
In particular, the feminization of labor migration is an important phenomenon that is 
clearly associated with the current economic changes such as the reorganization of the 
mechanisms of social reproduction, the informalization of female labor, and the 
feminization of labor. It also reveals some of the relations among gender, production, 
reproduction, and mobility. Mobility tends to be associated with the power of capital. 
The mobile nature of capital and commodities, and the immobile nature of labor, has 
dominated the understanding of the relationship between capital and labor. Feminist 
economists have focused on women’s labor force participation in the global South 
under the international division of labor in the 1960s. Women’s labor force 
participation continued to increase with the growth of the service industry. What is 
intriguing about the recent feminization of labor migration trend is that the immobile 
nature of reproductive services engendered the mobility of workers. For example, 
people need basic services such as food provision, clean housing, and health care. In 
an economic sense, mobility serves capital accumulation by reducing the cost of 
reproduction. 
Can marriage migration be placed in the discourse of the feminization of labor 
migration? As I noted earlier, many of the economic implications of marriage 
migration are more subtle than those of labor migration, and marriage migration more 
typically involves the attainment of citizenship and possible biological reproduction. 
Hence, marriage migration cannot be simply located in the discourse of the 
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feminization of labor migration. However, it is worth exploring the historical 
specificity of the processes within a given society. The feminization of labor migration 
was largely based on the experience of the decline of the welfare state in the global 
North. Other parts of the world, which relied on different institutional arrangements 
for social reproduction, may or may not face the same types of problem regarding 
social reproduction or may deal with their problems in a different manner. For 
example, in the case of Korea, the family has played an important role in all 
dimensions of social reproduction. Recent changes in economic structure, labor 
market, and family patterns have challenged traditional arrangement of social 
reproduction, resulting in the current crises of population and care. In other words, if 
countries in the global North dealt with the pressure to lower the cost of care at the 
moment of the decline of the welfare state through labor migration, countries in Asia, 
in particular Korea, may choose to deal with the current population and care crisis 
through marriage migration. This is a question that should be substantiated with 
thorough studies of the changes in the ways in which social reproduction has been 
organized in Korean society. I attempt to shed light on some of the relations around 
social reproduction and cross-border marriage in Korea in this thesis. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
LOCATING CROSS-BORDER MARRIAGE IN THE CONTEXT OF SOCIAL 
REPRODUCTION IN ASIA: METHODOLOGY 
3.1. Historical Approach 
What B does now can only be explained in terms of its relationship to what A 
did before in such settings: we have to see it as a moment in a sequence. We 
are forced to recognize here that it is not social structure as a timeless world 
of facts or social action as a timeless world of meanings but history that is the 
proper subject matter of sociology—that structure and meaning are related 
through action in time.  
—Abrams, Historical Sociology, 1982, p. 7 
The phenomenon of cross-border marriage offers an opportunity to explore historical 
changes in the political-economic conditions for, meanings of, and relations among 
categories such as production/reproduction, public/private, market/non-market, and 
gender. The purpose of this study is not to theorize the universal characteristics of 
cross-border marriage but rather to draw attention to the historical specificity of the 
emergence of cross-border marriage between Vietnam and Korea by exploring the 
concrete structural conditions that led to it. 
The historical approach distinctively focuses on processes. In other words, the 
historical approach does not take social categories as fixed; rather, it pays attention to 
their constantly changing meaning and to the relations among them. Hence, questions 
take the form of “why” or “how” rather than “what.” Abrams (1982) points out that as 
the question changes from “what” to “why,” our sociology becomes historical; but 
“why” questions should be contained within “how” questions if we are to undertake 
genuine historical analysis. Exploring these why and how questions is a process of 
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examining the changing relations and meanings of various social categories. They are 
not merely conceptual; they are grounded in political, economic, and social change.  
Why and how cross-border marriages happen in a grand scale in East Asia at this 
moment is a primary question of this research. As discussed earlier, it requires the 
exploration of the political economic changes of both East Asia as a receiving region 
and Southeast Asia as a sending region. I discuss this issue with the case of marriage 
between Korean men and Vietnamese women. Mapping out the trends of cross-border 
marriages in East and Southeast Asia, Jones and Shen (2008) noted it is a visible 
social phenomenon in this region.  In particular, the marriage between Korean men 
and Vietnamese women increased in a dramatic pace in the 2000s. Considering that 
Korea is an ethnically homogeneous society and the attitude towards international 
marriage was rather conservative, if not negative, the dramatic increase in marriage 
between Korean men and Vietnamese women begs for attention. In addition, the fact 
that the local government promotes international marriage and that international 
marriage brokerages were able to proliferate in Korea also requires further scrutiny.     
3.2 Data and Ethnography of Statistics 
Sociologists analyze a variety of types of data, and each type only serves as a proxy 
for a social reality. In this research, I use publicly produced data, including statistics, 
government documents, and newspapers26. This project starts with numbers, which 
demonstrate the trends of cross-border marriages, the socio-demographic 
characteristics of the families involved, and the demographic conditions of this 
phenomenon. However, this project ultimately attempts to connect these data to other 
                                                 
26 These and other data are not free from errors or from the politics of representation. The extent to 
which the data are incomplete or inaccurate is not known, however. 
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sources of information about political, economic, and cultural changes in order to 
enhance the understanding of the phenomenon of cross-border marriage. In order to do 
so, I have also reviewed policy papers, laws, newspapers, and various types of 
statistical data produced by the National Statistical Office and the relevant ministries. 
The full list of secondary data sources I have used in this research is shown in Table 
3.1. 
Secondary statistical data were used to explain the socio-demographic characteristics 
of cross-border marriage as well as the demographic and economic conditions in 
Korea and Vietnam. For the demography of cross-border marriage, foreign-residents 
surveys from the Ministry of Administration and Security in Korea, annual 
immigration statistical data from the Ministry of Justice in Korea, various statistics 
from the National Statistical Office, including vital statistics in Korea and visa 
statistics from the Korean embassy and consulate in Vietnam, were used. Surveys 
conducted by government and research institutes including the 2009 National Survey 
on Multicultural Families were also used as a reference. For the demographic 
conditions of cross-border marriage, Korean census data (National Statistical Office), 
Korean agricultural census data (National Statistical Office), Korean vital statistics 
from the period 1970–2010 (National Statistical Office), Vietnam census data for 1989 
and 1999 (General Statistical Office), data from the Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 
(General Statistical Office), and Migration Survey (UNIFA) data were used. Statistical 
data from international agencies such as World Development Indicators, World Bank 
Gender statistics, and UNICEF country information were also used as a reference. For 
socioeconomic conditions in Korea, National Finance (National Assembly Budget 
Office), Time Use Survey (National Statistical Office), National Survey of Fertility, 
Family Health and Welfare in Korea (Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs), 
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Annual Statistics for Women (Korea Women’s Development Institute), Annual 
Statistics for Health and Welfare (Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs) were 
reviewed. For general migration trends, the UN International Migration Stock and 
Global Migrant Origins databases were reviewed. 
The archival research in this project is mostly based on newspapers, laws, and policy 
papers. I gained access to information about pertinent laws in Korea through the 
Ministry of Government Legislation (http://www.moleg.go.kr/main.html). Laws in 
Vietnam were accessed through the Web resources Vietnam Law and Legal Forum 
(http://news.vnanet.vn/vietnamlaw). Policy papers of the Korean government, 
published by the relevant ministries including the Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Family Affairs, the Ministry of Gender Equality, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry 
of Food, Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Ministry of Public Administration 
and Security, as well as local councils’ minutes, were reviewed. In the case of 
Vietnam, policy papers published by the government in English were reviewed. Most 
of these were published by international agencies in conjunction with the Vietnamese 
government. 
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Table 3.1 List of Major Statistical Data 
Data Year Publisher 
Korea   
Census 2000, 2005 National Statistical Office 
Vital Statistics-marriage, divorce 1992–2006 National Statistical Office 
Immigration office data 2000–2007 Immigration office/Ministry of Justice  
Agricultural Census 2000, 2005 National Statistical Office 
National Finance/Account 2006, 2008 National Assembly Budget Office 
Time Use Survey 1999, 2004 National Statistical Office 
Child Care Survey 2009 Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family 
Survey on the Korean Women 
Farmers 
2003 Korea Women’s Development Institute/Ministry of 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery 
National Survey of Fertility, 
Family Health and Welfare 
in Korea 
2003, 2006 Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs 
Marriage Migrants Survey 2006 Ministry of Gender Equality and Family 
Foreign Residents Survey 2007, 2009 Ministry of Administration and Autonomy 
National Survey on Multicultural 
Families 
2009 Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs 
Annual Statistics for Women 2006 Korea Women’s Development Institute 
Annual Statistics for Health and 
Welfare 
 Korea Institute of Health and Social Affairs 
Household Income and 
Expenditure Survey 
 National Statistical Office 
Wage Structure Survey  Ministry of Labor 
Vietnam   
Census 1989, 1999 General Statistical Office 
Statistical Yearbook 2005, 2008 General Statistical Office 
UNIFA Vietnam  http://vietnam.unfpa.org/publications.htm 
International   Webpage 
World Development Indicators  http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-
development-indicators 
World Bank Gender Statistics  http://genderstats.worldbank.org 
UN International Migration 
Stock 
 http://esa.un.org/migration 
Global Migrant Origin Database  http://www.migrationdrc.org/research/typesofmigrati
on/global_migrant_origin_database.html 
UNICEF Country Info  http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/repkorea_statist
ics.html 
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3.3 Details of Field Research 
Besides the publicly produced data, I also collected data through my own field 
research. How the data from my field research and my experience in the field needs to 
be addressed briefly, however. There are several theoretical and methodological 
concerns that students of sociology grapple with, such as structural–individual 
relations and multilevel—for example, local, national, and global—analysis. Although 
I went to the field with a fairly well-defined conceptual framework and research 
proposal, both were challenged during my fieldwork experience.  
The information, which I obtained in the field through the observation and interviews, 
enriched my understanding of my research subject. It also led me to modify my 
theoretical framework and my research focus. I discuss some of the details of my 
fieldwork in this section on methods to explain the process of the field research itself. 
I also return to it later on to describe my understanding of the process of cross-border 
marriage. 
My field research was conducted in multiple sites in Korea and Vietnam from 
September 2007 to July 2008. I spent the first month establishing contacts and 
mapping out the institutional configuration in each country. While I reviewed 
government documents, policy papers and newspapers, I also talked to numerous 
people in the governments, NGOs and the academy. The relevant institutions in Korea 
are summarized in the Table 3.2. Then, I moved to the rural area and conducted 
participant observation and interviews. My interviews with Vietnamese marriage 
migrants and their husbands in Korea were conducted in the first phase. I then moved 
49 
to Vietnam and visited my interviewees’ hometowns and interviewed their family 
members and neighbors. I was affiliated with the International Organization for 
Migration in Ho Chi Minh City as an intern. While I was staying in Ho Chi Minh City, 
I established contacts with the Women’s Union, a governmental organization, which is 
in charge of issues of cross-border marriages. There I reviewed reports published by 
international agencies and NGOs. Overall, 14 Vietnamese marriage migrants, 11 of 
their husbands in Korea, 22 parents of marriage migrants, and 15 single women in a 
primary sending neighborhood were also interviewed27. In addition, I interviewed 3 
brokers and observed in the process of marriage brokerage arranged by a commercial 
agency. In Vietnam, I witnessed Korean bridegrooms’ selecting their prospective 
Vietnamese wives, and joined them on the city tour with their prospective spouses 
over the course of three days.  
 
 
                                                 
27 A full list of interviewees is shown in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.2 List of Relevant Institutions  
Korea 
Governmental Organizations and Research Institutes 
Ministry of Gender 
Equality28 
in charge of general family policies and runs a 
national network of Marriage Migrants Support 
Centers
Korea Women’s 
Development Institute 
Ministry of Justice runs the Immigration Office  
Ministry of Health, 
Welfare and Family 
Affairs 
traditionally dealt with population and family 
policies in recent decades 
Korea Institute of 
Health and Social 
Affairs 
Ministry of Food, 
Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishery  
sees cross-border marriage in terms of rural 
bachelor issues 
 
Ministry of 
Administration and 
Security 
Started to produce foreign resident survey from 
2007 
 
The Low Fertility, 
Aging Society 
Commission 
deals with cross-border marriage and multicultural 
families in terms of national population issues 
 
The National Human 
Rights Commission  
addresses human rights violations in the process of 
cross-border marriage and human rights issues 
within the lives of multicultural families
 
National Assembly   
The Committee for 
Women  
deal with issues of marriage migrants and 
multicultural families 
 
 
The Committee for 
Health, Welfare and 
Family 
  
Governmental Program for Multicultural Family under the Ministry of Gender Equality 
Central Office for 
Multicultural Family 
Support Centers 
 
Develops and distributes the support program for 
multicultural family, runs the pilot policy project 
for multicultural families, trains and evaluates the 
social workers for the programs, supports the 
management of local centers, and deals with the 
public relations 
http://liveinkorea.mog
ef.go.kr/changelocale.
do 
Local Multicultural 
Family Support 
Centers 
 
Offers educational program including Korean 
language, cultural integration, childcare, job 
training, and counseling and translating services. 
 
Emergency Support 
Center for Migrant 
Women 
Emergency call center for domestic violence http://www.wm1366.
or.kr/ 
                                                 
28 The regime changed in February 2008, and the composition and name of the ministry has changed. 
One of the major change regarding cross-border marriage is that family affair has moved from the 
Ministry of Gender Equality and Family (now the Ministry of Gender Equality) to the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare (now the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs). Later, it was moved 
back to the Ministry of Gender Equality in 2010. 
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Table 3.2 List of Relevant Institutions (Continued) 
Korea 
Governmental Program for Multicultural Family under the Ministry of Gender Equality 
Pre-departure 
Orientation Program in 
Ho Chi Minh City 
Awareness program for Vietnamese brides 
supported by Ministry of Gender Equality in 
Korea, Women’s Union in Vietnam, IOM and run 
by the Korean Committee for UN Human Rights 
Policy 
 
 
 
Non-Governmental Organizations29 
The Korean Migrant 
Women’s Human 
Rights Center 
started as a support group for women migrant 
workers in 2001, extended its mission to all 
migrant women in Korea in 2003 and 
established a migrant women’s emergency 
hotline service in 2006 
 
The Ansan 
Immigrant Center  
established the Migrant Women Counseling 
Center in 2005 and Kosian’s30 House in 2000, 
which engages in the issue of second-
generation cross-border-marriage couples. 
 
The Association for 
Foreign Workers’ 
Human Rights in 
Pusan  
established the Migrant Women and 
Multicultural Family Center in 2005 
 
 
 
                                                 
29 Before this network of Multicultural Family Support Center was established, a number of local NGOs 
took care of issues associated with marriage migrants and multicultural families. As this network was 
established, some of these groups were integrated into this network because funds for Marriage Migrant 
Support Centers were distributed to the local groups who run programs for marriage migrants. In a way, 
local Marriage Migrants Support Centers in the network share the same source of funding and a certain 
schema for supporting marriage migrants; however, the operation of the local center is up to the 
organization that runs the local Marriage Migrants Support Center. When it comes to the local level, the 
boundary between the government and NGO is not entirely clear. NGOs who took initiative on the 
issues around cross-border marriage were those who support migrant workers. Some organizations, 
such as the Ansan Immigrant Center and the Korean Human Rights Center for Migrant Workers, had a 
regular gathering among cross-border marriage couples but most of them were couples of female 
Korean workers and male migrant workers in Korea. As marriage migration increased, the needs for 
supporting marriage migrants were necessary. In addition, the cases of domestic violence of marriage 
migrants were often reported to the counseling services of NGOs supporting migrant workers. These 
NGOs transferred the cases to women’s groups because NGOs supporting migrant workers usually 
offered legal counseling for labor-related issues. However, women’s groups who dealt with violence 
against women did not have enough experience and resources to assist marriage migrants. Gradually, 
some of the NGOs supporting migrant workers developed their own programs for marriage migrants. 
30 This word is composed of the words “Korean” and “Asian.” 
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Table 3.3 List of Interviewees 
In Korea In Vietnam 
Name 
Year of 
Birth/Age Name 
Year of 
Birth/Age Name 
Year of 
Birth/Age Name 
Year of 
Birth/Age 
Vietnamese women who 
married Korean men 
Korean Husband and 
family Single women Parents 
VWK1 1984 KH1 44 VW1 1976 VF1 71 
VWK2 1983 KF1  VW2* 1989 VM1 53 
VWK3 1980 KH2 44 VW3 1987 VF2 1953 
VWK4 1986 KH3 48 VW4* 1985 VM2 1950 
VWK5 1984 KH4 42 VW5 1977 VF3 1965 
VWK6 1984 KH5 40 VW6 1993 VM3 1966 
VWK7 1980 KH6 37 VW7 1990 VM4  
VWK8 1973 KH7 39 VW8 1986 VF5 1953 
VWK9 1985 KH8 45 VW9 1983 VM5 1958 
VWK10 1986 KF2 43 VW10 1978 VM6 1965 
VWK11 1984 VM0  VW11 1990 VM7 1958 
VWK12 1982   VW12 1990 VF8 1951 
VWK13 1983   VW13 1989 VM8 1956 
VWK14 1974   VW14 1990 VM9 1964 
      VW15 1988 VM10 1947 
      VM11 69 
      VM12 1957 
      VM13 1963 
Brokers*  VM14 40 
BV1      VM15 1956 
BK1 43     VF16 1955 
BK2      VM16 1961 
        
Note. KH=Korean Husband, KF=Korean Family Member, VWK=Vietnamese Women 
marriage migrant in Korea, VW=Single Vietnamese Women, VW*=Vietnamese Women who 
married Korean men but wait for the paper work, VF=Vietnamese Father, VM=Vietnamese 
Mother, BV= Broker in Vietnam, BK=Broker in Korea 
*BV1 and BK1 were interviewed in Vietnam 
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3.4 Process of Field Research 
Initially, I identified three potential field sites, counties in Kyongsang province, Cholla 
province, and Chungcheong province in Korea, based on the size of their marriage-
migrant populations, their environments (rural-urban), and the vitality of their local 
marriage-migrant support groups. The assessment was made based on the 2006 
Marriage Migrant Survey and the media coverage of NGOs. All three are mostly rural 
areas with large marriage-migrant populations and active local support groups for 
marriage migrants. Among these factors, the accessibility of the marriage-migrants 
support group was an important one in choosing the field site because these groups are 
the focal point where migrant women gather, and it was not easy to contact 
Vietnamese women who married Korean men without their assistance. I realized that 
it took a considerable amount of time to build a trusting relationship with the NGO 
workers and even more time to break the ice with the Vietnamese women who 
regularly participated in the centers’ programs. Eventually, I decided to focus on one 
place and to spend enough time to establish relationships with before interviewing 
Vietnamese women. 
I decided to do field research in Dangjin county in Chungnam province based on my 
preliminary research for the following reasons: 1) it has an average-size population of 
marriage migrants; 2) this county is classified as a rural area but it has a good 
combination of rural and urban characteristics; and 3) the Dangjin Cultural Center was 
active in bringing marriage migrants together by offering language and cultural 
programs, although it gained less media attention than the other two areas in 
Kyoungsang province and Cholla province. The primary purpose of this center is to 
offer art classes to local residents. Five regular staff members and two other volunteers 
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worked for this center. Among them, only one staff member and one volunteer are in 
charge of running the program for marriage migrants. That made it relatively easy to 
contact the organizer in the center and the Vietnamese participants in the programs. 
I joined the Dangjin Cultural Center to work as an intern, and I spent three months 
there before I conducted interviews. As an intern, I went to the center every day and 
participated in most of the programs in which Vietnamese women participated, for 
example, e.g. Korean language class, knitting class, quilting class, cooking class, and 
child-care class. I also helped organize events for marriage migrants. Several weeks 
later, I was able to join in casual conversations with the participants, and sometimes I 
was asked to join their meals or go on an outing to the market after class, or to stay 
over at their homes. 
I combined participant observation with interviews in order to understand the process 
of marriage migration. Seeing the women’s living environment and learning about the 
center’s programs, and the group dynamics in the center were all important. 
Furthermore, spending enough time with women before their interviews was also 
important not only for the quality of interviews but also for ethical reasons. 
Researchers are responsible for the ways in which interviewees are represented and 
none of the researchers are free from the risk of misrepresenting their interviewees. 
The best possible way to avoid this risk is by paying close attention to the interviewees 
and their social context and by spending adequate time with them. Throughout the 
fieldwork experience, I developed more complete understanding of my interviewees’ 
social backgrounds and their stories. I heard from an organizer of the center that a 
couple of surveys or short interviews had been conducted previously, but that no one 
had spent sufficient time with the participants before doing research. The perception 
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was Given that a few studies had already been conducted, I tried to select people who 
had not taken part in other interviews among participants at the center. 
I helped compile the database of information about Vietnamese participants at the 
Dangjin Cultural Center. Among 86 registered participants, about 30 participated in 
programs fairly regularly. I made a short list of 24 based on their background 
information including family settings, husband’s occupation, and year of entry in 
Korea, and contacted them to ask whether they would be interested in participating in 
my research. Most of them responded positively at the beginning. Unfortunately, 
many of those who had arrived in Korea recently and had stayed in Korea less than 6 
months later withdrew their acceptance because their husbands were not happy about 
it. Between December and January I interviewed 14 Vietnamese women who had 
married Koreans. Although this is a small number of interviews, the narratives began 
to be repeated and I decided to change the direction of the interview.  
A Vietnamese translator who had volunteered for the center assisted me in my 
research. Her involvement made interviewing much easier because she knew most of 
the participants very well. She often added background information regarding 
participants after the interviews. In addition, the center’s coordinator, who has played 
an important role as a mediator of any family conflicts, provided additional 
information about the family after each interview. Interviews were conducted either at 
the interviewee’s house or at the center, depending on the interviewee’s preference. 
An interview normally took 80 to 120 minutes, but informal conversation over meals 
or snacks continued often for hours after the interview. Interviews were conducted in 
Korean by me and translated into Vietnamese by a translator. Most interviewees 
preferred to speak in Vietnamese, but sometimes they spoke in Korean as well. 
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Interviews were audio-recorded if interviewees permitted, and I also took notes during 
the interviews.  
After each interview, the summary of interview was written in English and the 
contents were cross checked with the translator. Audio recordings were partially 
transcribed. Although the interviews were very informative, I realized that interviews 
are one method for opening up other conversations and relationships. Once the 
interviews were conducted, I was able to have more intimate conversations with the 
interviewees and to participate more often in informal gatherings. Much of this 
experience was written in the field notes that I kept every day in Korean. I also had 
chances to talk with interviewees’ husbands and family members. I added notes about 
conversations at the end of interview notes or field notes. The interviewing of Korean 
husbands and in-laws of Vietnamese women unfolded naturally. I interviewed 8 
Korean husbands and 2 in-laws. 
Reducing boundaries between interviewer and interviewee is clearly important in this 
type of research. I had to struggle between distance and immersion, however. Initially, 
I had concerns about when to ask certain questions and in what way. When I spoke 
with the interviewees’ Korean husbands or in-laws in Korean, this concern became 
more acute. Given my social location, I often found it more difficult to talk with 
Korean husbands than with Vietnamese wives. This may be because I did not have a 
chance to get to know the Korean husbands, however I met their wives on a regular 
basis for three months. I also felt certain that different sets of norms were operating 
between their (older, less-educated, working-class) Korean husbands and me, a 
(single, younger, highly educated, female) researcher, at least in a subtle way. 
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After conducting all the interviews, I contacted people in the rural part of Dangjin and 
stayed there for a week. Although I conducted research at the Dangjin Cultural Center 
which was located in the urban part of the county and often visited my interviewees’ 
house, I felt that it is important to stay in the rural area for certain period of time and 
to understand the social life in the rural community. The visit helped me gain a real 
sense of their isolation, both physically and emotionally. Since it was winter, most of 
the old people, who are the majority of residents, gathered together in a town hall. I 
was able to spend some time talking with them, about agriculture and cross-border 
marriages there in the town hall. 
I also conducted research in Vietnam from February 2008 to June 2008. I was based in 
the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Ho Chi Minh City from 
February to May. I strategically chose IOM as a host institution because the IOM in 
Ho Chi Minh City was running the pre-departure orientation program for Vietnamese 
women who married Korean men and because it has archived substantial migration 
research, including that pertaining to marriage migration. Moreover, it was important 
that their working language is English since I am not fluent in Vietnamese. The 
Vietnamese staff members at IOM assisted me in arranging a meeting with the 
Women’s Union; they gave me very helpful advice when I met with interviewees in 
rural areas, and they helped me deal with Vietnamese governmental organizations. 
The first two months were spent conducting library research, institutional mapping, 
and preparing for interviews. Due to my Vietnamese-language constraints, I focused 
on reviewing the available English literature. The library of the IOM in Hanoi was a 
good source of Vietnamese government publications in English and other publications 
on Vietnam by various international organizations. I also contacted relevant ministries 
and government organizations such as the Ministry of Labor, Invalids and Social 
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Affairs (MOLISA), the Viet Nam Committee on Population, Family and Children 
(CPFC), and the Women’s Union to gain more information; Unfortunately, it turned 
out that contacting the governmental organization was often not very useful because 
sharing government information with the public was not common at the time. 
Among these governmental organizations, the Women’s Union deals with the issue of 
cross-border marriage directly with the assistance of the Ministry of Justice and the 
police department. In Vietnam, commercially arranged marriages are illegal. The only 
institution authorized to deal with cross-border marriage is the Women’s Union. It is a 
national popular organization that reaches to the grassroots level. Currently, nine 
Marriage Support Centers are in operation in Vietnam under the supervision of the 
Women’s Union. Marriage Support Centers assist cross-border marriages legally, in 
other words, without commercial transactions. However, these centers are not active 
enough to replace the commercial brokerage industry. 
Some governmental and nongovernmental research institutes have published papers on 
this issue. The Southern Institute of Social Science and the Institute for Social 
Development Studies have conducted research on cross-border marriage between 
Vietnamese and foreign nationals. In addition, a number of international organizations 
or NGOs, including IOM, Action Aid, Mobility Research and Support Center have 
worked on the issue of trafficking. In Vietnam, cross-border marriages are often 
discussed in the context of trafficking in women. 
There are several Korean NGOs who do transnational work regarding marriage 
migration in Vietnam. They work in both Korea and Vietnam and have launched new 
programs for Vietnamese marriage migrants. The Korea Center for United Nations 
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Human Rights Policy and the International Organization for Migration in Ho Chi 
Minh City have launched a pre-departure orientation program for Vietnamese 
marriage migrants with the cooperation of the Ministry of Gender Equality and the 
Vietnam Women’s Union in 2007. Since I was working closely with these groups, I 
was able to access various data including a survey of Vietnamese participants of the 
program. There are other Korean NGOs that are based in Hanoi. For example, the 
Vietnamese Women’s Culture Center started its program in 2007 in Korea and opened 
an office in Vietnam in 2007. The Korean Foundation also opened an office in 
Vietnam and launched a pre-departure education program in Hanoi in 2007. 
The role of the Korean consulate in Ho Chi Minh City was important because nearly 
80% of the visas for Vietnamese marriage migrants are issued there. Even a “marriage 
migrants support officer” was sent to this consulate from the Korean government. 
Since I was based in IOM, I was able to establish a working relationship with the 
Korean consulate. I was able to attend various meetings and workshops on the issue of 
cross-border marriage, organized by the Korean consulate. I occasionally spent a 
whole morning either sitting in front of or inside the Korean consulate to observe the 
crowds who were visiting the consulate for visas. Occasionally, some casual 
conversation happened with Vietnamese women who had married Koreans or 
Vietnamese workers who had been working in Korea. 
The Korean community in Vietnam illustrates one form of the cultural exchanges 
between Korea and Vietnam. It is relevant as a contributing factor for migration. 
Although learning about the Korean community in Vietnam was not part of my 
research agenda, as a Korean, I learned about it anyway. The Korean community in 
Vietnam is quite large. It is also physically visible because Koreans live in particular 
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areas, for example, the newly built cities near Ho Chi Minh City such as Phu My 
Huong and An Phu. The representation of the Korean community in Vietnam is 
overwhelmingly associated with wealth, modernity, and development. I talked with 
people in the Korean community in Vietnam from the Korean consulate, the Korea 
Trade-Investment Promoting Agency (KOTRA), and Korean international schools. I 
also visited a private Korean-language institute and talked with a manager because the 
mobility toward Korea, including labor migration, study abroad, and marriage 
migration, is well understood there. The popularity of the Korean-language school 
indicates the sentiments about Korea among young Vietnamese.  
During the research period in Vietnam, four of the Vietnamese women I had 
interviewed in Korea visited their families in Vietnam. While they visited their 
families, they invited me to join their trips in Thu Duc, Tay Ninh, Can Tho, and Dong 
Nai. Often I stayed at their parents’ houses for several days or more as a Korean friend 
of their daughters. It was a great chance to observe and participate in the lives of their 
families and neighborhoods. Since a significant number of my interviewees in Korea 
came from the Tay Ninh area, I decided to interview families and neighbors there. Tay 
Ninh is about two hours away from the Ho Chi Minh City and had been one of the 
biggest sending regions of brides in Vietnam until the local government took a 
restrictive policy towards cross-border marriages in the late 2000s. I also decided to 
interview the family and neighbors of one of my interviewees near the Ho Chi Minh 
City area in order to compare the experiences and attitudes of people in the rural and 
the urban areas. I interviewed one interviewee’s mother and two sisters and two of 
their neighbors (four single young women) in the urban area. Interviewing people in 
the urban area went well, without any trouble from the Vietnamese authorities. For 
example, my interviewee’s family did not report to the police that I stayed overnight in 
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their house; however, I had to report to the local authority when I visited some parts of 
Tay Ninh. 
To conduct research in Vietnam as a foreigner, I needed to obtain permission from the 
Vietnamese authorities. Consulting with other researchers, I found that the standard is 
not applied equally. I learned that authorities are not very concerned about researchers 
interviewing people in urban areas but that interviewing people in the rural areas is 
another matter. Hence, I contacted a local authority in charge of this issue, in this case 
the Tay Ninh Women’s Union, with the assistance of IOM. I submitted a written 
research proposal and questionnaire. One of the Vietnamese women who had married 
a Korean man had been killed in Korea around that time,31 and cross-border marriage 
had become an extremely sensitive issue. The Tay Ninh Women’s Union asked me to 
obtain approval from the Central Women’s Union in Hanoi. With the efforts of 
various IOM staff members, I finally met with an officer in Hanoi, explained my 
research and assured her that my research would follow the protocols of the Internal 
Review Board of the Cornell University and adhere to an ethical code of conduct. It 
typically takes about three months from the time you contacted them until you were 
able to schedule interviews. The Women’s Union had the power to permit or disallow 
my interviews, and there was very little room for negotiation. I suggested to the 
Women’s Union the number of interviewees, the criteria of interviewees, and the 
length of interviews. However, I was not given adequate detailed information about 
my interviewees until I arrived in Tay Ninh. 
When I arrived at the Tay Ninh Women’s Union, the translator and I were introduced 
to the chair of the Tay Ninh Women’s Union and we then moved to the village, where 
                                                 
31 It was reported as a suicide but some suspected that it was a murder. 
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local union members recruited interviewees with two officers. When we arrived at the 
house of one of the local Women’s Union members, 5 mothers whose daughters had 
married foreign men (1 Taiwanese and 4 Korean), 5 single women, and 6 local 
women’s members were waiting for us. Since we had arrived with two Women’s 
Union members and since two members of the Department of Foreign Affairs joined 
later, 10 people from the government were present as observers. Ten observers were 
sitting on one side facing 10 interviewees on the other. I suggested changing the 
seating arrangement, but they said that they were fine with this. In addition to the odd 
physical setting, I experienced huge time pressure because all the interviewees were 
waiting there. I did not feel that I could keep them there all day, although I was 
permitted to do so. Due to the time constraints, I decided to conduct a group interview. 
I split the interviewees into two groups, mothers and single women. First I conducted 
the interview with the group of mothers and then with the group of single women. I 
asked a question and each individual in the group answered a question. Sometime, 
participants developed a conversation among one another. The first group interview 
lasted about two hours and the other one lasted about an hour. After the interviews, I 
compared notes with my translator and wrote interview notes. The interview went 
surprisingly fast compared with interviews I had conducted before. I assume that this 
is because they were prepared for the interview with the submitted questionnaire. It 
was hard to verify their answers because I had never met them before and because my 
translator and I were not allowed to stay in the village. 
After this interview, I thought that it was important to have another set of interviews in 
which authorities would not be involved. I decided to visit the families of the marriage 
migrants whom I interviewed in Korea and to conduct interviews if possible. 
Arranging interviews with the interviewees’ parents and their neighbors was relatively 
63 
easy, since I had made an informal visit when some of my interviewees visited their 
families. The flow of interviews was very different, too. It took much more time to go 
through semi-structured interview questions because they like to talk about their 
daughters. I interviewed 16 mothers or fathers whose daughters had married Korean 
men, including my interviewees’ families, and one mother whose daughter had 
married Taiwanese men. I also interviewed six single women in my interviewees’ 
families or neighborhoods. Three of them turned out to have been introduced to a 
Korean man or married to Korean men but had waited nearly a year to depart for 
Korea. Interestingly, it did not seem as though it would happen anytime soon.  
After the contract with IOM was over, I was able to contact several Korean marriage 
brokers. I found them through the internet and Korean magazines, which are circulated 
in the Korean community in Vietnam. It was tricky to meet them in Vietnam because 
commercially arranged marriage is illegal there, as are commercial marriage brokerage 
agencies. I started contacting people in “the gray area”, namely those who assist with 
paperwork. Then my search extended to those who arrange the meetings and 
marriages in Vietnam. Arranging a meeting for cross-border marriage is illegal if a 
commercial transaction is involved. Since, this type of match making was happening 
in Vietnam, I felt I had to contact them in order to observe the process. I was able to 
follow the journey of one group from their departure at the Tan Son Nhat airport in Ho 
Chi Minh City to the marriage process in Ho Chi Minh City for three days. While I 
was following them, I was able to conduct a long interview with the brokers. 
Once I had returned to Korea, I visited my original field site again and caught up with 
my interviewees and some of their husbands. I felt that the relationship with them had 
improved after my time in Vietnam. First, I was able to appreciate where they came 
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from. Second, I received a lot of support from them and their families while I was in 
Vietnam. Those experiences changed the nature of my relationship with them. They 
were curious about my experience as a foreigner in Vietnam and what I thought about 
Vietnam. Also, I felt that my relationship with their husbands had changed 
significantly because we had had quite lengthy conversations in Vietnam when they 
visit their family in law. As I had been the only other Korean speaker in the group, I 
had been able to speak with them more. 
During the course of the next month, I conducted further research on the marriage 
broker industry in Korea. There are several associations of matchmakers: the Korean–
Foreigner Matchmakers Association, the Korea Wedding Counselor Association, and 
the Marriage Consultant Association. I interviewed a vice president of the Korean–
Foreigner Matchmakers Association, which explicitly addresses cross-border 
marriages as a major area of business. Assessing the scale of the broker industry is not 
an easy task. So far, Internet measurement has been widely used to measure the scale 
of the industry. However, the Act to Regulate Marriage Brokerage Agents (Act. No. 
8688) was implemented in June 2008. It required marriage brokerage companies to 
register by September 15, 2008. As of 2008, 763 international matchmaking agencies 
had registered and 203 registration certificates had been issued, and the reviewing 
process was in progress (Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs, 2008). 
3.5 Some Issues of Analysis 
One question that is increasingly raised in the social sciences is how to treat the 
“nation-state” category. In the conventional academic literature of the social sciences, 
“nation-state” has been treated as a given, fixed category. This has been criticized by 
critical sociologists, historians, anthropologists, political scientists, and geographers. 
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In particular, Wimmer and Glick Schiller (2003) has discussed “methodological 
nationalism” and migration research. Methodological nationalism is deeply rooted in 
the academy, and it often limits our understanding of current transnational processes. 
Furthermore, due to the way in which data and academic literature are produced, any 
attempt to study social phenomenon, especially migration, cannot escape 
methodological nationalism. Nonetheless, I found it extremely challenging to deal 
with cross-border marriages without using the nation-state category. As the term 
“cross-border marriage” indicates, it presupposes the border between two states. It is 
impossible to describe the phenomenon without acknowledging the state category. As 
the state is indispensible to discussions of the modern world, cross-border marriage 
itself is a modern phenomenon. The way that I structure the chapter on demographic 
conditions is very much based on the state category; furthermore, the data were 
collected by national statistical offices. The extent to which using national statistics 
and organizing chapters based on the state category influences our way of thinking 
about certain social phenomenon is still debatable. However, if our goal is to 
understand global political-economic processes in the case of cross-border marriages, 
and if we acknowledge that the mechanism, role, and meaning of the state are 
constantly changed in this process, the fact that we use national statistics and organize 
chapters based on the state category will not change our understanding dramatically. 
Despite my initial optimism, describing the demographics of cross-border marriages 
was another not an easy process. I examined the demographic characteristics of 
Korean–foreign couples with those of Korean–Korean couples to find “meaningful” 
comparison. Whether I intended it or not, I could not be free from the idea that I am 
participating in the process of generalizing Korean–Korean couples and particularizing 
Korean–foreign couples through this comparison by using Korean-Korean couple as a 
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standard reference point. In addition, the way in which these couples are particularized 
is very much associated with negative qualities such as low income and low education. 
As foreign spouses gain the Korean citizenship, these Korean-foreign couples became 
Korean–Korean couples legally. In other words, the way that data are collected is very 
much based on the ethnic division. I do not have an answer for how to reconcile this 
uneasiness, but it is worth acknowledging the trouble. 
3.6 Summary 
This research asks a question of why and how cross-border marriages happen in a 
grand scale in East Asia at this moment. Answering this question requires examining 
not only the phenomenon of cross-border marriages, but also the processes of 
changing social structure.  I introduced various types of data, which I used in this 
research, including statistical data, archival data, and ethnographic data. Each type of 
data has its own limitation in terms of representing social reality. I attempted to 
triangulate these data and to understand the fuller picture of the phenomenon. The 
numbers from the statistical data tell as much stories as the interviews from the field 
work. In order to understand the meaning of these, historical and structural context 
needs to be linked. While different kinds of data complement each other, the picture 
with various data may be messy and often contradictory. However, this kind of 
contradiction and messiness lead us to further the initial questions. A new set of why 
and how question have emerged in the process of identifying the gap and seeking 
further explanation. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT: STRUCTURAL CONDITIONS OF CROSS-
BORDER MARRIAGE IN KOREA AND VIETNAM 
4.1 The Scale of the International Marriage Market between Vietnam and Korea 
Cross-border marriages between Korean men and foreign women started in the late 
1980s and increased dramatically during the 1990s. In 2009, 167,090 marriage 
migrants32 were living in Korea, 149,853 were women33 (Ministry of Administration 
and Security, 2009). The countries of origin for marriage migrants include China, 
Vietnam, Japan, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Uzbekistan, among others (Table 
4.1). Marriages between Korean men and Chinese women, predominantly ethnic 
Korean Chinese, were dominant in the 1990s, and marriages between Korean men and 
Vietnamese women increased dramatically in the 2000s; Vietnamese women quickly 
became the second largest group of marriage migrants (Figure 4.1). The overall 
decrease in cross-border marriages that occurred in the late 1990s can be explained as 
follows. First, economic uncertainty after the economic crisis of 1997 may have 
contributed to a decrease in cross-border marriages. Second, there were growing 
concerns about fraudulent marriages to Chinese women beginning in the mid-1990s34. 
The concern was that marriage was being used as a means to attain a citizenship for 
                                                 
32 According to the Immigration Office, a “marriage migrant” is a foreigner who has Korean spouse. It 
doesn’t differentiate between foreigners who come to Korea with a spouse visa and those who arrived 
with another visa and married later in Korea. This number includes marriage migrants who attained 
Korean citizenship.  
33 Among these, 2,047 men and 39,370 women attained citizenship. 
34 Beginning in November 1993, marriage fraud was extensively covered in Korean newspapers 
(Seoulsinmun 1993-11-09, Segyeilbo 1993-11-09, Seoulsinmun 1993-11-10, Dongailbo 1993-11-10, 
Seoulsinmun 1993-11-11, Kyounghayngsinmun 1993-12-01,Kukminilbo 1993-12-02, Dongailbo 1993-
12-02, Kyounghayngsinmun 1994-1-04, Seoulsinmun 1996-01-31). The Immigration Office decided to 
investigate marriage fraud and to deport any violators found (Kyounghayngsinmun, Hangyere, 
Hankukilbo, Seoulsinmun, Dongailbo 1993-11-30). In 1994, the court gave a decree of nullity in the 
case of a Chinese woman who married a Korean man and left his home after 5 months (Kukminilbo 
1994-10-04, Segyeilbo, Seoulsinmun, Dongailbo 1994-10-05). 
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Korean Chinese women. As marriage fraud became an issue, the Korean and Chinese 
governments signed a memorandum of an agreement on cross-border marriage 
procedures in 1996.35 In addition, the Korean government amended the Nationality 
Law in 1997 and implemented it in 1998 (Lee, 2005, p. 82). Previously, foreign 
women attained Korean citizenship as soon as they married Korean men, but the 
amended Nationality Law stipulated that they must stay in Korea for 2 years before 
applying for citizenship (Nationality Law 6.2). However, the number of cross-border 
marriages increased again beginning in 1999, when wording on the regulation of the 
marriage brokerage industry was deleted from the legislation.  
The number of cross-border marriages increased even more beginning in 2003. The 
trends after 2003 vary depending on the brides’ nationality. In the case of China, the 
abolishment of the memorandum between Korea and China in 2003, mentioned above, 
contributed to the increase of cross-border marriages after 2003, but they decreased 
significantly in 2006. According to a National Statistical Office analysis the 
announcement of implementing the visiting-worker permit for Korean diasporas in 
both China and the former Soviet Union in 2007 and the foreseen opportunity for 
labor migration contributed to the decrease in marriage migration (Result of Marriage 
Statistics in 2006, National Statistical Office). In the case of Vietnam, there are many 
contributing factors, but the following two points are widely speculated by NGO 
workers and brokers, although not yet proved. The application process for acquiring a 
Taiwanese visa through marriage became more difficult in 2005. The interview 
process changed from a group interview to individual interviews, and the rejection rate 
                                                 
35 According to this memorandum, each party must notarize the marital status of the prospective 
husband and wife, and the marriage must be registered and notarized by each government. Only after 
this notarization process can a Chinese bride can apply for a Korean visa. This memorandum was 
abolished in 2003, and couples now must only report the marriage to each government without 
notarization and apply for a visa (Shindonga Magazine 2006, vol. 557, pp. 140–145). 
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was about 30% (Chen, year not listed). Korean-Vietnamese marriages peaked in 2005. 
In addition, the implementation of a work-permit system36 in 2003 may have 
contributed to the increase in marriage migration to a certain extent because the 
system works based on the demands by the employers in Korea and male workers are 
preferred in the sectors such as agriculture, construction and machinery in Korea. The 
Vietnamese women’s opportunity for labor migration became more restricted with the 
new work-permit system. 
Table 4.1 Marriages between Koreans and Foreigners, by Gender, 1990–2006  
Year Total marriages 
Marriages between 
Korean nationals 
and foreigners Foreign wives 
Foreign 
husbands 
1990 399,312 4,710 619 4,091 
1991 416,872 5,012 663 4,349 
1992 419,774 5,534 2,057 3,477 
1993 402,593 6,545 3,109 3,436 
1994 393,121 6,616 3,072 3,544 
1995 398,484 13,494 10,365 3,129 
1996 434,911 15,946 12,647 3,299 
1997 388,591 12,448 9,266 3,182 
1998 375,616 12,188 8,054 4,134 
1999 362,673 10,570 5,775 4,795 
2000 334,030 12,319 7,304 5,015 
2001 320,063 15,234 10,006 5,228 
2002 306,573 15,913 11,017 4,896 
2003 304,932 25,658 19,214 6,444 
2004 310,944 35,447 25,594 9,853 
2005 316,375 43,121 31,180 11,941 
2006 332,752 39,690 30,208 9,482 
(Source: National Statistical Office) 
                                                 
36 The work-permit system and visiting work permits for diasporas are two different systems. The work-
permit system was introduced in 2003 and implemented in 2004. There was a consideration for Korean 
diasporas within the work-permit system, but visiting work permits for diasporas, particularly in China 
and countries of the former Soviet Union, made the border-crossing process and working easier. The 
employment sectors were expanded as well (Ministry of Justice, 2007). 
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Figure 4.1 Cross-border marriages between Korean men and foreign women, by 
nationality and year (Source: National Statistical Office) 
Table 4.2 Border Marriages between Korean Men and Foreign Women, by 
Nationality and by Year  
 Korean men and Foreign women 
Year Japan China US Vietnam 
The 
Philippines 
Mongolia Cambodia Uzbekistan Other 
1990 175 88 268 * * * * * 88 
1991 224 106 232 * * * * * 101 
1992 1,223 429 249 * * * * * 156 
1993 826 1,851 230 * * * * * 202 
1994 561 2,043 227 * * * * * 241 
1995 1,412 8,450 188 * * * * * 315 
1996 2,370 9,271 228 * * * * * 778 
1997 1,075 7,362 213 * * * * * 616 
1998 1,004 4,688 1,514 * * * * * 848 
1999 1,248 2,883 280 * * * * * 1,364 
2000 1,131 3,586 235 95 1,358 77 * 43 779 
2001 976 7,001 265 134 510 118 * 66 936 
2002 959 7,041 267 476 850 195 * 183 1,046 
2003 1,242 13,373 323 1,403 944 318 19 329 1,263 
2004 1,224 18,527 344 2,462 964 504 72 247 1,250 
2005 1,255 20,635 285 5,822 997 561 157 333 1,135 
2006 1,484 14,608 334 10,131 1,157 594 394 314 1,192 
*included in “other” category 
(Source: National Statistical Office) 
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4.2 The Marriage Squeeze in Korea 
The term “marriage squeeze” describes “the effects of an imbalance between the 
number of males and females in the prime marriage ages” (Schoen, 1983, p. 61), and 
is generally measured by examining the sex ratio (the number of males per 100 
females) at these ages (Schoen, 1983, p. 62). Although early research on marriage 
squeezes often focused on numerical differences between men and women, recent 
analyses have also considered compositional matters such as availability of suitable 
spouses by education level and within geographically based marriage markets. Fossett 
and Kiecolt (1991) discussed other considerable factors such as geographic 
accessibility, race, marital status, and labor force status for their research on sex ratios 
and family formation. Williams et al. (2006) discussed marriage squeeze in terms of 
education and occupation in both urban and rural settings. This change in approach 
suggests that the understanding of the term “marriage market” may have changed. In 
general, the marriage market loosely refers to the population pool at the prime 
marriage age but does not highlight the various characteristics of this population, such 
as level of education and income that may stratify the market. Recent research has 
taken account of other characteristics besides age. These attempts result in a more 
dynamic understanding of marriage markets. 
The average sex ratio at birth from 1970 to 2005 is 109.89 in Korea (National 
Statistical Office, Trends in Vital Statistics 1970–2005). It belongs at the high end of 
the natural sex ratio at birth (104–110) (Weeks, 2005, p. 327). Park and Cho (1995) 
discussed the relationships among the imbalance of the sex ratio at birth, low fertility 
rates, and son preference in Korea. According to them, the son preference persisted in 
Korean society while the fertility rate decreased rapidly and the norm of a small 
family became established (Park and Cho, 1995). Because technologies for 
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determining the sex of fetuses and sex-selective abortion were available, they 
contributed to the distortion of the sex ratio at birth (Park and Cho, 1995). Park and 
Cho (1995) pointed out that one of the social implications of the high sex ratio is the 
marriage squeeze. They predicted the bride shortage, as Table 4.3 shows. They also 
counted the marriage age gap, four years on average, between the bridegroom and 
bride. Assuming ongoing very low mortality for both sexes, and assuming that age is 
the only factor in marriage, males ages 5 to 9 would have difficulty finding a partner 
when they reach marriage age; in other words, they predicted that 27 out of 100 males 
would not be able to find a partner (Park and Cho, 1995, p. 74). This situation will 
worsen if surplus males in the older age group find partners in the younger female age 
group because of the sex-ratio imbalance of their own age group (Park and Cho, 1995, 
p. 74). In addition to the sex-ratio imbalance, the rapid decrease in fertility has also 
contributed to the marriage squeeze. Given that Korean men usually marry younger 
women and that the absolute number of births has been decreasing, a marriage squeeze 
on men has appeared unavoidable (Park and Cho, 1995, p. 75). 
Table 4.3 Comparison of the Number of Males in Five-Year Age Groups with the 
Number of Females Four Years Younger in 1990 (Park and Cho, 1995, p. 75) 
Males Females  
Age Number Age Number M/F (* 100) 
25–29 2,160,912 21–25 2,073,159 104.2 
20–24 2,294,290 16–20 2,220,129 103.3 
15–19 2,267,129 11–15 1,926,386 117.7 
10–14 2,054,494 6–10 1,959,426 104.9 
5–9 1,999,901 1–5 1,573,958 127.1 
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Park and Cho’s (1995) study predicts a marriage squeeze in Korea based on the 
population structure in 1990. In order to understand the marriage squeeze in relation to 
cross-border marriage more accurately, various factors that reflect structural 
conditions and influence gender relations, including age, education attainment, 
occupation, residence (urban/ rural), and cultural norms, should be accounted for. For 
example, according to Park and Cho’s (1995) general description based on age, 
Korean women should not face any problem in finding partners. As Table 4.4 shows, 
however, the proportion of never-married men and women varies according to 
education level. 
Jones (2004) indicates that “the marriage squeeze [in East and Southeast Asia] leaves 
well educated women and poorly educated men ‘stranded’ in the marriage market” (in 
Williams et al., 2006, p. 87). 2005 Census data37 in Korea support this thesis. A high 
proportion of women who never married tend to attain higher education levels; on the 
other hand, a high proportion of men who never married tend to attain a high school 
education or less, as Figure 4.2 shows.  
                                                 
37 Aggregate census data for the population by sex, detailed education level, and marital status are 
available from the 2005 census. 
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Figure 4.2 Proportion of Never-married Population, by Education and Gender*, 
2005 
(Source: National Statistical Office)  
*age of 15 or older 
 
Table 4.4 Proportion of Never-Married, by Age, Gender, and Education, 2005 
Male 
 Total 20 to 24 25 to 29 30 to 34 35 to 39 40 to 44 45 to 49 50 to 54 
Elementary 6 93 83 70 51 29 13 5 
Secondary 33 95 75 43 23 10 5 2 
Tertiary 44 99 85 39 13 5 2 1 
No 
Schooling 10 97 94 88 73 53 34 19 
Female 
Total 20 to 24 25 to 29 30 to 34 35 to 39 40 to 44 45 to 49 50 to 54 
Elementary 1 72 48 23 9 3 1 1 
Secondary 23 83 44 15 6 3 2 1 
Tertiary 47 97 66 23 10 6 5 5 
No 
Schooling 10 90 79 60 39 20 9 4 
* percentage of the never-married within the cohort 
** includes attending and dropping out 
(Source: National Statistical Office) 
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As Jones (2004) noted, the marriage squeeze is observed at both ends of the education-
level spectrum; highly educated women and poorly educated men tend to remain 
unmarried. The rural bachelors’ marriage crisis is one manifestation of the marriage 
squeeze on poorly educated men. Given the positive relation between education and 
income levels in Korea38 and the tendency for women to have to “marry up”,  the 
marriage squeeze on low-income males is predictable. The recent expansion of cross-
border marriage to urban men may also be read in this context and will be discussed 
later in the thesis. 
4.3 Marriage of Rural Men as a National Issue and Cross-Border Marriage in 
Korea 
4.3.1 The National Discourse of the Marriage of Rural Bachelors 
In 1990, newspapers39 reported six suicides of rural bachelors. According to the 
newspapers, these farmers committed suicide because they were frustrated by not 
being able to find brides. After these suicides were reported, numerous articles and 
editorials discussed the problem further. The range of responses varied from an 
analysis of the causes of the “bride famine”40 to calls for solutions to the problem. The 
“bride famine” was often portrayed in terms of women’s unwillingness to stay in the 
rural areas. Young women had begun moving in substantial numbers to the cities in 
search of jobs throughout the industrialization period and this stream has continued to 
the present time. As a result, the number of marriage-aged rural women has decreased. 
Moreover, urban women are less likely to marry rural men and remain in rural areas. 
                                                 
38 Monthly wage levels by educational attainment, Social Indicators in Korea 2008, National Statistical 
Office. 
39 Segyeilbo 1990-01-12, Kukminilbo 1990-01-15, KyongHyangsinmun 1990-01-15, Hankukilbo 1990-
02-15, KyongHyangsinmun 1990-03-03, Kukminilbo 1990-05-26. 
40 This term was used by the media to describe the deficit of women in the rural areas 
(Kyounghyangsinmun, 1984-06-02; Seoulsinmun, 1986-07-11, Kukminilbo, 1990-02-22, Seoulsinmun 
1994-10-09). 
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This tendency has been attributed to comparatively low economic and living standards 
in rural areas that have resulted from urban-biased economic development over the 
last three decades.  
The solutions for this problem, which were presented in the public media, were 
summarized as follows. First, the economic and living conditions in the rural areas 
should be improved through the adoption of mechanized and cash-crop farming for the 
long term. Second, marriages of rural bachelors with women in the urban areas or in 
other countries should be arranged for the short term. Cross-border marriages, which 
had relatively viable short-term effects, became a popular solution. For example, the 
National Committee for Rural Bachelor’s Marriage was organized by the peasant 
movement, and this organization tried to arrange dates between farmers and female 
factory workers (Segyeilbo 1990-1-12, Kukminilbo 1990-02-05). Also, beginning in 
the 1990s, dating between Korean farmers and Korean Chinese women was arranged 
or supported by various individuals, organizations, and sometimes the government.41 
When rural issues were discussed, the marriage of rural bachelors was often 
mentioned as central to the various rural crises that arose during the period of 
                                                 
41 “Two Korean congressmen attempted to arrange marriages between Korean men and Korean Chinese 
women after they visited Yanbian, China” (Kukminilbo 1990-09-01). In December 1990 and January 
1991, news of a marriage between a Korean farmer and a Korean Chinese woman was reported 
(Kukminilbo 1990-12-22, Seoulsinmun 1990-1-11). The Family Welfare Research Institute planned and 
organized a trip to China for 20 rural bachelors, and this was supported by the Ministry of Health and 
Social Affairs under the “Marriage Project for Rural Bachelors and Korean Chinese Women” 
(Hankukilbo 1991-02-04, Dongailbo 1991-02-17). “Samyang Food corporation decided to employ 
Korean Chinese women and arrange a meeting with Korean rural bachelors” (Hangyere 1991-04-21). 
“Housewives club organized a bazaar and the profits will be used for supporting rural bachelors to go to 
China” (Hankukilbo 1991-07-27). “22 couples finally married through these arranged meetings and the 
candidates for the next trip will be nominated by the Rural Development Administration” (Dongailbo 
1991-09-08). Also, “Research Center for Rural Problem helped 11 rural bachelors go to Sakhalin, 
Russia to meet Korean descendents there” (Dongailbo 1992-02-11). After diplomatic relations between 
China and Korea were established, the volume of arranged meeting increased. In 1993, the Family 
Welfare Research Institute organized a trip to China for 53 rural bachelors (Hankukilbo 1993-03-01). It 
is not yet clear whether the Family Welfare Research Institute continued this program. However, 
commercial marriage-broker agencies appeared in the newspapers and the industry seemed to grow 
around this time (Seoulsinmun 1992-8-15).  
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liberalization. During the local election campaigns, a number of candidates promised 
to solve the problems of rural bachelors by improving living conditions in the rural 
areas42 (Seoulsinmun 1991-03-16, Dongailbo 1991-03-18, Kyounghyang 1992-03-21). 
It was clear that the rural bachelors’ marriage problem was critical and that improving 
rural conditions was an important solution for this problem at that time. 
Why did the marriage of rural bachelors become a national concern? According to the 
2005 Census, the percentage of never-married single men age 40 to 49 in rural areas 
(myeon bu) was 11%. This rate is high where near-universal marriage has been the 
norm and remains highly desirable. It is also fairly high compared with the average 
percentage of never-married single men age 40 to 49 in Korea, but there are many 
segments of the population with a similarly high or higher percentage of never-
married singles, such as women in the same age group who are highly educated. Why 
were Koreans more concerned about rural bachelors? Many factors potentially 
contribute to this alarm, including the patriarchal culture of Korea. Koreans have a 
strong son preference due to their patriarchal culture, and the sex-ratio imbalance 
provides evidence of this tendency. Considering the patriarchal culture in Korea, 
marriages of men may matter more than marriages of women43. In terms of how 
marriages of rural bachelor became a national concern, however, the structural change 
in Korea deserves attention. 
4.3.2 Rural Development in Korea 
Economic development in Korea has gained attention because of Korea’s rapid 
industrialization, and because development was achieved largely at the expense of the 
                                                 
42 In 1991, the first local election was held as the municipality was introduced. 
43 This contrasts to the case of Singapore where the question of highly educated women’s marriage is 
prevanlent. 
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agricultural sector. The contribution of the agriculture to industrialization was 
essential in terms of maintaining and supplying cheap labor, providing cheap food for 
laborers, and land for factories. The role of the agricultural sector is often downplayed 
in the picture of Korean development, where it is often regarded as a “lagging sector” 
that needs to “catch up” (Gills, 1999, p. 2). It is important to understand the rural 
changes that occurred with industrialization, because they established the primary 
conditions for cross-border marriage, although the context of cross-border marriages 
has certainly changed rapidly since the 2000s. 
Korean rural development after decolonization can be roughly categorized into three 
periods: the transition period (1945–1961), the developmental regime (1961–1979) 
and liberalization (1979–present). After liberation (1945) and the Korean War (1950–
1953), the Korean economy was struggling with the lack of an industrial basis and 
recovering from the destruction. This period is described as “lacking policy, 
preparation, and competence” and as marked by “the ‘desultory’ presence of the US 
occupation” (Henderson, 1968, p. 57 in Boyer and An, 1991, p. 31). By the end of the 
1950s, South Korea faced an economic crisis as U.S. economic assistance was 
drastically cut and replaced by loans. This situation led to a military coup in 1961. The 
military regime implemented a strong development project. The general narrative of 
the Korean development is as follows: 
Facing a lack of domestic capital, raw material, and technology, the military 
government set the direction of economic development toward a labor-
intensive manufacturing export strategy. The only way that Korea could be 
competitive was to decrease prices by decreasing costs. Supplying cheap labor 
was critical in this process. (Gills, 1999, p. 8) 
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The international division of labor emerged around this time, and labor-intensive 
industries were relocated off-shore. This decision shows that the Korean military 
government shared the rationality of the global economic order (Gills, 1999). 
One notable policy that the military government implemented regarding the 
relationship between the industrial and agricultural sectors was “the low agricultural 
products–price policy.” This policy kept the price of agricultural products low, 
especially the price of rice, which was the major food for Koreans and the basis of 
agricultural production in Korea (Gills, 1999). According to Gills (1999), there are 
two impacts of low price policy of agricultural products with regard to supplying labor 
for the industrial sector. On the one hand, it kept the cost of subsistence low so that 
workers’ wages could be kept low. On the other hand, it lowered incomes in the 
agricultural sector. This may have led to migration from the rural to urban areas and 
the creation of surplus industrial labor. Although a low agricultural products–price 
policy was not the sole cause of the rural–urban migration, it suggests that government 
policy was geared toward industrialization at the expense of agriculture. 
Boyer and An (1991) divided rural development into two periods under this regime: 
1961–1971 and 1971–1979. They suggested that the economic gain through 
industrialization in the first phase was redistributed for rural development in the 
second phase (pp. 31–42). Indeed, the disparity between the rural and the urban areas 
was one of the most serious concerns, as shown in the following excerpt from the third 
Economic Development Plan: 
the rapid economic growth in Korea in the 1960’s accelerated the nation’s 
industrialization but brought about relative lagging of the rural economy at the 
same time. As a result, we see the necessity of attaining more balanced 
development among sectors at the moment. (Korean Government, 1971, p. 87) 
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The rural development project was carried out, and the small and medium towns were 
developed in order to balance the gap between the rural and the urban. However, this 
second phase of rural development project is rather a response to the political 
challenges resulting from the growing discontent of urban people. The labor union 
movement to improve working and living conditions appeared in the late 1960s and 
the government faced political challenges from the people, and needed to take action 
in order to secure its legitimacy. The military government attempted to maintain the 
support of the rural people through a rural development project. 
The 1980s were a period of liberalization, and the Korean economy was integrated 
into the global economy even further. The basis of the Korean economy shifted from 
labor-intensive to capital-intensive industries under the government’s economic plan 
in the 1980s. Labor-intensive industries started to move to China and Southeast Asia, 
and the importing of agricultural products increased during this period. The 
agricultural sector was regarded as a declining “industry” with little competitiveness. 
A key issue of agricultural policy was how to improve its “competitiveness and 
productivity” rather than how to maintain sustainable rural communities. In the late 
1970s, the Korean government began importing agricultural products. The rationale 
for the importing was that Korean agriculture encountered stagnating productivity as a 
result of the low agricultural products–price policy, but external pressure to open up 
the agricultural products market intensified (Lee, 1991, p. 20). With this import policy, 
the idea of Korean rural development declined, and the idea that the “agricultural 
sector is hopelessly lagging” and that the “people cannot sustain themselves if they 
only engage in the agricultural sector” became widespread (Lee, 1991, p. 13). In 
particular, this kind of attitude intensified even more after the Uruguay Round, which 
began in 1986. The market-oriented restructuring of the agricultural sector began in 
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1983, and a series of rural development policies for “strengthening competitiveness” 
were implemented. The general ideas of these policies include 1) the elimination of 
small-scale farm households; 2) the expansion of the farming scale; and 3) the 
promotion of agri-business, commercialization, and mechanization (Gills, 1999, p. 
64). For example, the Korean government set the goal that the ratio of the 
nonagricultural income of farm households should increase by up to 70% by 2000. 
The Agricultural Rent Management Act in 1986 regulated tenancy. Later, this was 
replaced by new Legislation on Agricultural Land in 1994 (effective in 1996) that 
made it easy for nonfarmers and agriculture-related industries to hold land. These 
farmland policies contributed to the withdrawal of small farm households from the 
agricultural sector. The government offered loans in order to promote the cultivation 
of cash crops and the mechanization of agriculture; however, this further increased 
farmers’ indebtedness. During 1987 and 1996, the average farm household debt 
increased more than nine times (Gills, 1999, p. 78). 
4.3.3 Changes in the Rural Population 
Data on the farming population and farm household income generally support Gills’ 
(1999) thesis that the Korean economic development was a process of extracting 
resources from the rural areas. As industrialization progressed, the proportion of the 
farming population within the total population decreased, from 56.9% in 1960 to 
15.5% in 1990 to 7.1% in 2005; and the contribution of the agricultural sector to the 
GDP decreased, from 39% in 1960 to 9% in 1990 to 3% in 2005 (Agriculture Census, 
National Statistical Office; World Development Indicator Database). Initially, the 
“rural” population was nearly coterminous with the population engaged in agriculture 
and farming occupations, and with those living in the administrative category of 
“county,” which is composed of towns (eup) and townships (myeon). As 
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modernization progressed, however, these categories became much more complicated. 
For example, a “county” could and did become industrialized and more urbanized as a 
result of new local or national development plans. The National Statistical Office 
began to use administrative categories instead of the categories of rural and urban in 
1995. The government explains the current administrative categories as follows: “one 
of the ways to identify urban areas is the differentiation method in terms of the 
administrative system, and in the case of Korea, the smallest administrative units, that 
is, towns (eup), townships (myeon), neighborhoods (dong), exude a hierarchical 
tendency depending on the degree of urbanity. Neighborhoods (dong) tend to be very 
much urban, although townships (myeon) are more rural, with towns (eup) between 
the two as transitional zones” (http://atlas.ngii.go.kr).44 
The migration from the rural to urban areas happened actively during the 
developmental regime. For example, the population of Seoul, the capital, tripled 
between 1960 and 1975, and the government launched a new population redistribution 
policy in 1977 (Kim, 1981, p. 205). However, this policy also was an attempt to solve 
the problem by developing multiple cities in various local areas rather than developing 
the rural areas. The increase in the urban population continued in part because of 
ongoing rural to urban migration among working-age men and women. In particular, 
the proportion of rural to urban female migrants between the ages of 15 and 24 
                                                 
44 The definition of “farming population” has also changed over time. According to the 2005 agriculture 
census, anyone who stayed in the farm household on the census day was counted as part of the “farming 
population.” According to the 1980 agriculture census data, anyone who stayed at the farm household 
more than three months or who was going to stay more than three months from the census day was 
counted as part of the “farming population”; maids, nannies, workers, and boarders are included. “Farm 
households” are divided into “full-time farm households” (households in which all members engage in 
farming) and “part-time farm households” (households with a member who did nonagricultural work 
for more than a month [Agriculture census 2005, National Statistical Office]). 
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increased from 40.9% during the period 1966–1970 to 50.3% during the period 1970–
1975 (see Table 4.5).  
Rural-urban migration led to changes in the population structure within farming 
communities. According to 1975 data from the Economic Planning Board, people 
under age 30 made up 39.2% of the agricultural-sector labor force, and people over 50 
years old made up 26.6%. By 1989, however, the figures were 8.5% and 53.1%, 
respectively (Lee, 1991, p. 26). The aging tendency accelerated during the 1990s.   
The decrease of the farming population continued between 1990 and 2005 (Figures 4.3 
and 4.4). The declining rural living standard due to the failure of the neoliberal 
agricultural policies in the 1990s may have contributed to the continuous drift of the 
farming population during the period 1990–2005. Gills (1999) argues that the 
sufficiency of living expenses in farm households also dramatically decreased, from 
92.1% in 1979 to 77.2% in 1987 to 63.6% in 1996 (Table 4.6). The rural areas have 
thus been associated with economic hardship, hard work, and backwardness since the 
industrialization.  
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Figure 4.3 Total farming population by gender and the proportion in the total 
population from 1960–2005, Agricultural Census 
(Source: National Statistical Office) 
Table 4.5 Age-Sex Composition of Net Rural to Urban Migration, 1960–1975 
(Kim and Sloboda, 1981, p. 61) 
Age at 
End of 
Period* 
1960–1966 1966–1970 1970–1975 
Males 
(%) 
Females 
(%) 
Sex 
ratio 
Males 
(%) 
Females
(%) 
Sex 
ratio 
Males 
(%) 
Females 
(%) 
Sex 
ratio 
5–14 32.1 30.8 100.3 27.0 26.9 109.2 29.1 22.0 108.3 
15–24 35.3 42.5 80.0 33.7 40.9 89.7 41.0 50.3 66.5 
25–34 27.4 17.6 149.7 27.5 17.9 166.9 18.8 10.0 153.8 
35–44 4.5 2.4 184.6 8.1 6.8 130.5 6.4 6.9 74.9 
45–59 0.0 2.9 0.2 2.9 4.7 66.7 3.2 6.0 43.4 
60+ 0.6 3.9 16.2 0.8 2.7 31.4 1.8 4.8 30.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 96.3 100.0 100. 108.9 100.0 100.0 81.8 
Number 
(1000s) 
459.3 477.0 - 1206.3 1107.3 - 759.2 928.4  
(Source: Calculated from KDI adjusted CSR net migration estimates) 
*because of the irregular interval between censuses, the ages covered by the first age 
group are 6–15 for migration during the period 1960–1066 and 4–14 for migration 
during the period 1966–1970. For other age groups the exact ages covered by the 
1960–1066 estimates are one year in advance of those given, i.e., 16–25, 26–35, . . . , 
61+ 
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Table 4.6 Sufficiency of Living Expenses (percent), 1962–1996 (modified from 
Gills, 1999, p. 70) 
Year 1962 1966 1971 1975 1979 1983 1987 1991 1996 
Sufficiency 96.9 92.3 93.4 116.0 92.1 82.2 77.2 74.7 63.3 
Sufficiency = Agricultural income / Living Expenses * 100 
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Report on the Farm 
Household Economy Survey (annual data) 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Changes in structure of farming population from 1990 to 2005 
(Source: Agriculture Census 1990, 2005, National Statistical Office) 
2005 
1990 
86 
4.3.4 The “triple exploitation of rural women in Korea” 
Many of the young women who moved from rural to urban areas during the 1960s and 
1970 were absorbed into the labor-intensive manufacturing sectors (Koo, 2001). What 
happened to the women who remained in the agricultural sector? Gills (1999) has 
argued that rural women in Korea were exploited by the invisibility of women’s labor 
at home and in the field, and that this exploitation intensified with the restructuring of 
the agricultural sector. According to Gills (1999), this “triple exploitation of rural 
women” is also related to the fact that “in subsistence agricultural production, female 
labor, though incorporated into the public sphere of production, is not remunerated, 
since this labor is regarded as merely an extension of household reproduction” (p. 
121). Unlike wage labor in other industries, there is no minimum measure of labor in 
the agricultural sector. In the case of women, it is hard to demarcate their labor 
between “public” agricultural work and “private” household work. In particular, their 
participation in “public” agricultural work has been required even more under the 
pressure of commercialization. 
Beginning in 1999, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry started to conduct 
research on women farmers and established a plan for fostering women farmers in 
order to accommodate the changing environment, a plan that mainly addresses the 
declining farming population and the emerging importance of women as farm 
laborers. This plan for fostering women farmers did not gain much attention, but it 
indicated that the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry recognized the declining 
farming population as a problem and attempted to solve this problem by 
acknowledging women’s contribution to the agricultural sector and fostering women 
farmers even before the discourse of low fertility and aging society gained currency in 
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the mid-2000s. According to the Survey of Women Farmers in 2003,45 78% of women 
farmers reported working more than 10 hours a day (Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry 
and Fishery, 2003). Again, however, their contribution was hardly recognized or 
compensated. The declining farming population and intensifying the hardship of 
maintaining livelihood with farming, which have accumulated throughout the 
industrialization and globalization process, made rural areas less desired, in particular 
by Korean women. The “bride famine” problem, which represented the rural crisis in 
the 1990s, has persisted, and is now directly linked to the sustainability of rural 
communities. According to the Agriculture Prospectus 2005 by the Korea Rural 
Economic Institute, the Korean rural population of 1.2 million is expected to decrease 
during the next 10 years, and a serious agricultural labor-deficit problem is expected 
(Dongailbo 2005-04-06). 
4.3.5 Marriage Squeeze in Korea as a Signal of the Rural Crisis? 
Agricultural census data in 2005 show a marriage squeeze in the farming population. 
As is shown in Table 4.7, the never-married farming population of prime marriage 
age, between 25 and 34 years old, is 122,717 for males and 55,972 for females, and 
the sex ratio is 219 and 371 for those between 30 and 34 years old alone (Agriculture 
Census 2005, National Statistical Office). Severe sex-ratio imbalances are observed 
throughout the age groups as well. The marriage squeeze in the farming population is 
rooted in structural changes that have occurred within the industrial structure, 
including industrialization, the rural to urban migration, and the shrinking agricultural 
sector. The marriage squeeze phenomenon became a social issue in the form of the 
“rural bachelor’s marriage problem” or the “bride famine” because it is linked to the 
                                                 
45 It was conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry through Gallup Korea in 2003. The 
sample size was 1,302.  
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population of rural areas, labor in the agricultural sector directly, and the sustainability 
of agriculture as a consequence. In other words, the marriage squeeze represents a 
crisis of social reproduction in the rural area in this context46. 
Cross-border marriages which were prescribed for the solution for this problem raise a 
new set of questions; how do cross border marriages, in particular marriage migrants 
play a role in dealing with the current crisis of social reproduction in Korea? What are 
the demographic and economic conditions in Vietnam? Is there any pronounced 
marriage squeeze on women in Vietnam? How the marriage market between these 
countries was formed? In the next section, I will explore the demographic and 
economic conditions and marriage squeeze in Vietnam. 
                                                 
46 While there has been much media coverage of the “bride famine” for rural men and much active 
governmental intervention during the last two decades, very little public attention has been paid to the 
marriage of highly educated single women in their 30s. I did a keyword search of the Korean media 
database, which includes 9 major newspapers for the period 1985–2007. Using the keyword phrase 
“single women in their 30s,” I found 104 articles. Newspaper articles about single women in their 30s 
are mostly reports of new marriage trends, or emerging markets such as tourism, literature, and other 
cultural products for single women in their 30s. These women are often referred as “gold misses”: 
highly educated, high-income single women in their 30s. Nonetheless these unmarried women have not 
grabbed the attention of government policy makers to nearly the extent that the rural bachelors have. 
 While cross-border marriage has already expanded to low-income urban men, the discourse on cross-
border marriage is still largely associated with the marriage of rural bachelors, and it is still associated 
with the marriage squeeze on men in rural areas. The marriage squeeze in rural areas is in turn rooted in 
the economic and demographic structural changes that occurred during the period of industrialization, 
and can be considered a signal of the crisis of reproduction of the agricultural sector and in rural life in 
general. The current expansion of cross-border marriage to low-income urban men and the marriage 
squeeze on men with low education is symptomatic of a broader problem of social reproduction and 
intensified social stratification in Korea. 
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Table 4.7 Never-Married Farming Population, by Gender, 2005 
Age group Male Female Sex ratio Sex ratio* 
20–24 76,014 66,506 114  
25–29 75,605 43,288 175 114 
30–34 47,112 12,684 371 109 
35–39 24,035 3,987 603 189 
40–44 12,529 1,649 760 314 
45–49 6,082 848 717 369 
50–54 1,977 456 434 233 
* sex ratio between men in one cohort and women in the next younger cohort.47 
(Source: Agriculture Census 2005; National Statistical Office) 
4.4 Demographic Conditions of Cross-Border Marriage in Vietnam 
4.4.1 Political History and Demographic Changes 
Vietnam has experienced a turbulent political history: 70 years of French colonial rule 
(1884–1954) and 30 years of war (1946–1975) (Barbieri et al., 1996, p. 212). The first 
Indochina war (the Vietminh War) for independence lasted from 1946 to 1954, and in 
1954 the Geneva Conference provisionally divided Vietnam into North and South 
Vietnam. The second Indochina war (the Vietnam War) for reunification lasted from 
1965 to 1975; the country was finally reunited in 1976 under a socialist regime. This 
political turbulence presumably resulted in demographic changes, but it also explains 
the limited availability of data at the same time. Barbieri et al. (1996) noted that 
prior to the first national population Census in 1979, the data—which were 
unpublished—were limited and defective. They consisted of population counts 
during the French colonial period, then partial censuses conducted in 1960 and 
1974 in the north and 1976 in the south. In addition, there were a few local 
level surveys such as those taken in 1962 and 1967 by the National Statistics 
Institute in Saigon. (p. 211) 
                                                 
47 Park and Cho (1995) suggested this method to take into account the difference in marriage ages 
between men and women in Korea. 
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Much of the research on population in Vietnam depends on the national census counts 
of 1979 and 1989 and the Vietnam Demographic and Health Survey in 198848 as a 
major source of data (Barbieri et al., 1996; Goodkind, 1995a, 1997; Banister, 1993). 
Hence, the discussion on demographic changes prior to the 1979 census may be a 
general estimation, and I will focus on the discussion after the reunification in 1976 
and the economic liberalization (Doi Moi) in the 1980s, using data from the 1989 
census, 1999 census, and statistical yearbooks.49 
The literature describes various distinctive characteristics of the Vietnamese 
population. Among these, two general characteristics persist from the 1979 census to 
the 1999 census: 1) a young population, and 2) a low sex ratio. The total population in 
Vietnam in 1979 was 52.7 million, and the population increased steadily to 76.3 
million in 1999 and to 84.3 million in 2005.50 The fertility rate decreased from 6.1 
during the period from 1969 to 197451 to 2.2 in 2005.52 As of 1989, the population 
pyramid of Vietnam was bell-shaped, with nearly 40% of the population under 15 
years of age (Barbieri et al., 1996, p. 216). It has subsequently begun to shift toward 
more of a barrel shape; 33% of the population was under 15 years old in 1999 
(Population and Housing Census Vietnam 1999, General Statistical Office). The sex 
ratio in 1979 was 94.2. There are two explanations for this low sex ratio: 1) the excess 
male mortality during the war of reunification (1965–1975), and 2) the massive 
                                                 
48 Barbieri et al. (1996) also used complementary data from research conducted by the General 
Statistical Office, the National Committee for Population and Family Planning, and by international 
organizations (UNHCR, UNFPA, UNDP, WHO) and NGOs (p. 212). 
49 I omitted the 1979 census because I couldn’t access the data. However, some of the citations in this 
section include references to the 1979 census data. 
50 Barbieri et al., 1996, p. 216; Population and Housing Census Vietnam 1999; 
http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/vietnam_statistics.html. 
51 This figure is estimated from the 1979 census, the 1989 census, and the 1988 Demographic and 
Health Survey and National Committee for Population and Family Planning (Barbieri et al, 1996, p. 
216). 
52 http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/vietnam_statistics.html. 
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emigration of males during and after the war of reunification (Goodkind, 1997, p. 111; 
Barbieri et al., 1996, p. 215). Male teenagers tried to avoid being drafted (Kibria, 1993 
in Goodkind, 1997). Nearly 400,000 Vietnamese left the country in 1979, and the 
accumulated total number of emigrants exceeded 1.8 million as of 1993, according to 
the UNHCR (Barbieri et al., 1996, p. 228). Subsequently, the sex-ratio imbalance has 
been narrowed to 94.7 in 1989 and to 96.4 in 1999 (Barbieri et al., 1996, p. 215, 
Population and Housing Census Vietnam 1999; General Statistical Office). 
4.4.2 The Vietnamese Double Marriage Squeeze 
Goodkind (1997) has analyzed the sex-ratio imbalance and its implications for 
marriage among the Vietnamese. He emphasized that Vietnamese women faced a lack 
of men as a result of the country’s unique historical experience, discussed above. 
According to the Vietnam 1989 Population Census, women in Vietnam between the 
ages of 20 and 34 out-numbered their male counterparts by about 10% (Goodkind, 
1997, p. 111). In a numerical sense, women in Vietnam were caught in a marriage 
squeeze. Goodkind (1997) juxtaposed the marriage squeeze in Vietnam with the 
marriage squeeze within Vietnamese communities in the United States and Australia. 
He noted that Vietnamese men residing in the United States and Australia 
outnumbered their female counterparts by 20 to 30% (Goodkind, 1997, p. 111). 
Goodkind (1997) described these two trends as a “Vietnamese double marriage 
squeeze.” One of the assumptions on which his research relies is that a marriage 
market is likely to be formed based on nationality or ethnicity53 and may expand 
outside its national borders. Goodkind (1997) suggested the possibility of exchange 
between geographically separated marriage markets by showing that “the overseas 
Vietnamese press regularly carries advertisements for husbands seeking brides from 
                                                 
53 I refer to Vietnamese here. 
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Vietnam” (p. 121). Preferences for marriage between people of the same national or 
ethnic group have also been documented by Lievens (1999) who found a preference 
among Turkish and Moroccan migrants in Belgium to marry someone from their 
country of origin. As cross-border marriage among different nationals and ethnic 
groups increases, the assumption needs to be reassessed, however. 
Whether the marriage-squeeze in Vietnam that Goodkind (1997) analyzed has 
contributed to current cross-border marriages between Vietnamese women and foreign 
men, including Taiwanese and Koreans, is an interesting question. As we discussed 
earlier, Vietnam experienced a severe marriage squeeze as a result of political turmoil 
and war. According to the Vietnam 1999 Population Census, the sex ratio at that time 
was 96.4: there were still more women than men in Vietnam. Because of the lack of a 
partner, Vietnamese women may have found an alternative through cross-border 
marriage. However, the sex-ratio imbalance itself does not explain why Taiwanese or 
Korean men became a part of this alternative. Furthermore, the sex ratio for those 
between the ages of 15 and 24, who were roughly at the marriage age in the 2000s, 
was 99.9, while the sex ratio for those under 29 years of age was 102.8; signifying that 
the marriage squeeze has ended (Table 4.8). Although the marriage squeeze may have 
contributed to the growth in cross-border marriage initially, and since the imbalance 
has corrected itself over time but the stream of cross-border marriages persists, we 
need to explore other factors such as educational attainment and labor participation in 
relation to marriage. 
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Table 4.8 Sex Ratio by Age in Vietnam, 1999  
Age Group Male Female Sex ratio 
0 647,832 615,767 105.2 
1–4 3,034,911 2,873,732 105.6 
5–9 4,634,400 4,398,762 105.4 
10–14 4,654,315 4,412,247 105.5 
15–19 4,141,058 4,081,222 101.5 
20–24 3,430,084 3,496,303 98.1 
25–29 3,281,300 3,286,874 99.8 
Total (0–29) 23,823,900 23,164,907 102.8 
(Source: Vietnam 1999 Population and Housing Census; General Statistical Office) 
4.4.3 Economic Development in Vietnam 
Vietnamese society has experienced huge socioeconomic and cultural changes since 
the transition of its economy (Doi Moi) in 1986. The Vietnamese economy is one of 
the fastest-growing economies at the moment. GNI per capita has increased from 
130USD in 1990 to 760USD in 2007 (World Development Indicator). The average 
annual GDP growth rate between 2003 and 2007 was nearly 8.05% (calculated from 
Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2008; General Statistical Office, p. 674). Vietnamese 
economic development has often been compared to that of East Asian tiger economies 
(Van and Mallon, 2003). Although there are similarities in terms of their overall 
strategies and governance, for example, their focus on export-oriented industrialization 
under an authoritarian regime, there are tangible and intangible differences. The 
transformation from an agriculture-based economy to an industrial and service-based 
economy also occurred in Vietnam, although the pace and the modality have differed 
somewhat from its East Asian counterparts. First, the degree of change is different, 
although they share similar patterns. The share of agriculture in Vietnamese GDP 
decreased from 39% in 1990 to 22% in 2004; while, the share of industry in GDP 
increased from 23% in 1990 to 40% in 2004 (World Development Indicator). In 
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addition, data on the percent of labor employed in various sectors of the economy 
present a somewhat different picture. Agricultural employment decreased from 75% in 
1990 to 58% in 2004, and industrial employment increased from 12% in 1990 to 17% 
in 2004 in Vietnam.54 These patterns are similar to those described for Korea, although 
the pace and extent of the transformation in Vietnam was less pronounced55.  
In addition, female labor force participation rate in Vietnam has been higher and more 
consistent overtime as a result of the country’s socialist legacy; it was estimated to be 
79% in 1980 and 77% in 2006 (World Development Indicator). This contrasts with the 
female labor force participation rate in Korea, which was 39.3% in 1970, 42.5% in 
1980, 47% in 1990, 48.6% in 2000, and 50% in 2005 (National Statistical Office). In 
Vietnam in 2004, 60% of female employees worked in agriculture, 14% in industry, 
and 26% in service occupations (World Development Indicator). In Korea in 1980, 
39% of female employees worked in agriculture, 24% in industry, and 37% in service 
occupations (World Development Indicator).  
Third, the pace of urbanization and rural to urban migration has been relatively slow in 
Vietnam. The proportion of the Vietnamese population that was urban was 19.2% in 
1979, 19.4% in 1989, 23.7% in 1999, and 29.6% in 2009 (World Development 
Indicator). It is an interesting contrast to Korea, where 28% of the population was 
                                                 
54 In 2000, 65.1% of the employed population were engaged in agriculture, forestry, and fishing, and 
13.1% were engaged in industry and construction; in 2005 the figures were 57.3% and 18.2%, 
respectively (Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2006; General Statistical Office).  
55 For example, in Korea the share of agriculture GDP decreased from 39% in 1965 to 16% in 1980, 
and the share of industry in GDP increased from 21% in 1965 to 37% in 198055 (World Development 
Indicator). Agricultural employment decreased from in Korea 58.1% in 1965 to 34% in 1980, and 
industrial employment increased from 10.3% in 1965 to 29% in 198055 (World Development Indicator).  
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considered urban in 1960, 41% in 1970, 57% in 1980, and 74% in 1990. Although 
Vietnam’s urban population increased during this period, the data show that more than 
70% of the population still resides in rural areas. 
Rural to urban migration is a quintessential part of the changes in gender relations that 
occurred during the industrialization period in the late twentieth century. It usually 
accompanies with growth in job opportunities for women in labor-intensive 
manufacturing industries and changing expectations about the roles’ of young women 
as income earners. The economic transition in Vietnam was also associated with 
migration from rural to urban areas (Ungar, 2000; Dang et al., 2003). Per capita 
income in urban areas was nearly twice that in rural areas; for example, in 1999 urban 
income was 516.7 (thousand dongs) and rural income was 225.0 (43.6%); in 2002, the 
figures were 622.1 and 275.1 (44.2%); in 2004, they were 815.4 and 378.1 (46.3%); in 
2006, they were 1,058 and 506 (47.8%) (Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2008; 
General Statistical Office, p. 601). This income gap persists, although it has improved 
over time. 
The comparably slow pace of Vietnamese urbanization can be explained in part, by 
the long-standing de-urbanization policy of the socialist Vietnamese government, but 
also by discrepancies in the data56. Banister (1993) explains that the communist 
leadership was ideologically opposed to urban population growth and concentration 
(p. 35). The government implemented a de-urbanization policy, including a household 
registration system and a population relocation policy.57 According to Dang (2005), 
migration, rural to urban migration in particular, was effectively regulated until 1990 
                                                 
56 Also, there are issues of the vague definition of “urban” and of underreporting.  
57 From 1976 to 1980 the government sent 1.47 million people, mostly from the cities, to the new 
economic zone, and from 1981 to 1991, 2.3 million (Banister, 1993, p. 35).  
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because residents were only allowed to access basic necessities based on their 
residential permits.58 He further explains that migrants without permanent registration 
have no or limited access to formal sector jobs, education, health care, housing, land-
use certificates, notary public services, loan credits, business, or registration for their 
purchases of houses or vehicles (Dang, 2005). The data show that this stream of 
migration has increased, but remains comparatively small compared with the drastic 
economic structural changes that have occurred in recent decades59. It is also likely 
that some rural to urban migration was not counted by the authorities, as some people 
failed to report their moves to the cities. Indeed, obtaining registration for the city is 
extremely difficult so many tend to live in urban areas without ever registering. In 
addition to other estimation problems, it is hard to estimate what percent of rural to 
urban migration streams is female. 
4.5 Summary 
I discussed the population changes that accompanied the political-economic changes 
in Korea and Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, political turmoil heavily influenced the 
population dynamics. The marriage squeeze on women was discussed as a potential 
condition for cross-border marriage. However, the sex ratio has become more 
balanced recently. I have drawn attention to the relatively slow urbanization, small-
                                                 
58 There are four classifications (United Nations Country Team, 2004, p. 24): KT1 permanent 
registration—nonmigrant with household registration; KT2 permanent registration—intradistrict mover 
with household registration; KT3 temporary registration—migrant, residing independently or with 
relatives, without household registration book, 6–12 months registration with extension; and KT4—
floating migrant, residing in guest house or temporary dwelling, without household registration book, 
1–3 months or no registration. 
59 According to the Vietnam 1999 population and housing census, only 1.9% of the rural population 
(541,978 men and 575,582 women) moved from rural to urban areas between 1994 and 1999, and those 
in the age group 20–29 were the biggest migrant group (Vietnam 1999 Population and Housing Census; 
General Statistical Office). As of 2009, 73.1% of the labor force was classified as rural (World 
Development Indicator).  
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scale rural to urban migration, and low employment in the industrial sector in Vietnam 
when compared with Korea. Current increases in marriage migration may be due in 
part to the current rapid economic development in Vietnam and to internal population 
changes. These may be more relevant than the sex-ratio imbalance to marriage 
migration than to the sex-ratio imbalance. This thesis requires further research.  
In the case of Korea, I have paid attention to how the marriage of rural bachelors 
became a national concern in the context of the rural crisis in the 1980s and the 1990s. 
The rural bachelors’ crisis can be described as an example of a marriage squeeze in 
demographic terms. I attempted to situate the concept of “marriage squeeze,” which 
describes numerical imbalance between men and women, in the context of structural 
changes. The current discussion regarding the marriage squeeze already takes into 
consideration the socioeconomic characteristics of this population. I attempted to think 
of marriage squeeze as a signal of the crisis of social reproduction in the case of rural 
bachelors’ marriage and cross-border marriage in Korea in the late 1980s and 1990s. 
The marriage squeeze most affects men with low education, but an increase in cross-
border marriage among urban men seems to be linked to the overall marriage squeeze. 
What kind of social change does the current marriage squeeze reflect? I will discuss 
this further in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
COMMERCIAL MARRIAGE BROKERAGE INDUSTRY AND THE 
PROCESS OF MARRIAGE BROKERAGE 
The commercial marriage brokerage industry is an important element to explaining 
marriage migration in Asia. The commercial matchmaking industry is directly linked 
to the increase in cross-border marriage and is a distinctive characteristic of the current 
mass cross-border marriage phenomenon in East Asia (Wang and Chang 2003; Lee 
2005). Many scholars have identified the recruitment industry as a future research 
topic in migration studies, but there are only a handful of studies on international 
marriage brokerage agencies in Asia. Wang and Chang (2003) described the 
international matchmaking system between Taiwan and Southeast Asian countries. Ko 
et al. (2005) studied the brokerage practice between Korea and Vietnam, and Korea 
and the Philippines with a focus on human rights violations in the practice of marriage 
brokerage. 
In addition, several studies also explore matchmaking processes. Constable (2003) 
offered an ethnographic study of commercially arranged marriage between American 
men and women from China and the Philippines. Thai (2008) studied international 
marriage among Vietnamese American men and Vietnamese women. The first two 
works engage in the discussion of commodification to a certain extent by observing 
the emergence of the de facto marriage industry and marriage market (Wang and 
Chang 2003; Ko et al. 2005). They describe the marriage process from the 
perspectives of couples who engaged in commercial marriage brokerage without 
imposing a moral framework or drawing attention to the complex cultural meanings of 
exchange of a variety of capital (Constable 2003; Thai 2008). In this chapter, I attempt 
99 
to document the transnational marriage brokerage process on the one hand, to illustrate 
how the commercial brokerage industry is located in an institutional context across 
countries, and how its operation moves back and forth across the boundary between 
public and private, and formal and informal, on the other. 
The primary issue of researching commercial recruitment agencies is the legal 
ambiguity of the commercial marriage brokerage industry and, consequently, data 
problems. In many cases, commercial marriage brokerage agencies are not legally 
recognized and as such interviewing brokers or engaging in participatory observation 
is difficult. Even if this industry is legally recognized, the data tend not to be very 
accurate. In the case of Korea, the national statistical data on commercial marriage 
brokerage agencies was collected under the category of private service60. After 2008 
when new regulations for the marriage brokerage industry were implemented, it was 
possible to access to more accurate data. This chapter is written based on field 
research from October 2007 to July 2008 in Korea and Vietnam, in particular, 
participatory observations including of the marriage brokerage process, a workshop 
for brokers held by the Korean Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City, IOM interviews with 
officers and single women at the Marriage Support Center in Ho Chi Minh City, and 
interviews with two brokers in Korea, two Korean brokers in Vietnam, and one 
Vietnamese local broker in Vietnam. I also analyze in-depth interviews with 14 
Vietnamese women who married Korean men, 8 Korean men who married 
Vietnamese women, and their families. Government documents and Web pages of 
commercial marriage brokerage agencies were used as reference for the scale and 
structure of the industry and the legal frameworks of the industry. 
                                                 
60 Korean Standard Statistical Classification 
(http://kostat.go.kr/kssc/main/MainAction.do?method=main&catgrp=ekssc) 
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5.1 Decision to Marry Foreigners 
5.1.1 Men’s Decision to Marry Foreign Women 
Korean men who marry foreigners are often represented as older, less educated 
farmers. Data from the National Survey on Multicultural Families in 2009 shows that 
this media representation is not entirely incorrect in terms of their education and 
income levels.61 As mentioned in a previous chapter, cross-border marriage is not 
limited to rural areas, however. While early media attention focused on rural 
bachelors, the marriage migrants themselves have recently had the overwhelming 
media attention. There has been less recent discussion about the husbands of marriage 
migrants, who they are and how they decided to marry foreign women. 
I heard a variety of stories during informal conversations with the husbands of my 
Vietnamese interviewees and ended up interviewing a number of the Korean husbands 
who had married Vietnamese women. Each of them had a different life story, and it 
was indeed hard to summarize them as a grand narrative. There are various reasons 
that prospective bridegrooms considered cross-border marriage. Based on the 
interviews, I am going to reconstruct a Korean man’s narrative to give a sense of who 
these men are, why they considered cross-border marriage, and what kind of process 
they went through. I presented three common themes that emerged from the interviews 
with quotes. Then I selected one interview based on the scope and the richness of the 
information. 
“Korean women are snobbish.” 
Interviewees often explain that they chose to marry a foreigner because Korean 
women are snobbish. Most of them tried to meet Korean women through their network 
                                                 
61 See chapter 6 for details.  
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of family and friends. However, they often found that Korean women are “too 
materialistic and snobbish.” Women whom they met often asked directly how much 
they earned, whether they had any assets, and whether they were planning to live with 
their parents. They felt insulted and upset. They looked for other possibilities. 
“I was a fine man when I was young.” 
I heard the following story repeatedly from the Korean husband interviewees: “I was a 
fine man when I was young. I am not sure what happened. All of sudden I found 
myself undesirable.” Initially, I took it as nothing more than a statement to compensate 
for their “undesirable” situation. However, some of the individual life histories 
converged with the history of national economic development. For example, a 44-
year-old man, who used to work for the one of the biggest steel companies in Korea 
until he was laid off after the Asian financial crisis in 1997, must indeed have been 
considered a fine young man with a good job in the late 1980s. He wanted to establish 
himself a little more before he married, so he postponed marriage. However, he was 
laid off in his mid 30s, and it took a while for him to find a job in a smaller steel 
company. The fact that he is in his 40s may make him less desirable in the marriage 
market. However, it seems that the opportunity for him as a factory worker with a 
modest education to build an economic foundation for a family has declined 
structurally. 
Stigma of commercially arranged marriage 
Seven out of 8 interviewees married through commercial arrangements. Some of them 
brought this up at the beginning of the interview. They often said, “I am not qualified 
to talk about the marriage” or “I feel ashamed to talk about this.”  It was clear that 
many were aware of the negative media representation of commercially arranged 
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cross-border marriages. It seems that there are double stigmas associated with the men 
who engaged in cross-border marriage: the fact that they looked for foreign brides 
indicates their weak socioeconomic status, and the stigma associated with the 
commercial arrangement itself, which is often associated with abusive practices. 
Minho’s Story62 
Minho is 40-year-old truck driver. Ever since he was 28 years old, he has either been 
self-employed or driven a truck. He did not have any time or space for meeting women 
because he was so busy. He met a woman through other people when he was about 35 
or 36 years old but the woman was snobbish. She asked how much he earned, whether 
she had to live with his parents, and how much money he was going to send to her 
parents. This made him withdraw the idea of marrying a Korean woman. 
Even though he did not personally know anyone who had married a foreign woman, 
he knew about it through the media and decided to marry a foreigner. He was afraid 
of Chinese women because of the publicity about fake marriages. Filipinas were not 
very familiar to him and he was also concerned about his kids in the future. 
Vietnamese people seemed very diligent and they look like Koreans. So he made up his 
mind to see Vietnamese woman. 
He found an advertisement in the local newspaper and called one of the agencies. The 
person from the agency visited him and showed him photos of married couples. That 
same week, he went to Vietnam. He talked to his family before he headed for Vietnam. 
His parents did not say anything because they generally supported his decisions most 
                                                 
62 Interviewee’s name is not his real name. I chose this narrative because this offered more detailed 
information of his decision making process and his experience in marriage brokerage agencies than 
others. 
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of the time. One of his brothers-in-law warned him that he might feel that he wasted 
money later. He was aware that there are many uncertainties about this marriage. The 
bride might not perform as a wife as satisfyingly as he expected or she might run 
away. It was not an easy decision because he had to take into consideration these 
uncertainties and his future kids. 
When he went to the airport there were another 9 men from all over the country. He 
explained that since a broker (siljang) is able to find at most 2 to 3 bridegrooms per 
month, various offices set one departure date and send people on that day. He used the 
agency called “Happy Wedding,” which has offices nationwide. But he mentioned that 
it may be difficult to find them because they change their name constantly and the 
managers quit their jobs frequently and start their own marriage brokerage 
businesses. 
He chose his wife because she was a first daughter. First daughters are responsible 
and vital. Also she had grown up without parents. He thought she must be strong. 
Since he was the youngest, he thought it was a good match. After 45 days, he went to 
Vietnam again and stayed for 5 days. A Vietnamese local authority reviewed whether 
he had property and was healthy. 
After his wife came to Korea, he had a chance to communicate with her in more detail 
with the help of an acquaintance at church who could speak Vietnamese. He realized 
that she did not receive any of the money that he had given her through the agency. He 
was very upset about it and called the other nine men who had been married at the 
same time. He seriously considered suing the agency, but the cost was too high given 
the benefits. Now he has two babies. His only worry is supporting his children. He is 
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already 40 years old, and in order to support his children until university, he has to 
work another 20 years. 
He continued to talk about how he felt about cross-border marriage in general. He 
mentioned that it was not easy to talk to other people about this process because he 
married through an agency, which involves money issues, unlike a “normal love 
affair.” But at the same time, he emphasized that it was not an easy choice. He had to 
consider many things such as whether his kids would be discriminated against or not, 
and whether he and his wife would face any problems in the family. He felt really 
sorry whenever he saw an international marriage that failed or when a woman ran 
away. He mentioned that men who choose this kind of marriage are less educated and 
earn little. Hence, their lives are hard and it is hard for them to spend enough time 
with their wives and take care of them. Women often stay alone or with their parents-
in-law, and it must be really hard for these women to stand. He thinks that that is why 
this kind of marriage does not work out very often. 
5.1.2 Women’s Decision to Marry Foreign Men 
While marriage-migrant women gained huge media attention, they tended to be 
portrayed as victims of domestic violence, as filial women who want to support their 
poor family in their home country, or as vicious women who want to take advantage 
of a Korean husband. Ironically, the media coverage represented marriage migrants in 
a certain way, and it created a particular set of images of “Vietnamese women.” Little 
attention has been paid to the socioeconomic status of these women in Vietnam or to 
their decision-making process. Below, I present three common themes in relation to 
Vietnamese women’s decisions and their experiences with commercial marriage 
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brokerage agencies. I also select one interview to highlight, which shows the 
interviewee’s experience of commercial marriage brokerage.  
Trying their luck 
Most Vietnamese migrant interviewees indicated that their friends or neighbors told 
them about the possibility of participating in meetings with foreign men. Their degree 
of commitment to marrying foreign men varied. Most of them said that they just 
casually went to the meeting out of curiosity, as an “experiment,” or “trying their 
luck.” Although they spoke about it casually, it did not seem to have been a 
spontaneous or casual decision. Travelling from the rural area to Ho Chi Minh City 
seems like a big deal to those who have not left home before. Also, some areas such as 
Can Tho are more than a 10 hour-bus ride from Ho Chi Minh City. 
Marriage for free 
Since most of them were from rural areas, they stayed at the dormitory in Ho Chi 
Minh City. They went to the meetings repeatedly until they were selected. It took a 
couple of weeks for some, but it usually took longer than a month. If it took too long 
for a woman to be selected, she was expected to pay for her room and board for the 
period of her residence and to leave the dormitory, so the idea that women can 
participate in the brokerage process for free is not always true. It is free only if the 
woman marries a foreigner. The cost of room and board is eventually paid by her 
husband. Once a woman was selected, she tended to stay at the dormitory, even after 
the wedding, until she left for Korea. 
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Brides Contests and Private Networks 
Most of my Vietnamese interviewees in Korea who had been married between 2003 
and 2005 had gone through a “brides contest” type of arrangement.63 However, my 
interviews with single women in Vietnam in 2008 offered a new story. I interviewed 
15 single women in the origin neighborhoods of the marriage-migrants I interviewed 
in Korea. Three of them turned out to be already seeing Korean men through web 
cameras or were married and waiting for their paperwork to be completed. They 
indicated that their neighbors or friends who had married Korean men introduced them 
to Korean men through web cameras. The way to meet foreign men seems to have 
become more diversified as the personal networks of Vietnamese marriage migrants 
have become established in Korea. Some of my marriage-migrant interviewees said 
that they had already introduced their relatives or neighbors in Vietnam to Korean men 
and they had received rewards from both parties. Often marriage-migrant interviewees 
showed me photos of their sisters or relatives and asked me whether I knew any single 
Korean man. The importance of migrant networks was reaffirmed innumerable times. 
As the migrants’ networks grew through kinship, friends, and community members, 
the likelihood of emigration increased by lowering the cost, mitigating the risk, and 
raising the benefits (Massey et al., 1994, p. 728). The marriage brokerage trends are 
changing from mass, impersonal, commercial arrangements to personal network–
based, pseudo-commercial arrangements. 
                                                 
63 The details of the “bride contest” are illustrated later in this chapter. 
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Mai’s Story64 
Mai was born in 1984. Her hometown is Tay Ninh, in the southern part of Vietnam. 
Her father is a farmer. She has three older brothers. It is a relatively small family 
compared with other people, but their parents had the idea that men and women are 
equal. Her family was fairly wealthy when she was young because her father owned a 
lot of land and cultivated commercial trees. However, her father was not very good at 
managing his fortune, and he ended up being indebted. Her brothers could not go to 
university and she also had to drop out of high school after the first year. The family 
had to sell their land and house, but still their debt wasn’t gone. The debt became 
larger due to interest. It was about 10,000USD. It was the biggest reason why she 
decided to come to Korea. 
For years she helped her family at home, and she worked in a shoe factory for a year 
before she came to Korea. It was by chance that she participated in a meeting with 
Korean men. One of her acquaintances at the factory asked her whether she was 
interested in going to the meeting. She talked only to her mother before she went there. 
Her mother told her to ask many questions when she met men. But when she went to 
the meeting place (at a hotel), there were literally 100 girls. She thought that she did 
not have a chance, because there were so many beautiful girls for only three Korean 
men. The meeting process consisted of three stages. It started in the morning and 
continued until afternoon. During the first stage, there were three men sitting in a big 
room. Many women presented themselves to them. Without any conversation, the men 
chose about 10 women. The second stage was similar; the men looked at them more 
carefully but there was still no conversation. They finally chose 3 women among 10. 
                                                 
64 This is not the interviewee’s real name. This interview was chosen because it provides a more 
detailed story of one Vietnamese woman’s experience with a marriage brokerage agency. Her socio-
economic background is “typical” but the form of marriage and family life is not. 
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During the final stage they held conversations. Men were asked about their family, 
occupation, and age. Women were asked whether they could read and calculate. 
During that phase, Mai was informed that her potential husband was a lawyer and 
had two children. If they found that everything was okay, they would go shopping and 
spend time together. She stayed with her husband until 10 o’clock. She said that she 
was very proud and happy that she was selected from among 100 beautiful girls. (She 
used the term “pass” as if she had passed an exam). 
When she told her parents that she was going to Korea, they were against the idea 
because they knew that her future husband had two kids already and that it was not 
his first marriage. But her decision was firm. Her husband visited her family and gave 
her parents about $300 and gave her $100. Her friends and neighbors were also 
worried because they did not know anyone who had married a Korean man. There 
were some Taiwanese–Vietnamese couples but she was the first person in the 
neighborhood to marry a Korean man. The neighbors thought Koreans were stingy 
and that Korean women had a hard life—they watched Korean soap operas on TV and 
Korean women were always waiting for their husbands at home, helping their 
husbands take their jackets off, and preparing meals when they came home from work. 
Vietnamese men do not expect that kind of assistance from women. 
After her decision was made, she stayed at the agency. The owner of the agency was a 
Korean man and his wife was a Vietnamese from Tay Ninh. The agency ran a Korean-
language class. She stayed at the agency and took classes for two months. Her 
husband paid for this. It was in a three-story building. The first floor was a living 
room, the second floor was for the broker and his nephew, and the third floor was 
accommodations for the women who were going to Korea. They shopped and cooked 
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together there. There were about 10 girls. Five of them married through the process 
mentioned above, and the others married through the picture process. She explained 
that there were normally two processes. In the first, Korean men come to Vietnam and 
meet women; in the second, brokers send pictures to Korea and Korean men select 
one of them in Korea and come to Vietnam to meet the woman they chose. 
Mai came to Korea in 2004 and began to suspect that her husband might not be a 
lawyer. She asked her husband whether he was really a lawyer. He assured her that 
he was a lawyer. However, she discovered that he was a driver. She was very upset 
about it, but he took her out to make her feel better. After about 6 or 7 months, she 
asked her husband for money to send her family because her family was indebted. 
When her husband refused, they had a big fight. Her husband finally called the broker 
and asked for advice. The broker suggested that he find a job for her if he could not 
give her money, so he did find her a job. She worked at a canteen for 5 months and 
saved about $5,000. It was hard work. She only had two days off each month and 
worked until late. In the mornings she had to prepare meals and do household chores. 
Initially, her husband and her mother-in-law insisted that her salary go into her 
husband’s bank account. But when she earned $1,000 the first month, she cried to see 
that money. Her husband was moved and told her to send all the money to her family. 
She sent a total of $7,600 including her salary, her husband’s contribution, and her 
savings from their living expenses. Now her family has cleared its debt and her 
parents are building a house. She is very happy about her achievements, but has 
regrets; if she had come to Korea a little earlier, then her brothers would have been 
able to attend a university. Since her daughter’s birth, she no longer sends money. 
From time to time, she performs day labor during harvest times because her 
husband’s parents work in agriculture. She spends money on her daughter and 
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herself. In general, she knows that she has an economically better life in Korea. 
However, she feels lonely because her husband is always out, and whenever he is at 
home, he is on the Internet. In addition, his teenage son gives her a headache. But she 
did not want to talk about this. 
5.2 Transnational Marriage Brokerage Process 
5.2.1 The Marriage Tour 
Commercially arranged cross-border marriage is usually known for “a week marriage 
tour package” or “bride contest.” It usually takes at least 3 to 4 months from when a 
prospective bridegroom visits a marriage brokerage agency until his bride arrives in 
Korea. Although it is hard to generalize, the process is as follows, according to the 
brokers I interviewed. A prospective bridegroom contacts a marriage brokerage 
agency and becomes a “member.” To be a member, the prospective bridegroom 
submits basic documents, including a family register and CV. The prospective 
bridegroom then visits Vietnam for a matching and a wedding. It is usually a five- to 
seven-day tour. As Illustrations 5.1 and 5.2 show, the schedule for such as visit is quite 
busy. Meeting prospective partners, getting married, and honeymooning all happen 
within 5 days. A medical examination is also conducted while the prospective 
bridegroom stays in Vietnam.  
He returns to Korea with his bride’s documents, including her family register, birth 
certificate, proof of marital status (single status), and a copy of her resident 
registration. He reports his marriage to the Korean government and sends proof of the 
marriage and other relevant documents to Vietnam in order to obtain an interview with 
Vietnamese authorities. He also sends documents to the Korean government in order 
to obtain a visa for his wife. Documents include his family register with the wife’s 
111 
name, a reference, a note of confirmation of the wife’s health, proof of taxation, a 
copy of his bank book, a real estate register, and proof of employment or any 
equivalent proof.  
In Vietnam, the bride reports her marriage to the Vietnamese government and sets a 
date for the interview with Vietnamese authorities. This is a new change since the new 
law (Decree 69) in Vietnam was implemented in 2006. The Vietnamese government 
requires an interview of the couple with Vietnamese authorities in all cases of cross-
border marriage. Once the date is set, the prospective bridegroom visits Vietnam again 
and participates in the interview with his wife. After the interview, the wife applies for 
a visa at the Korean Embassy or Consulate. 
A wife stays at the dormitory run by the recruiter in Vietnam until she leaves for 
Korea. Most agencies mentioned that they run education programs, including Korean-
language and culture classes, but interviewees who stayed in the dormitory stated that 
they did not learn anything while they stayed there and also did not receive the 
promised stipends that brokers promised them and their husbands when they married. 
One of the interviewees described this dormitory as a “prison,” and once she escaped 
this dormitory went back home because she missed her family so much. She came 
back to the dormitory later but was scolded severely. It seems that the underlying 
purpose of the dormitory is keep brides from changing their minds and running away 
until they depart for Korea. 
 
 Illustration 5.3 shows the itemized budget that a broker I interviewed had presented 
on his website. Looking at the logistics of this process, some of the documents need to 
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be translated and authenticated, health proof is required, the wedding is organized in 
Vietnam, and the husband travels to Vietnam twice before the wife ultimately flies to 
Korea. Not only brokers in the marriage brokerage agencies, but also government 
authorities, and those involved in notary offices, medical centers, airlines, hotels, 
restaurants, local transportation, photos, dress, hair, and makeup are involved in this 
process. Hence, it is not just cross-border marriage brokerage agencies that constitute 
this international marriage industry.  
Day Time Details 
SAT 
 8:00 pm Departure from Incheon Airport 
1:00 am Arrival in Ho Chi Minh City 
SUN 
1:00 am Check in at hotel 
Morning Meeting 
Afternoon City tour and shopping 
Evening Meeting bride’s parents 
MON 
Morning Medical checkup  
Afternoon Medical checkup 
Evening Bridegroom and staff meeting 
TUE 
Morning Wedding 
Afternoon Honeymoon 
WED 
Morning Honeymoon 
Lunch Vietnamese seafood 
Evening Return to Ho Chi Minh City 
THUR 
Morning Guchi tour 
Afternoon Last meeting 
Dinner Korean restaurant 
9:30 pm Airport 
Illustration 5.1 A Detailed schedule of Marriage Tour of Bridegroom (from 
interview with kb2) 
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Day 1 
 
Arrival in 
Vietnam 
 
 
 
 
Day 2 
 
Meeting 
and 
Selecting 
 
 

Day 3 
 
Medical 
Checkup, 
Wedding 
 
 

Day 4,5 
 
Honeymoon 
 
 
 
Day 6 
 
Arrival in 
Korea 
Illustration 5.2 Schedule of Cross-border Marriage tour of Bridegroom to 
Vietnam (modified from Ko et al., 2005) 
 
Items Price (Won) Misc 
2 Airfares for the bridegroom  
Airfare for the bride 
1,500,000  
530,000  
Including airport fee and passport 
issue 
Including visa fee 
Documents of bridegroom 2,400,000  Documents for two trips 
Hotel and food Including food and drinks 
Transportation in Vietnam Renting taxi and van 
Wedding Dress, makeup, photo, video, gifts 
for brides, reception 
Marriage business operation 2,370,000 Cost for fast track of paperwork 
Medical expense STD, AIDS, mental illness checkup 
Transportation for guests for 
wedding 
Fee and cost of marriage in Vietnam
Meeting Renting taxi and van 
Translation Including transportation of 
prospective brides 
Marital portion 300,000  Gift to bride’s parents as a sign of 
gratitude 
Guide 700,000  Guide in Vietnam 
Korean brokerage 1,200,000  After-service and office 
maintenance 
Marriage  3,000,000  Paperwork, translation, after-service
 
Total 12,000,000    
Illustration 5.3 Itemized expenses for cross-border marriage tour to Vietnam 
(from interviewee with kb2) 
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5.2.2 Selecting a Wife 
While I conducted fieldwork in Vietnam, I was able to participate in the Vietnam 
portion of one of the tours as an observer. I write in particular, about the meeting and 
selecting process in this section because it often has been a focus of concern about the 
cross-border marriage process. The head office in Korea organizes each trip and one 
person from the head office travels with each group of bridegrooms to Vietnam. They 
arrive in Ho Chi Minh City around midnight, and Korean staff members in Vietnam 
pick them up at the airport with their van. In the past, such meetings usually took place 
in a hotel near the airport the next day. However, as Vietnamese government 
regulations have become stricter, the venue and time of such meetings has changed. 
One of the broker interviewees mentioned that his company even uses a bus as a venue 
for meeting: a bus with prospective brides drives along the road and a van carrying 
prospective bridegrooms follows the bus, and the men board the bus one by one to 
meet with prospective brides. On the trip that I participated in as an observer, the 
matching meeting happened right after the men’s arrival around midnight at the house 
of “big madam”65. According to a Korean staff person in Vietnam, meetings usually 
happened at a hotel or a restaurant but the number of bridegroom was small in this trip 
so they decided to hold the meeting at Big Madam’s house. Only two men arrived on 
this trip, and one of them had already made up his mind after he was introduced to a 
bride through his neighbor. He met her through a web camera. 
Since it was very dark, I could not see the neighborhood of Madam’s house very well. 
Madam’s house seemed to be located on the outskirts of Ho Chi Minh City. Her house 
was a typical three-story Vietnamese house. When we arrived at the house, about 25 
                                                 
65 A Vietnamese woman broker who recruits Vietnamese prospective brides is called “madam”. The 
term, “big madam” refers to the one who is in contact with Korean brokers. They are based in the city 
and run the dormitory for Vietnamese prospective brides.  
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girls were waiting in the ground-floor living room and on the staircases. The 
prospective bridegroom, a Korean staff member in the Vietnam office, and a 
Vietnamese translator who is a Korean staff member’s wife sat on one side of the 
room and there were two empty chairs in front of them. The Korean staff member in 
Vietnam explained the process to the bridegrooms very briefly. It seemed that the 
bridegrooms did not have good knowledge of the process. Basically, it was a three-
part process. During the preliminary round, the women present themselves—and their 
names and ages—two at a time, and the man chooses whom he likes. During the 
second round, the women are given information about the man—age, job, family 
situation—and the women can leave if they do not want to continue. During the final 
round, each party can ask questions, and the man makes a decision. After explaining 
the process, the Korean staff member in Vietnam also advised the prospective 
bridegroom that he had to choose enough people during the first round because quite 
a number of women might leave during the second round because of his physical 
handicap, and he did not need to take it personally if a lot of women left the room 
during the second stage. 
The prospective Korean bridegroom looked pretty nervous. It was right after the 5-
hour flight, which was his first trip to Vietnam. He was sitting on a plastic chair in a 
shabby house in the middle of nowhere around midnight and trying to find his lifetime 
partner. He seemed to have a hard time making decisions during the preliminary 
round. Two girls came and sat on the chairs at once, and told him their names and 
ages. The Korean staff member in Vietnam who was a primary organizer of the whole 
process in Vietnam “helped” him to make decisions by making comments such as 
“she looks nice,” “she seems too young,” or “you can choose both of them if you 
like.” The preliminary process did not take long because it was based solely on first 
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impressions and the provided information was only name and age. Those girls who 
were not chosen left the house. About 15 women stayed in the room and they stood in 
front of the prospective bridegroom in a single line. The Vietnamese translator 
provided the girls with information about him: He is 42 years old. He used to be an 
electronic technician but he lost one arm while he was working. He is currently 
unemployed and lives on an industrial hazard pension. He has parents and a brother. 
She read this information twice loudly and asked the girls in the room, “Is it clear? If 
you do not want to stay, please leave the room now.” The majority of women left 
immediately, and 5 stayed. The bridegroom seemed a little upset about the situation 
even though he was told beforehand that it could happen. The Vietnamese translator 
pressed the 5 remaining girls again, one by one: “Do you really want to stay?” 
The dynamics at that moment were quite interesting. There was a sharp contrast 
between the girls in the room and the Vietnamese translator and Big Madam. The 
latter were older and well dressed. These women seemed to have a certain authority 
over these girls. In particular, the translator herself had married a Korean man, and 
this may have helped her gain some credibility with the girls. I remember that a 
number of my Vietnamese women interviewees in Korea mentioned that they trusted 
the broker because he had married a Vietnamese woman and his wife worked with 
him. At the moment when the translator pressed the girls in the room, I felt that she 
really worried about these girls’ futures as a sister or an aunt who had followed the 
same path in advance of them. It was an unexpected scene to me. After being pressed 
twice, two girls left the room in tears. Later I asked the other Korean broker (kb1) why 
the Vietnamese translator pressed the remaining girls so much. The Korean broker 
casually answered that “it is for quality control. There are some girls who remain, 
even though they do not really want to marry the prospective bridegroom, because the 
117 
chance of remaining during the final round and being selected is rare to them, or they 
may feel pressured or embarrassed about staying at the dormitory too long. Those 
girls tend to change their mind later. So it is better to make sure that they leave.” 
There were three girls left in the room. The Korean staff member in Vietnam asked 
Madam “to check,” and the three girls went upstairs with Madam. To my knowledge, 
this was to check the girls’ bodies, which has been an issue in the media. According to 
the Korean staff member in Vietnam, it was to check whether the girls have any big 
scars on their bodies. The broker must have been concerned about this. The other 
broker (kb1) from Korea offered a long explanation for why the checking process is 
necessary for the business the next day, even though I did not ask him. “You know that 
the guys who come here [Vietnam] to marry are losers. They are so low quality that 
they demand crazy things. Once there was a guy who asked us to change a girl after 
he found that the girl he married had a rotten tooth. We have to make sure that these 
girls do not have any big scars or some evidence of giving birth on their bodies 
because it is easy to get fake documents in Vietnam. There is no way that we can 
really figure out whether they are telling us the truth. If the madam sends a girl and 
said that the girl has never been married, we just have to believe it. In a way, we are 
the managerial line and madams are the production line. This is a way to control 
quality. But we do not do it. Madam does it” (interview with Korean broker 2008-6-
22). 
 The prospective bridegroom asked whether he could have time to date the girl once 
he made his decision. The staff member answered that he could spend a whole day 
before the wedding. The prospective bridegroom asked what would happen if he 
renounced his decision. The staff member answered that they could arrange a new 
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meeting but since so many girls had left the room already, it wouldn’t be easy to find 
another one. After a while they came back, and Madam confirmed that there was no 
problem. The bridegroom asked the girls what they wanted to do once they were in 
Korea, for example, study or work. He must have heard that Vietnamese women came 
to Korea with “Korean dreams” to find an opportunity. The girls answered that they 
did not have any specific desire. They may have been told that it was safer not to talk 
too much about what they thought. Also, the meeting itself did not seem the right place 
to talk about it. The bridegroom asked again whether they had any questions for him 
and they answered they did not have any more questions. The question and answer did 
not seem substantial at all. After a couple of minutes, he was asked to make a 
decision, and he did. By the time we came back to the hotel where the prospective 
bridegrooms and staff members stayed, it was nearly 1:40 AM. This means that the 
whole process took less than 2 hours. 
5.3 Transnational Marriage Brokerage System 
5.3.1 Marriage Brokerage System between Korea and Vietnam 
Brokerage practices vary widely depending on the scale of the business. The following 
is the system used by one of the biggest Korea–Vietnam marriage brokerage agencies 
in Korea, which I learned about from my interviews with brokers and from my 
participatory observation of the marriage brokerage process (see Illustration 5.4). Big 
marriage brokerage agencies tend to have their head offices in big cities and numerous 
local branch offices in Korea. The relationships between the head office and local 
branches are rather contractual or mechanical based on the division of labor. For 
example, a branch office recruits bridegrooms at the local level. The head office 
organizes trips to Vietnam, along with meetings, and the eventual weddings in 
Vietnam. The head office usually has a set departure date, once a week or once every 
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two weeks. Local branches send the recruited prospective bridegrooms to the point of 
departure on a designated date. In this process, the local branch receives about 35% to 
47% of the membership fee that the prospective bridegroom pays and the job of the 
local branch office is done at this point. The membership fee varies, but it currently 
ranges from $10,000 to $13,000 (assuming 1$ = 1000won) according to interviews in 
the summer of 2008. A local branch office means a local recruiter. So the head office 
tends to recruit “local branches.” A local branch may or may not have a physical 
office, although a big marriage brokerage agency tends to have office-based branches. 
This form of organization has developed because it is not possible for a single office, 
even if it is a big agency, to consistently recruit a large number of bridegrooms. This 
makes sense logistically for organizing trips to Vietnam. Although local branch offices 
recruit bridegrooms at the local level, the head office also continually recruits 
bridegrooms these days because it is more profitable for them. 
Big marriage brokerage agencies also have branch offices in Vietnam.66 These branch 
offices consist of a couple of Korean staff members and Vietnamese translators. The 
branch office in Vietnam has a Vietnamese partner, called a “big madam,” based in 
the city. Each “big madam” manages local recruiters (“small madams”) and brides in 
the city. Each big madam takes care of prospective brides who were sent by local 
recruiters. Big madams usually run a kind of dormitory in the city, and prospective 
brides stay at the dormitory until they get married and leave for Korea. When the 
meeting date is set, prospective brides are presented at the meeting. When a 
prospective bride gets married, the big madam receives about $500 and she allocates 
money to her staff members and local recruiters. 
                                                 
66 It depends on the agency. Two of the big agencies that I interviewed were based in Ho Chi Minh City. 
According to them, most agencies are based in Ho Chi Minh City, though there are growing businesses 
in Hanoi. 
120 
Unlike the office structure in Korea, the relationship between a big recruiter and a 
small local recruiter in Vietnam seems less formal. When it comes to local recruiters, 
it seems that they do not necessarily identify themselves as recruiters in the cross-
border marriage industry. They just “help” neighbors who want to marry foreigners 
from time to time. The mother of one of my interviewees, whom I discovered working 
as a local recruiter during my field research, mentioned that she got to know a big 
recruiter in the city at the wedding of her daughter, who married a Korean man 
through a marriage brokerage agency, and since then she occasionally introduces girls 
in the neighborhood to a big recruiter in Ho Chi Minh City. She also helps complete 
paperwork for those in the neighborhood who want to marry foreigners. She does not 
have an office, but her house was decorated with photos of her daughter and her 
daughter’s family in Korea. People who are interested in marrying foreigners began 
visiting her house after hearing about her by word of mouth in the neighborhood. She 
mentioned that she also paid attention to single girls in the neighborhood and asked 
whether they were interested in marrying a foreigner. She received $100 each time a 
girl she recruited married a foreigner. 
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Illustration 5.4 Vietnam–Korea marriage brokerage system (modified from Ko et 
al., 2005) 
* Arrows indicate the flow of money 
5.3.2 Changing Marriage Brokerage Practices with the Establishment of Networks 
As the “bride contest” became a social issue in both countries and the migrants’ 
network grew, a new matching method (“one-to-one matching”) was introduced in the 
cross-border marriage brokerage industry. According to this method, a Korean man 
meets a potential spouse through a Web camera and makes up his mind before he goes 
to Vietnam. This method reflects the changes in the marriage brokerage practice. 
Interviewee kb1 mentioned that 90% of Korean–Vietnamese marriages happened 
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through “bride contests” organized by agencies from about 2003 to 2006, but these 
days, he thinks that 40% to 50% of marriages are organized by individuals through 
their networks of families and friends. The nature of the business practice is changing 
from introducing prospective spouses to assisting with documents and organizing trips 
and weddings. This change has occurred not only because of government regulation 
but also because a significant number of Korean men and Vietnamese women have 
already married, and they tend to introduce their single family members and neighbors 
to each other. It was evident that most Vietnamese women interviewees who had lived 
in Korea for more than three years had introduced others, often their sisters or 
neighbors, to their husbands’ friends or relatives. Since the paperwork process takes a 
long time and is costly for individuals, Korean–Vietnamese couples who introduce 
their single acquaintances tend to contact the marriage brokerage services that they 
themselves used in order to ask for assistance. Although the establishment of personal 
networks may contribute to reducing the role of marriage brokerage agencies, these 
agencies continue to play a role in the process of cross-border marriage, just in a 
different manner. 
The “after service team” is an important part of marriage brokerage agencies because 
it continues the “business,” and it creates an interesting dynamic between brokers and 
multicultural families. Several interviewees mentioned that companies regularly 
contact newlywed couples and offer counseling or translating services. They said that 
“after-service” is important because it influences their companies’ reputation, and the 
fact that a large number of couples maintain a good family life is a source of their 
company’s credibility. Indeed, they run a Web-based community of couples and 
maintain the informal relationship quite actively. Members of this community post 
photos of their families and celebrate newborn babies. It seems that personal 
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relationships among multicultural families have been built within the community of 
Korean–Vietnamese couples even though the community has been created by a 
commercial agency.  
I found that brokers often position themselves as men who have married foreign 
women and who maintain good family relationship. They thus try to establish a 
brotherly relationship with his customers. During the interviews, brokers often 
presented themselves as a counselor on family problems and a messenger between 
families in Vietnam and Korea. Brokers said that they help organize family visits to 
Vietnam for married couples, deliver money from the couple to Vietnamese family 
members, and checking on the well-being of their families in Vietnam. The 
transnational nature of international marriage brokerages and the fact that they are 
mobile creates room for them to expand their roles. Besides these practical matters, the 
fact that they have married Vietnamese women provides a certain kind of legitimacy 
to their acting as counselor. The formal nature of customer and service provider 
becomes blurred as they continue to maintain the relationship through counseling and 
other personal exchange.  
It is worth noting that this information is based on my interviews with brokers and my 
observations and research of this industry. However, I noticed that most of my 
interviewees who married Vietnamese women did not necessarily maintain a good 
relationship with their brokers. One of the biggest reasons is that they realized later 
that the brokers had cheated them during the marriage process. One of the husbands 
mentioned that he realized that his wife’s family had received less than 20% of the 
money that he had given to the broker. He did not realize for several months, however, 
until he was able to communicate with his wife. The women I interviewed said that 
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they preferred to stay in touch with other friends or neighbors to gain support or 
advice, rather than communicate with brokers, although some of them mentioned that 
they occasionally receive calls from their broker to ask whether they know any single 
men. They identified local support groups such as the Dangjin Cultural Center, a local 
multicultural family center, or church for alternatives. They also know other 
multicultural families in their neighborhood through these organizations or through 
their personal networks. Recently they formed an informal network of husbands of 
Vietnamese marriage migrants in the country, and they also try to bring multicultural 
families together for dinners or picnics. 
5.4 Government Regulation of the Marriage Brokerage Industry and Its Practice 
The characteristics of the marriage brokerage system between Korea and Vietnam are 
very complex and ambiguous to define. First, the system is legally ambiguous. While 
commercial marriage brokerage agencies are legal in Korea, they are illegal in 
Vietnam. The only organization that deals with cross-border marriages in Vietnam 
legally is the Women’s Union, a governmental organization. The cross-border 
marriage brokerage system requires that there be parties in both countries. As long as 
one party is not legally recognized, the whole system cannot be entirely legal. Second, 
the degree of formality of relationships among people in the brokerage process varies. 
While the relationship between a prospective bridegroom and a broker in Korea is a 
formal customer and service provider relationship, the one between a prospective 
bride and a broker in Vietnam seems to be a more informal and personal one. 
Furthermore, the degree of formality depends on the stage of the process and the level 
of locality. For example, the relationship of a prospective bride or bridegroom with a 
local recruiter may be more informal than the one with an organizer of a trip or a 
meeting. In other words, the boundary between commercial relationships and human 
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relationships is not clear. Finally, the system is considered by many to be morally 
ambiguous. Whether a commercially arranged marriage is socially acceptable or not 
matters, especially when it incorporates what are often considered unjust practices, 
such as brides contest. For example, one of the practices of cross-border marriage 
brokerages, often called the “bride contest,” has been problematized because the 
process blatantly objectifies and commodifies Vietnamese women; hence, it violates 
the human rights of Vietnamese women. These ambiguities and differences in the 
cross-border marriage brokerage processes seem to be bound each other. 
5.4.1 South Korea 
The Korean government concerned itself with the marriage of rural men beginning in 
the late 1980s, and local government officials and organizations have devised various 
solutions to the problem since then. While 26 local governments implemented bills to 
support the international marriage of local bachelors in 2005 and 2006, a new law 
regulating marriage brokerage agencies was implemented in 2008 after the absence of 
regulation from 1999 to 2008. The Support for Multicultural Families Act (Act. No. 
8937) was implemented in the same year. 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the bill to support international marriages for 
local bachelors was implemented in the context of the crisis of rural communities. 
However, it is hard to rule out the possibility that brokers were involved in the policy-
making process. What I found during my research is that commercial marriage 
brokerage agencies were often involved in the process of implementing this policy. 
For example, some municipalities selected one commercial marriage brokerage 
agency to conduct the international marriage projects. According to one interviewee, 
his agency carried out the international marriage projects of multiple local 
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governments. The debate on the bill recorded in the minutes of one municipality 
suggested that commercial marriage brokerage agencies were involved in lobbying for 
this policy. 
 
K: Are we going to support the marriages between Koreans? 
Y: No. 
K: Then, isn’t there an equity issue? I do not understand why we should 
support international marriage. 
Y: Marriage among Koreans is the most desirable but it has not worked out. 
That’s why we came up with this solution. 
 . . .  
K2: Where did you get this idea? 
Y: There is an international marriage project at the Province level. It was 
motivated to keep up with the province project. 
K: You know that marriage brokerage agencies are very commercial. This bill 
may be interpreted as approving this commercial characteristic. Why do not 
we try to organize a matching meeting for single people [instead of hiring 
marriage brokerage agencies]? 
O: I talked to the person from the marriage brokerage agencies a couple of 
times. If one applies for an international marriage, one goes to China or 
Vietnam and meets about 10 women there. . . .  
K: Then, say, one is selected to participate in an international marriage 
project. Does it mean that he has to marry to receive the funds? 
O: The marriage brokerage agency will take care of it. 
K3: I think this law was made as a result of lobbying by marriage brokerage 
agencies. I think giving financial support for newborn babies in rural areas is 
a better idea. I do not know how this law was passed at the province level, but 
if they cared about rural communities, they would have not made this kind of 
law (99th Geoje City Council, 2006-4-21 pp. 263–274). 
 
Indeed, it was puzzling that these bills were implemented during 2005 and 2006, 
nearly two decades after the rural bachelor’s marriage issue became widely discussed, 
even if we take into account that low fertility became a national issue and marriage 
became an important policy agenda. As shown above, marriage brokerage agencies 
played an important role in realizing this bill. Whether intended or not, this bill 
allowed government funds to be used to support the marriage brokerage industry. 
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In addition, however, the central government showed a willingness to regulate the 
marriage brokerage industry by implementing a law to regulate marriage brokerage 
agencies in 2008. The purpose was to regulate the commercial marriage market, 
especially the cross-border marriage market, which had become a social issue. All 
companies in this business are now required to register. In order to register, companies 
must meet a certain standard and participate in an education program. It is often 
described as a victory of civil society, but there also seem to be more conflicts of 
interest associated with this legislation that are beyond the scope of this research. 
I have found that the commercial marriage brokerage industry was also involved in the 
process of implementing the regulation policy. As the marriage-migrants’ network 
continued to be established, the marriage brokerage industry began to lose its share of 
the market and attempted to monopolize the business by introducing the registration 
system for brokers. I participated in one of the workshops as an observer for people in 
the international marriage brokerage business organized by the Korean Consulate in 
Ho Chi Minh City before the legislation was enacted. One of the controversies 
involved the boundaries of the marriage brokerage business. Big agencies had already 
formed a national association67 and pushed the agenda that all the individuals should 
register to the government in order to do business as marriage brokers.  
It is extremely difficult to draw a line between commercial businesses and personal 
affairs, however, given the fluid nature of marriage brokerages and of marriage itself. 
For example, a Korean man who had married a Vietnamese woman introduced a 
                                                 
67 There are several associations of marriage brokerage businesses. The Korean Foreign Matchmakers 
Association (http://kfman.or.kr/) and the Korea International Wedding Counselor Association 
(http://www.kiwca.com/info/info.asp) are two prominent associations of international marriage 
brokerage companies. The purpose of these associations is to protect the interests of broker agencies. 
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Korean friend to a friend of his wife’s and received some rewards from his friend and 
his wife’s friend. In this case, the issue is whether this activity is that of a commercial 
marriage brokerage and whether he must therefore register. A broker interviewee 
shared his opinion about this legislation, saying that “we are the ones who lobbied for 
this legislation initially but now it’s become a pain in our necks. It is pointless if all 
the people who are involved in marriage brokerage do not register. Anyway, it does 
not really matter for us. We know enough people and we can use their names instead 
of our company name and claim that the marriage is organized between individuals.” 
The marriage brokerage industry is not just an object of regulation. The industry 
actively intervenes in the policy-making process. In addition, it constantly finds a way 
to go around the legal boundaries by exploiting the informal nature of marriage 
brokerage and personal relationships. 
5.4.2 Vietnam 
Because the marriage brokerage practices for cross-border marriage became a social 
issue in Vietnam, the Vietnamese government implemented strict policies on 
regulating commercial marriage brokerages in 2002 and 2006 (Decree 68 and Decree 
69). However, despite the strict official gestures, the practice does not seem to have 
disappeared only diversified. 
According to Decree 68 in 2002, the Women’s Union, a governmental mass 
organization, is the only entity legally permitted to deal with cross-border marriages, 
and the Women’s Union can run Marriage Support Centers. As of 2008, nine Marriage 
Support Centers under the Women’s Union were in operation, including one in Ho Chi 
Minh City. Commercial marriage brokerages are banned in Vietnam. According to the 
staff member at the Marriage Support Center in Ho Chi Minh City, this center is 
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distinguished from commercial marriage brokerage agencies because no monetary 
transaction takes place. Despite the government’s efforts, the commercial marriage 
brokerage business continues to operate, as the increasing number of cross-border 
marriages shows. Rather, some Korean marriage brokerage agencies signed a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the local women’s union and used it 
legal grounds for their business.68 
The job description for the Marriage Support Center staff members is very similar to 
what the commercial marriage brokerage agencies do. A Vietnamese single woman 
who wants to marry a foreigner can contact a Marriage Support Center and obtain 
counseling from a staff member in there. A staff member gives the single woman a 
full perspective on cross-border marriage, including the downside of this kind of 
marriage. If this single woman still wishes to marry a foreigner after the counseling, a 
staff member files her details and preferences and arranges a meeting with a foreign 
man. This center also runs a dormitory and provides Korean-language class and other 
homemaking classes. This is very similar to what commercial marriage brokerage 
agencies do, except there is no monetary transaction involved, and this center does not 
recruit foreign bridegrooms. Then how do they find prospective foreign bridegrooms? 
A staff member admitted that the center works with a Korean agency because it is a 
responsible one. However, the supplier of foreign husbands is a Korean commercial 
marriage brokerage agency, and each Korean man pays that agency in order to meet a 
Vietnamese woman. Vietnamese women usually do not pay in the case of 
                                                 
68 One Korean agency took Memorandum of Understanding with Women’s Union in Ho Chi Minh City 
(http://www.pimwedding.com/index1.jsp.) 
The other agency emphasized that they worked with the Women’s Union in Hanoi and Haiphong. They 
advertised that they were the only legal agencies. They also posted the photos of the meeting with the 
Women’s Union on the web. (http://www.royalsangsa.co.kr/). 
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commercially arranged marriages in the southern part of Vietnam.69 Under the current 
Vietnamese legal framework whether this agency is responsible or not is not an issue. 
However, it does not seem possible for Marriage Support Centers to function without 
Korean partners. There have been discussions to screen the quality of Korean 
prospective bridegrooms among NGOs, but it proved practically impossible to do so70. 
The Vietnamese government amended Decree 68 in 2006 in order to more strictly 
regulate cross-border marriages organized by illegal matchmakers. As I have said, a 
couple must obtain a joint interview with the Justice Department to prove that they are 
marrying voluntarily and that they are able to communicate each other. The following 
are the detailed contents of Decree 69: 
Within 20 days after receiving regular marriage papers and fees, justice 
departments will interview the two parties concerned at departmental 
headquarters to check if they are getting married voluntarily, if they are able to 
communicate in a common language and understand each other. A notice on 
their marriage will be posted at the department and at the district people’s 
committees of the Vietnamese party’s residence and the permanent residence 
of the foreign party on seven successive days. Marriages are illegal if the 
interview and examination results show that the marriage is supported by 
illegal matchmakers, not in accordance with national customs and morals, a 
result of women-trafficking and for sexual abuse, or for other profit-making 
purposes. (Vietnam News 2006-07-28) 
This amendment clearly speaks to the debate surrounding the commodification of 
Vietnamese women, which was sparked by a news article on the marriage brokerage 
process (Chosunilbo 2006-4-21). Vietnamese students in Korea held a press 
conference to problematize the tone of this news article in Korea, and this became an 
issue of national pride in Vietnam. The Women’s Union in Vietnam sent letters of 
                                                 
69 While women don’t pay in most cases, some agencies based in the North have started to charge 
women as well for their services. 
70 Immigration Office started to offer mandatory information sessions for those who married foreigners 
from 2010. 
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complaint to the relevant Korean authorities. As a result of these attempts, it became 
extremely difficult to obtain cross-border marriages in some places such as Tay Ninh 
and Dong Thap. It is not clear why these two regions took particularly strong 
measures. I suspect that the volume of marriage migration was so high that the local 
government grew concerned about it.  
According to the Vietnamese interviewees who are from Tay Ninh, there was a 
common joke among people that “all the single women except the handicapped went 
abroad for marriage.” While there has been considerable opposition to commercially 
arranged cross-border marriages within Vietnam, the practice at the local level may be 
seen as more beneficial. One of the brokers whom I interviewed commented on the 
situation as follows: “If you meet people who are in charge of paperwork for cross-
border marriages in the local government, they do not have a strong will to stop cross-
border marriage. It is good for them and their local economy. There is no reason to 
stop. It is merely a media ploy.” 
5.5 Commodification of Vietnamese Brides and Intimacy 
 
The marriage brokerage industry has been problematized because it commodifies 
Vietnamese women. The most blatant form of this appears in the advertisements of 
marriage brokerage agencies. “Marry a Vietnamese Girl71” signs have been hung on 
pretty much every single street corner since 2001 in Korea. These signs usually 
include problematic statements that objectify Vietnamese women such as “Pay later,” 
“100% guaranteed payback,” and “They never run away” (Illustration 5.5). According 
to one interviewee, this was the most important means of advertisement until 2007 in 
                                                 
71 “베트남 처녀와 결혼하세요” In Korean, “처녀” means both “single woman” and “virgin.” 
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Korea, when it was banned legally72 because it contained the expressions 
commodifying Vietnamese women. Nonetheless, this type of advertising had created 
an association between commercially arranged marriages and Vietnamese women in 
Korea. 
Common descriptions of Vietnamese women on the websites of marriage brokerage 
agencies include: “sharing the Confucian culture [respecting elders and husband], 
having similar appearance, innocent [do not care about men's education, family 
background and age], diligent and family oriented” (compiled from the seven active 
websites of international match making agencies). Whether this description is accurate 
or not, it represents what is thought to be valued by a certain category of men in this 
marriage market. The kinds of virtues regarded to be absent or preferred at the 
individual level are closely connected to the broad socio-economic situation in Korea. 
Hence, the issue here is not just the commodification of the individual body, but what 
kind of qualities are emphasized in the process and what the structural contexts of this 
commodification process continue to be.  
                                                 
72 The regulation on outdoor advertisements was amended in 2007. It bans advertisements that include 
racial or sexual discrimination (5.2.5). 
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Illustration 5.5 Advertisements for marriage to Vietnamese women 
(Source: Chamyeoyeondae http://blog.peoplepower21.org/International/17210, 
Hangyere 2007-1-29) 
 
In a way, the development of the marriage brokerage industry represents the process 
of the commodifying of intimate life. The language above obviously suggests the 
commodification of Vietnamese women. However, what is sold exactly in this 
process? When we say that women are commodified, does it mean that the object of 
commodification is the women’s physical body or what women offer? Is the 
commodification problematic because of the object, the process or the impact? 
Commodification of women has been problematized because it limits the potential 
Vietnamese Virgin 
Cost 7800$: First Marriage, 
Second Marriage, The 
handicapped are welcomed  
Up to 65 years old=100% 
marriage 
Vietnam  
International Marriage 
Pay later 
First Marriage / Second 
Marriage / The handicapped 
Vietnam 
Never run away 
Specialized in international 
marriage 
134 
which women can achieve as human beings by subordinating them under the specific 
power relations. It raises the questions of male desire, power relations, and racism. 
What is distinctive about the rise of marriage brokerage industry is that it indicates the 
commodification of the family formation process which carries out particular 
functions within the society. In addition to the questions of women’s subordination, it 
allows us to ask questions about the demographic, socio-economic and cultural 
conditions that allow for the rise of the commercial marriage brokerage industry and to 
assess the consequences for the economy and society. In the next chapter, I will 
discuss the conditions behind the emergence of new marriage markets and migration 
systems in Asia. 
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CHAPTER SIX: 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE REGIONAL MARRIAGE MARKET: TRENDS 
IN CROSS-BORDER MARRIAGE 
Cross-border marriage in Asia is not a new phenomenon. The trends and patterns of 
cross-border marriages have changed over time, and the formation of the cross-border 
marriage market reflects certain changes in historical political economic conditions. 
For example, cross-border marriages between Japanese and Koreans, French and 
Vietnamese (Vu, 2006), and Pakistanis and Pakistani British (Charsley, 2008) are 
related to the colonial and post-colonial relations between the respective countries, and 
cross-border marriages between Koreans and Korean Americans and between 
Vietnamese and Vietnamese Americans (Thai, 2003; Goodkind, 1997) are related to 
political economic turmoil such as wars or other political-economic relations that 
created diasporas. These patterns of cross-border marriage among the same ethnic 
groups continue to exist.  
One of the recent changes in cross-border marriages is the emergence of new 
destinations such as Japan, Singapore, Taiwan, and Korea. This recent trend of cross-
border marriages seems distinctive in terms of its volume and the active role of 
commercial matchmaking agencies. Furthermore, the destinations have a great deal in 
common, including, in particular, their economic development experiences. How do 
we explain the emergence of new destinations for marriage migration? If cross-border 
marriage is a historically specific phenomenon, what kind of historical specificity has 
enabled this current trend of cross-border marriage to develop? These are important 
questions that have not been explored much in the studies of cross-border marriage, 
and which I attempt to explore in this chapter using the case of Korea and Vietnam. 
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The first section briefly explores the emergence of new destinations of marriage 
migration in Asia including Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea, which happen to 
share similar economic development paths73 (Wade, 1990; Jones and Findlay, 1998). 
The cross-border marriage coincides with a changing mode of social reproduction that 
corresponds to the structural changes led by the compressed economic development 
path of these destinations. In addition, the trends were expedited by the formation of 
the commercial marriage brokerage industry with the development of communication 
technology including the internet. The second section of this chapter explores the case 
of Korea and Vietnam more specifically and explains how the trends of cross-border 
marriage changed and the marriage market between the two countries was formed. 
6.1 A Question of Emergence of New Destinations of Marriage Migration and 
Economic Development in Asia 
6.1.1 Current Trends of Cross-Border Marriage and Studies 
Marriage migration to Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea from other parts of 
Asia has become increasingly visible during the last two decades.74 In 2003 the 
number of cross-border marriages was estimated to be 36,260 to Japan, 54,634 to 
Taiwan, 8,862 to Singapore, and 25,658 to South Korea.75 The percentage of cross-
border marriages of total marriages in 2003 was 4.9% in Japan, 32.1% in Taiwan, 
                                                 
73 Wade (1990) noted that the economic transformation from a predominantly agricultural base to that 
of a manufacturing exporter in Japan during the 1950s and 1960s is similar to that in Taiwan and Korea 
in the 1960s and 1970s (pp. 47–48).  
74 This is an assessment based on the data from the destinations. There are other trends, such as cross-
border marriage in the border-share areas and cross-border marriage between Southeast Asian women 
and men in the global North. However, the relevant data are less accessible than the complete data from 
the origins. The only origin that provides complete data may be the Philippines. And yet Jones and Shen 
(2008) noted that marriage migration to East Asia is the most important in terms of sheer numbers. See 
Jones and Shen (2008) for more complete mapping of the trends of cross-border marriage in East and 
Southeast Asia. 
75 Calculated from Jones and Shen (2008) for Singapore, Statistics and Information Department, 
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare, Vital Statistics of Japan, and the Korean National Statistical 
Office. 
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26.5% in Singapore, and 8.4% in South Korea. In this type of union, the foreign 
spouses are predominantly women: 77.5% in Japan, 75.8% in Singapore, and 74.8% in 
Korea.76 (See Figures 6.1 through 6.3) 
It is hard to estimate the total number of cross-border marriages because of the 
availability of data. The number of cross-border marriages from 1997 to 2007 in 
Korea is 261,079. Of those marriages, 186,758 were between Korean men and foreign 
women77 (Vital Statistics 2007, National Statistical Office). The total number of cross-
border marriages of men and women in Taiwan from 1998 to 2003 is 250,429 
(Department of Population, Ministry of the Interior, Taiwan, calculated from Jones 
and Shen, 2008). These women marriage migrants are mostly from other parts of Asia, 
but the origins of brides vary depending on the destination country. For example, the 
three biggest origins for marriage migration to Japan in 2003 are China, the 
Philippines, and Korea; for Taiwan they are China, Vietnam, and Indonesia; for Korea 
they are China (Korean Chinese and Han Chinese), Vietnam, and the Philippines; and 
for Singapore the top countries of origin are Malaysia, Indonesia, India, and China. 
Marriage between people of the same ethnicity is still observed in Taiwan and Korea 
(Jones and Shen, 2008). For example, in 2003, 64.7% of marriage migrants in Taiwan 
were ethnic Chinese, and in 2007, 33.8% of marriage migrants in Korea were ethnic 
Korean (Jones and Shen, 2008; Ministry of Administration and Security, 2007). 
                                                 
76 Ibid. 
77 In 2009, 167,090 marriage migrants lived in Korea, of whom 149,879 were women (Ministry of 
Administration and Security, 2009). The difference in numbers of marriage migrants partly reflects the 
number of divorce. The number of divorce between Korean and those with foreign origins from 2002 to 
2007 is 26,816 (Vital Statistics 2007, National Statistical Office) .  
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Figure 6.1 Marriage between Japanese and foreigners by sex, 1965–2006. 
(Source: Statistics and Information Department, Ministry of Health, Labor and 
Welfare, Vital Statistics of Japan. The data prior to 1970 do not include Okinawa 
Prefecture. Figures are the tabulation of Japanese and foreign nationals who married in 
Japan.) 
 
Figure 6.2 Marriage between Koreans and foreigners by sex, 1990–2009. 
(Source: National Statistical Office) 
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Figure 6.3 Marriage between Singaporeans and foreigners by sex, 1984–2007. 
(Source: Department of Statistics, Singapore) 
The pattern of cross-border marriages typically involves unions between men from 
wealthier countries and women from poorer countries, and this echoes the common 
pattern of the recent women’s labor migration (Constable, 2005). More specifically, 
the general pattern seems to be unions between men from wealthier countries who 
cannot find a spouse in the domestic marriage market because of their low income, 
education level, or rural background and women from poorer countries who seek 
economic improvement (Jones and Shen, 2008). Jones and Shen (2008) pay attention 
to the domestic population dynamics and point out the positive correlation between 
education and the proportion of remaining single women and the inverse correlation 
for single men. As women’s education improves and their labor participation 
increases, women tend to stay unmarried. On the other hand, less educated men of low 
income tend to remain unmarried as well. This can be read as a “marriage squeeze,” 
one that happens at two ends in this case (Jones, 2004). Unlike the conventional notion 
of “marriage squeeze,” which mainly focuses on the overall sex-ratio imbalance 
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among people of prime marriage age, this kind of marriage squeeze is often the result 
of rapid socioeconomic changes in a region. The study on marriage squeeze in Asia 
has focused more on the phenomenon of highly educated unmarried women than on 
unmarried men (Jones, 2004); however, the increase of female marriage migrants 
indirectly indicates that there is a marriage squeeze on men. 
One of the most widely accepted explanations for this kind of marriage squeeze is 
“gendered hypergamy,” according to which women tend to marry older men with 
more education or higher income (Constable, 2005; Jones, 2004), and it is also 
regarded as an important component in cross-border marriage. For example, Constable 
(2005) identified “global hypergamy” as one of the conceptual possibilities for 
theorizing cross-border marriages. While gendered hypergamy may be a plausible 
explanatory term, it requires careful attention when used as a general analytical 
framework. Gendered hypergamy presumes a stratification, which tends to be reduced 
to economic hierarchy. The primacy of the economic dimension is prevalent in most 
of the literature on cross-border marriage. The mail-order-bride approach, for 
example, emphasizes the economic disparity between the rich groom’s country and the 
poor bride’s country and highlights concerns about economic structural violence 
against women. This approach also appears to blend structural analysis of economic 
disparities between states, however, with an individual utility maximization approach, 
as one’s national identity is translated as an individual quality in this case, and treated 
as a prime identity. Attempts to overcome the shortcomings of structure approach, 
with its blanket victimization of women from poorer countries who marry men from 
richer countries, and its excessive emphasis on the structural violence against these 
women, have emphasized the agency of women in this process and how these women 
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negotiate their situations.78 These studies certainly expand the horizon of our 
understanding of cross-border marriages. In addition, they often engage in the notion 
of gendered hypergamy at least implicitly. 
Linking the marriage squeeze and cross-border marriage is an important step forward; 
however, it is rather overly simplistic to use gendered hypergamy as a framework. 
According to this logic, for example, women tend to marry up, and therefore more-
educated women cannot find a spouse because men tend to marry down, which in turn 
means that men with less education and lower income cannot find a spouse. Therefore, 
these men tend to look for spouses outside of the domestic marriage market, where 
their economic status can be translated as wealthy because of the status of their 
national economy within the world economy. Women, at the other end, may look for 
spouses outside of the domestic marriage market or stay unmarried. Put crudely, the 
hierarchy of national economies in the world economy is translated to one of 
individual quality, and this framework also assumes that this translation happens only 
in the population of both margins and that cross-border marriage will happen after 
exhausting the possibilities within the domestic marriage market. 
Gendered hypergamy does not necessarily explain why men’s search for a spouse 
outside of the domestic marriage market is so pronounced in East Asian countries in 
particular at this point, however. In order to answer this question, one must take 
structural conditions into account. I argue that the particular mode of economic 
development in these countries generated conditions that made certain groups of men 
less marriageable. In other words, a marriage squeeze at both ends indicates that men 
and women may have experienced the structural changes that occurred throughout the 
                                                 
78 See Constable (2005), Palriwala and Uberoi (2008), and Faier (2009). 
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industrialization period differently. The economic development path in East Asia was 
based on export-oriented industrialization that depended on cheap labor for the 
manufacturing sector, and the industrialization process was compressed into a short 
period of time. The socioeconomic and demographic changes that took place, such as 
GDP growth, industrial structural changes, rural to urban migration, urbanization, 
fertility decline, and improvements in women’s education and women’s labor market 
participation, were astonishing. Hence, the marriage squeeze is not just a matter of 
people’s individual qualifications in the marriage market but is also a structural issue 
associated with where these individuals belong within the social strata. For instance, 
being a farmer or a factory worker did not necessarily make a Korean man 
unmarriageable in the 1970s. The marriage squeeze is rather an indication of 
intensified stratification and an impasse of the ways in which social reproduction, in 
particular, of particular segments of the population is governed. 
6.1.2 Some Commonalities of New Destinations of Marriage Migration in Asia 
6.1.2.1 Rapid Industrialization and Decrease in Agricultural Sector 
There is a wealth of literature on economic development in East Asia. The East Asian 
strategy of economic development is often characterized as an export-oriented 
industrialization based on labor-intensive manufacturing for the global market in the 
process of the “new international division of labor”79 in the 1960s (Wade, 1990; Jones 
and Findlay, 1998; Mason, 2001). This led to a rapid structural transformation from an 
agricultural to an industrial and serviced-based economy (Mason, 2001, p. 7). As 
Table 6.1 shows, the percentage of the labor force in agriculture dropped from 33.1 in 
                                                 
79 This resulted in changes in production patterns “from specialized manufacturing concentrations in the 
older industrial countries to globally integrated production system whose labor intensive production 
sites have increasingly been located in the so-called newly industrializing countries” (Jones and Findlay, 
1998, p. 93). 
143 
1960 to 7.3 in 1990 in Japan, from 61.3 to 18.1 in Korea, from 56.1 to 12.6 in Taiwan, 
and from 7.4 to 0.4 in Singapore. In addition, the value added in agriculture dropped 
from 13.1 in 1960 to 2.5 in 1990 in Japan, from 35.8 to 8.7 in Korea, from 28.9 to 4.1 
in Taiwan, and from 3.8 to 0.3 in Singapore. Japan’s industrialization started earlier 
than other countries’ in the region, so the proportion of agriculture, in terms of both 
labor force and GDP contribution, is relatively lower than for Korea and Taiwan. The 
rates of rural to urban migration and urbanization were phenomenal. The urban 
population increased from 43.1% of total population in 1960 to 63.1% in 1990 in 
Japan, from 27.7% to 73.8% in Korea, and from 25.9% to 50.2% in 1985 in Taiwan 
(World Development Indicator; Speare et al., 1988). Singapore is an exception for this 
agricultural to industrial transformation in that its dependency on agriculture was low 
because it is city-state. These data indicate that the labor transfer from the agricultural 
sector played an important role in the early phase of industrialization in Japan, 
Taiwan, and Korea (Jones and Findlay, 1998) 
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Table 6.1 Summary of Agricultural Statistics: Four East Asian Countries, 1960–
1990  
Statistic and period Japan 
South 
Korea Taiwan Singapore 
Percentage of total labor force in agriculture 
1960 33.1 61.3 56.1 7.4 
1990 7.3 18.1 12.6 0.4 
Value added in agriculture (percentage of total GDP) 
1960 13.1 35.8 28.9 3.8 
1990 2.5 8.7 4.1 0.3 
Annual labor force growth, 1960–1990 (%) 
Combined 1.2 2.9 3.1 3.5 
Agriculture -3.9 -1.2 -1.9 -6.5 
Nonagriculture 2.3 5.4 5.4 3.7 
(adapted from Mason, 2001, p. 10) 
6.1.2.2 Labor Shortage, Migrant Labor and Women’s Labor Force Participation 
In the 1980s, “labor shortage, higher labor cost, capital accumulation, and 
considerable investment in education and other forms of human resource 
development” shifted these economies into “higher value-added manufacturing and 
service activities and growing investment in ‘offshore production’” (Jones and 
Findlay, 1998, p. 89). In response to the labor shortage, various policies to integrate 
the women into labor force—in particular married women—were implemented, and 
migrant workers appeared despite relatively strict regulation. While Japan and Korea 
attempted to solve the problem within their domestic labor markets, Singapore and, to 
a certain extent, Taiwan sorted out the issue by “importing” domestic workers from 
other countries (Bartram, 2000; Jones and Findlay, 1998). For example, Singapore and 
Hong Kong started to accept domestic workers, and Taiwan later implemented this 
policy in 1992 (Seol and Im, 2000). It is not clear to what extent these particular 
policies influenced women’s labor force participation, but their labor force 
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participation rates increased. Women’s labor force participation rates increased from 
45.7 in 1975 to 50.0 in 1995 in Japan, from 39.6 to 48.3 in Korea, from 38.1 to 45.3 in 
Taiwan, and from 29.6 to 50.1 in Singapore (Okunishi, 2001; Table 6.2).  
Figure 6.5 illustrates the trend over time in women’s labor force participation. In 1975 
by age followed a pronounced M shape in Japan and Korea, including highest labor 
participation among women between the ages of 20 to 24 and the lowest between the 
ages of 25 to 29, then showed recovery between the age 30–49 and a decline again 
after the age of 50. Women were thus largely out of the labor market during prime 
reproductive ages and rejoined labor market again as children grew older. In 1995, the 
lowest point of labor participation moved from ages 25 to 29 to ages 30 to 34, and the 
degree of decrease became more moderate in Japan, Korea and Taiwan. Again, 
women’s labor force participation rates in Singapore show a different trend; once it 
reaches its highest point, it decreases steadily. The trend in Taiwan is intermediate 
between Japan and Korea, and Singapore. Once the participation rate drops, it stays 
consistent until age 45 and then drops dramatically. Women’s labor force participation 
drops most during the reproductive years, and probably because child care depends on 
the family, especially women. 
Table 6.2 Women’s Labor Force Participation Rate, All Adults Ages 15 and 
Older 
 Census year 
Country 1975 1985 1995 
Japan 45.7 48.7 50 
South Korea 39.6a 41.9 48.3 
Taiwan 38.1 43.5 45.3 
Singapore 29.6b 44.9 50.1 
(Okunishi, 2001)  a14 and older, b10 and older 
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The trend of labor migration to Japan, Taiwan, and Korea emerged in the 1980s 
despite strict regulations. The patterns of migration are shown in Illustrations 6.1 and 
6.2. While Singapore relaxed the regulation on labor migration as early as 1968, others 
were rather slow in institutionalizing labor migration (Martin, 2001; Jones and 
Findlay, 1998). Taiwan officially accepted foreign workers in construction in 1989, in 
manufacturing in 1991, and domestic helpers and caregivers in 1992 (Seol and Im, 
2000). Japan and Korea did not accept unskilled migrant labor but “tacitly permit[ted] 
foreign students, industrial trainees and illegal entrants to take unskilled employment” 
(Jones and Findlay, 1998, p. 94). A work-permit system was implemented in Korea 
only in 2004 (http://www.eps.go.kr/kr/index.html). 
Japan Korea 
 
Taiwan Singapore 
Figure 6.5 Women’s Labor Force Participation by Age (Okunishi, 2001).  
a = ages 14–19; b = age 60 and older 
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Illustration 6.1 Migration in Asia 
Source: Global Migrant Origins Database 2007. 
Note: Bright line reflects 10 times the volume. 
 
 
 
Illustration 6.2 Three major Origins and Destinations of Marriage Migration in 
Asia  
Source: Based on Jones and Shen (2008) 
Note: Volume is not reflected in the arrows. 
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6.1.2.3 Decline in Fertility 
The fertility decline and the changes in family size occurred alongside the process of 
economic development in this region (See Figure 6.6). These were the consequences 
not only of economic development, but also of strong family-planning policies enacted 
as a part of economic development in Taiwan, Singapore, and Korea. They may have 
not influenced the labor market much in the 1980s but are thought to have a 
substantial impact now. In Japan, the total fertility rate was 2.0 in 1960, 1.54 in 1990, 
and 1.26 in 2005 (World Development Indicator). In Korea, the total fertility rate 
decreased from 5.66 in 1960, to 1.59 in 1990, to 1.08 in 2005 (World Development 
Indicator). In Singapore, the total fertility rate decreased from 5.4 in 1960 to 1.8 in 
2005 (World Development Indicator). In Taiwan, the total fertility rate was 2.71 in 
1978, 1.81 in 1990, and 1.11 in 2005 (Population and Housing Data, National 
Statistics in Taiwan). 
 
Figure 6.6 Total Fertility Rates in Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and Singapore 
(Source: World Development Indicator, Population and Housing Data from national 
statistics in Taiwan) 
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Jones and Findlay (1998) have argued that labor migration is related to regional 
economic integration. In a similar manner marriage migration may be related to 
structural changes associated with the economic development of individual countries, 
and with regional economic integration. Situating cross-border marriage within the 
regional context and analyzing the structural changes that have occurred in each 
country in the East Asian region is an ultimate research goal for the future. However, 
in this project I’ve limited my research to the case of Korea and Vietnam in order to 
provide an in-depth political economic context for the increase in cross-border 
marriage between these two particular states. 
6.2 The Formation of the International Marriage Market between Vietnam and 
Korea 
There are various theories about how migration streams are initiated and perpetuated. 
The most widely used framework is a push-pull theory to explore the push factors in 
the origins and pull factors in the destinations. For example, a high unemployment rate 
in the origin can be a push factor, and a labor shortage and high level of income in the 
destination can be pull factors. Migration theories have been developed with a focus 
on labor migration. Massey et al. (1993; 1994) summarized and evaluated the current 
theories of labor migration including neoclassical economics, new household 
economics of migration, dual labor market theory, world system theory, network 
theory, cumulative causation theory, institutional theory, and migration system theory. 
Each theory contributes to our understanding of migration with a different focus and at 
various levels of analysis, and all of these theories can overlap to a certain extent.  
Here I focus on the latter four theories, and their application in the perpetuation of 
marriage migration. The thesis of network theory is that migrant networks, “sets of 
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interpersonal ties among migrants, former migrants and non-migrants in origin and 
destination areas through the ties of kinship, friendship and shared community 
origins,” form social capital and serve to increase migration by reducing the cost and 
risk of migration (Massey et al., 1994, p. 728). Cumulative causation is defined as “the 
tendency for international migration to perpetuate itself over time, regardless of the 
conditions that originally caused it” (Massey et al., 1994, p. 733).  
Institutional theory suggests that private institutions such as commercial institutions 
and voluntary humanitarian organizations emerged to meet the demand of mediating 
the process once international migration began. Commercial institutions provide a 
range of services including “surreptitious smuggling across borders; clandestine 
transport to internal destinations; labor contracting between employers and migrants; 
counterfeit documents and visas; arranged marriages between migrants and legal 
residents or citizens of the destination country; and lodging, credit, and other 
assistance in counties of destination,” and humanitarian organizations provide services 
such as “counseling, social services, shelter, legal advice” (Massey et al., 1993, p. 
450).  
Migration systems are characterized by “relatively intense exchanges of goods, capital 
and people between certain countries” and generally consist of a core receiving region 
and a set of specific sending countries (Massey et al., 1993, p. 454). A migration 
system is not a fixed structure; rather it is dependent upon political economic changes 
such as “economic fluctuation, political upheaval or social change” (Massey et al., 
1993, p. 454). Network theory, cumulative causation theory, and institutional theory 
also intersect with migration system theory, but I will explore macroeconomic and 
institutional conditions in this section based on a migration system perspective. 
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A migration system cannot be divorced from the particular political-economic 
exchanges that occur among origins and destinations. In the case of Asia, the 
discussion on regional economic integration is important. Jones and Findlay (1998) 
argue that the East Asian international migration system emerged with economic 
integration based on their examination of institutional conditions and economic 
linkages such as foreign direct investment (FDI), trade, aid, and personal visits, for 
example, tourist flows. Martin (2001) sees growing investment and trade as an 
indication of Asian economic integration and suggests that increasing labor migration 
can serve as one of the pillars of Asian economic integration, including trade and 
investment. Although these discussions focus exclusively on labor migration, they are 
useful to understanding the structural commonality of the destinations because the 
identified destinations and origins of labor migration and marriage migration overlap. 
 Furthermore, Fawcett (1989) identified four categories of linkages in the migration 
system, “state to state relations; mass culture connections; family and personal 
networks; migrant agency activities,” and provided tangible examples such as “trade 
and financial flows, bilateral economic and technical assistance; international media 
diffusion through print, TV and film; remittance flows and correspondence from 
migrants; job recruitment and promotional materials and officially channeled 
remittances,” respectively (p. 674). These areas are also useful starting points for 
exploring the emergence of the marriage migration system. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, however, the approach to marriage migration cannot be same as the 
approach to labor migration. In a way, exploring the marriage migration system 
ultimately “genders” the current approach to migration systems. “Gendering” means 
exploring the gendered process of economic development and social reproduction. In 
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this section, I will explore the relationships between marriage migration and 
investment, labor migration, and cultural influences. 
6.2.1 Foreign Direct Investment and Cross-Border Marriages 
FDI is regarded as a key catalyst for new labor flow in a migration system (Jones and 
Findlay, 1998). The link between investment and labor flow is explained as follows:  
“the functional role of such links in migration is that they enhance transportation 
and communication systems as well as interpersonal information transfer . . . 
when international economic linkages involve countries of very different 
development levels, they are likely to stimulate unbalanced transfers—small 
numbers of the highly skilled in one direction, and large numbers of semi- and 
unskilled in the other” (pp. 95–96). 
Is this explanation applicable to cross-border marriage? In order for two people marry, 
a marriage market is required. By marriage market, I mean a pool of men and women 
who have potential to marry. How an international marriage market between two 
countries is formed is worth exploring. The literature on cross-border marriage in 
Taiwan highlighted FDI as a reference point from which to explore the reasons for the 
surge in marriages between Taiwanese men and Vietnamese women (Wang and 
Chang, 2002; Hsia 2004). Wang and Chang (2002) suggested that “the globalized 
capital investment indirectly catalyzed the development of the international marriage 
market” (p. 95). Hsia (2004) has argued that the economic interdependence between 
Taiwan and Southeast Asia contributed to the increase in marriage migration by 
applying a world-system approach to international migration. Hsia (2004) also 
attempted to show the linkage between FDI and marriage migration by laying out four 
types of marriage brokerage by Taiwanese investors and staff persons in Southeast 
Asia, transnational married couples, commercial marriage brokerage companies and 
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Southeast Asian women who work in Taiwan, and noted that the first three are 
relevant to the FDI. Hsia’s (2004) typology of brokers is useful, and indeed all of these 
types exist in the case of cross-border marriage in Korea. However, she did not 
account for how much each of these contributes to the full range of cross-border 
marriages. It is difficult to obtain accurate data to do so. However, it seems that 
marriages between Korean investors and staff persons in Vietnam and Vietnamese 
female workers occupy a relatively small proportion of cross-border marriages, 
judging from my interview with the brokers. Marriages through commercial 
arrangement or a migrants’ network seem more prominent practices. 
I reviewed the data on Korean direct investment in Vietnam. According to the 
Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam 2005, Taiwan and Korea are the first and second 
largest investors in Vietnam in terms of numbers of investment projects (p. 96). Figure 
6.7 shows a correlation between the FDI and the number of cross-border marriages 
between Vietnam and Korea. The investment began around 1992 when Korea and 
Vietnam established diplomatic relations. According to the Korea Trade–Investment 
Promotion Agency (KOTRA) (2007), 58% of the investment has taken place since 
2002. According to a KOTRA survey in Ho Chi Minh City, 68.2% of Korean 
investors engage in manufacturing sectors, and 65.5% invest in Southern Vietnam. 
This is relevant in the sense that the majority of Vietnamese marriage migrants are 
from Southern Vietnam. However, more layers of explanation are required in order to 
explain whether there is any kind of causal relationship between FDI and cross-border 
marriages. 
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Figure 6.7 Amount of Korean FDI to Vietnam and the number of spouse visas. 
(Source: KOTRA and Korean Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City) 
Hsia (2004) suggested a direct relation between FDI and marriage migration. I 
considered the possibility that Korean investors and staff persons are involved in 
cross-border marriage. For example, early investment from Korea to Vietnam was 
concentrated on labor-intensive light industry, which attracts female labor. While 
working in a factory, Vietnamese women may have married Korean co-workers or 
been introduced through them to other Koreans. The brokers with whom I spoke were 
skeptical about this possibility, however. According to one of the Korean brokers in 
Vietnam, while there were some instances in which Korean managers married 
Vietnamese women or introduced Vietnamese women to their acquaintances, this has 
happened only relatively recently, after marriage between Korean men and 
Vietnamese women had become increasingly popular through marriage brokerage 
agencies in Korea. In addition, none of the Vietnamese women I interviewed married 
through this process; most of them married through marriage brokerage agencies. 
According to the National Survey on Multicultural Families in 2009, 66.4% of 
Vietnamese marriage migrants answered that they married through the commercial 
marriage brokerage agency (Kim et al, 2010). If cross-border marriage between Korea 
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and Vietnam is predominantly arranged by marriage brokerage agencies, the question 
may be whether there is any relationship between the marriage brokerage industry and 
FDI. Another broker, who identified himself as on the frontier of the international 
marriage market between Korea and Vietnam, hinted at this possibility,  noting that he 
had gone to an industrial area where women workers reside in order to find a potential 
pool of candidates when he started his cross-border marriage brokerage business. 
While FDI may not influence cross-border marriage directly, high female population 
density caused by industrialization may play a role in generating a potential pool of 
candidates and by creating a venue for information to circulate and networks of 
marriage migrants to develop. The relationship between FDI and cross-border 
marriage is thus rather indirect. As exchanges between Korea and Vietnam have 
increased, business or personal networks have become established and, based on those 
networks, other cultural and economic exchanges—including labor migration or 
marriage migration have emerged. Migration agencies have played a role in this 
process. 
6.2.2 Mass Culture Connections and Cross-Border Marriages 
If FDI has helped to form a certain perception of Korea and Koreans within Vietnam, 
the Korean expatriot community may also have played a certain role. Their 
comparative wealth may have contributed to the view that Vietnamese people have 
which associates Korea with modernity. Even more influential than the presence of the 
Korean expatriot community is the Korean media. Some of the literature mentions that 
many Vietnamese women have developed an ideal image of Korea through watching 
Korean soap operas on TV (Kim, H. 2007). In the 1990s, the ownership of televisions 
increased dramatically within Vietnam from 2.3 million in 1990 to 3.57 million in 
2000, and satellite TV and the Internet became popular in the 2000s. By 2007, 
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Vietnam had 17.87 million Internet users80 (CIA, 2009). On average, 20 Korean soap 
operas per year have been purchased by Vietnamese TV stations since the first 
purchase was made in 1997 (Yoon, 2004). Korean soap operas account for 30% to 
35% of the Vietnamese soap opera market (Yoon, 2004)81.  
6.2.3 Labor Migration and Cross-Border Marriages 
It is also worth exploring the relationships among Korean investment in Vietnam, 
labor exchange between the two countries, and cross-border marriage. According to 
the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and Social Affairs in Vietnam, 118,756 
Vietnamese migrated to other countries for the purposes of labor during the period 
1992–2000, among them 16,836 females (Table 6.3). South Korea was the biggest 
destination country: during the period 1991–1999, 36,107 Vietnamese migrated to 
Korea for work, among them 8,007 females (Dang et al., 2003, appendix, Table 6.4). 
                                                 
80 “This entry gives the number of users within a country that access the Internet. Statistics vary from 
country to country and may include users who access the Internet at least several times a week to those 
who access it only once within a period of several months” (CIA, 2009). 
81 Indeed, it was not difficult for me to watch Korean soap operas in the rural areas, even without 
satellite TV, during my field research in Vietnam. 
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Table 6.3 Vietnam’s Labor Migrants by Sex, 1992–2000 (Dang et al., 2003) 
Year Total Female % Female 
1992 816 101 12.4 
1993 3,976 538 13.5 
1994 9,234 986 10.7 
1995 9,593 1,723 18.0 
1996 12,661 2,065 16.3 
1997 18,469 1,977 10.7 
1998 12,197 1,447 11.9 
1999 21,810 3,499 16.0 
2000 30,000 4,500 15.0 
Total 118,756 16,836 14.2 
Note: The number of labor migrants is cumulative. Source: MOLISA (2000) 
Table 6.4 Vietnam’s Labor Migrants to Selected Countries of Destination, 1991–
1999 (Dang et al., 2003) 
Destination Total Female Percentage of Female 
Japan 9,757 4,117 42.2 
South Korea 36,107 8,007 22.2 
Taiwan 6,615 3,468 52.4 
Singapore 487 3 0.6 
Arab 712 234 32.9 
Kuwait 2,527 21 0.8 
Libya 9670 0 0 
Eastern Europe* 4,460 1,305 29.3 
Note: *includes Former USSR, Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria, 
Poland, and Slovakia. Source: MOLISA (2000) 
Marriage migration from Vietnam to Korea started around 1999, nearly a decade after 
labor migration became relatively common. The fact that labor migration from 
Vietnam to Korea occurred a decade ahead leaves open the possibility that marriages 
among female Vietnamese migrant workers in Korea and Korean men had begun to 
take place. Consistent with Piper’s (2003) discussion on the blurred distinction 
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between marriage migration and labor migration, one of my interviewees mentioned 
that some female Vietnamese industrial trainees married Korean men after the 
economic crisis in 1997. However, the total number of marriages between Vietnamese 
women and Korean men until 2000 was fairly small.82 To verify the possibility of 
marriages between Vietnamese women workers in Korea and Korean men, I compared 
the number of spouse visa attainments and the number of cross-border marriage 
reports.83 As seen in Table 6.5, there are some differences in numbers between the two 
sets of data. For example, the number of cross-border marriages in 2006 is 10,131 
according to Korean vital statistics, but the number of visa attainments from the 
Korean embassy in Vietnam is 8,529. One speculation is that the difference in 
numbers may indicate the number of marriages between Vietnamese labor migrants 
and Koreans. By 2007, 25,659 Vietnamese workers were enumerated in Korea, of 
whom 4,317 were women. In addition, 13,444 Vietnamese students or Vietnamese of 
other category were in Korea, of whom 3,278 were women (Ministry of 
Administration and Security, 2007). It is not clear how many of these women had 
married Korean men because immigration statistics do not offer data on the number of 
visa changes. However, the number of Vietnamese female labor migrants and other 
visa holders, for example, students in Korea,84 is not likely to make up the whole 
difference.  
One other possibility is that the difference in numbers arises because of the procedure 
involved in cross-border marriage. Korean men usually go to Vietnam and marry 
Vietnamese women in Vietnam, then report their marriage to the Korean government 
                                                 
82 Vietnamese were classified as miscellaneous before 2000 in most National Statistical Office 
publications.  
83 I used the data from the Korean embassy in Vietnam instead of Korean immigration office data 
because the classification of the Korean immigration office data has changed over time.  
84 Data on marital status is not available.  
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after they have returned to Korea. Since one can report a marriage without being a 
spouse present in Korea, a Korean man can report the marriage in Korea in order to 
speed up the process for his Vietnamese spouse to obtain a visa. Then, the men send 
the necessary documents to their Vietnamese wives in Vietnam, which allows them to 
apply for visa to go to Korea. According to my interviews, it takes at least two months 
and sometimes a year from the time of the marriage to the departure for Korea. 
Nonetheless, the number of spouse visa attainments clearly indicates that most 
Vietnamese women who marry Koreans come to Korea directly through marriage, and 
not initially through labor migration. 
Table 6.5 The Number of Spouse Visa Attainments at the Korean Embassy in 
Vietnam and Cross-Border Marriages, from Vital Statistics 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Reported 
number of 
marriages with 
Vietnamese 
women 
95 134 476 1,403 2,462 5,822 10,131 6,611 
Spouse visa 
attainment 
83 104 400 1,602 2,389 4,566 8,529 7,956 
(Source: Korean Consulate in Ho Chi Minh City and National Statistical Office) 
To more fully understand the relationship between labor migration and marriage 
migration the trends are examined in Table 6.6 and Figure 6.8. While the volume of 
Vietnamese marriage migration to Korea has continued to increase, Vietnamese 
female labor migration has decreased since 2003, after the Korean government 
introduced the guest worker permit system. Under the guest work permit system, 
Korean entrepreneurs file their preferences for guest workers to the authorities, who in 
turn mediate the transaction of labor migrants. In many cases, the economic sectors 
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most in need of migrant workers, are manufacturing, agriculture, and construction, for 
which Korean entrepreneurs generally prefer male workers. The opportunities for 
female labor migrants have been slimmer since 2003. Interestingly, the scale of 
marriage migration has increased dramatically since 2003 (Ko et al., 2005). 
Intuitively, we might hypothesize that Vietnamese women increasingly have been 
choosing marriage migration, as the channel for labor migration has narrowed. 
Because there are many other factors associated with the increase of cross-border 
marriages, however, establishing causality remains difficult. 
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Figure 6.8 Cumulative numbers of female labor migrants and marriage migrants. 
(Source: Immigration Statistics from 2000–2005; Ministry of Justice) 
Table 6.6 Cumulative Number of Female Labor Migrants and Marriage 
Migrants  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Female labor migrants (total 
number of labor-related visa 
holders in Korea) 
4530 5198 5344 6201 5420 4510 
Marriage migrants (total number 
of spouse visa holders) 
180 253 444 1744 3693 7412 
(Source: Immigration Statistics from 2000–2005; Ministry of Justice) 
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6.3 Conclusion 
I started this chapter by showing the common trends of cross-border marriage in 
Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and Singapore and raised the question as to whether cross-
border marriage is related to the experience of economic development. In exploring 
this question, I attempted to engage the ongoing discussion regarding economic 
integration in Asia and the rise of the labor migration system. I have endeavored to 
show that the patterns of labor migration and marriage migration within East and 
Southeast Asia are quite similar in some ways. Understanding marriage migration in 
this context requires further analysis, however. I have explored some demographic and 
economic indicators, including changes in the contribution of agriculture to GDP, the 
percent of the labor force engaged in agriculture, the percent the population that is 
urban, women’s labor force participation, and fertility, to show the structural 
similarities and differences among these countries. In order to locate cross-border 
marriage within a regional context, in particular as it relates to economic development 
and integration, it will be necessary to explain the relationship between economic 
development and the resulting changes in population, family, and the mode of social 
reproduction, however. This will be discussed more in the next chapter. 
In the second half of the chapter, I explored possible linkages between FDI, mass 
cultural exchange, and labor exchange, which were suggested by migration system 
theorists. This is a somewhat troublesome process because it is difficult to show a 
direct relationship between these factors and cross-border marriage, although the 
linkage appears reasonable intuitively. Although I acknowledge that examining each 
factor’s associated with cross-border marriage is not the most feasible way to describe 
the relationships, I have attempted to consider each factor individually in as detailed a 
way as possible before providing a story. Last, I did not devote a great deal of 
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attention to the marriage brokerage industry in this chapter because the previous 
chapter highlighted the emergence of marriage brokerage industry. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: 
FAMILY DEPENDENT SOCIAL REPRODUCTION SYSTEM IN KOREA 
AND THE “MULTICULTURAL FAMILY” AS AN ENTERPRISE FOR 
RESTORING FAMILY VALUES IN THE CHANGING POLITICAL 
ECONOMIC CONTEXT 
 
In 2006, when the report of immigration statistics in South Korea was released, the 
South Korean media generated a great deal of publicity about it and competitively 
published articles with titles such as “With 1 million foreigners, Korea is heading 
toward a multicultural society” and “Foreigners occupy 1% of the population: The 
Age of the Multicultural Society has arrived in Korea” (Seoulsinmun, 2005). Setting 
aside questions of what qualifies as a multicultural society or what constitutes a “big” 
number, these articles reflect the media’s great interest in the presence of foreigners. 
As of 2007, 1 million (1,066,291) foreigners resided in Korea, of whom about 10% 
were female marriage migrants (Ministry of Justice, 2008a).85 Although the total 
number of marriage migrants among foreigners is not large, marriage between Korean 
men and foreign women in particular has garnered enormous attention due to its 
dramatic increase. “Marriage migrants” and “multicultural family” were the most 
popular terms in the policy arena since 2006, and a wide range of policies related to 
cross-border marriage or multicultural families have been implemented. The attention 
to the multicultural families is not just about the issue of increasing number of 
foreigners in Korea. In this chapter, I attempt to examine how the attention to the 
multicultural family is linked to the current issues of the population and care crises in 
Korea, and suggest that cross-border marriages may play a role as one of the 
mechanisms for dealing with these issues.  
                                                 
85 This report also notes that there were 8,145 illegal migrants who came to Korea through marriage.  
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The family has been an important institution for care provision in Korean society, 
where the state plays a relatively minor role. The way in which family provides care 
has changed overtime as family patterns changed and women’s labor force 
participation increased from the industrialization since the 1960s. Furthermore the 
recent economic restructuring in the 1990s put pressure on the current welfare regime 
to be re-organized. The attention to the cross-border marriage and multicultural 
families can be understood in the context of changing the family dependent welfare 
regime in Korea. In this chapter, I attempt to show how the concerns of population and 
care provision intersect around the families, and how multicultural families are linked 
to these concerns. First, I will explore the changes in population, labor, and welfare 
regime in Korea with a focus on the family, women’s labor force participation, and 
how these changes are reflected in the recent policies on “healthy families.” Then, I 
will provide a brief description of the demographic characteristics of cross-border 
marriage from the 2009 National Survey on Multicultural Families and the 2006 
marriage-migrants survey and discuss the implications of the multicultural family in 
the given context. 
7.1 Conditions and Discourse of Population and Care Crisis in Korea 
7.1.1 Population Regime 
7.1.1.1 Family Planning Campaign under the Developmental Regime (1961–1995) 
Population has been an important concern since the developmental regime, which 
seized power through a coup in 1961. During this period the governance was highly 
centralized and oriented toward economic development, and it has often been called a 
“developmental dictatorship” or “developmental state.” Population control was 
rationalized as a condition for the adequate supply of labor and jobs in the economic 
165 
development plan, as the “Population, Labor Force and Employment” section in the 
summary of the first five-year economic plan in 1962 makes clear: 
Since population, in the absence of well developed national policies, can be 
expected to grow at an accelerated rate, due to improved medical and 
sanitation services, which will reduce the death rate, and to an increase of 
females of reproductive age, population control measures will be required. . . . 
Assuming that the sum of the rate of increase in employment and the rate of 
increase in productivity determines the rate of economic growth, it is expected 
that the number of new jobs created will be greater than the number of new 
entrants to the labor force during the plan period, thereby reducing 
unemployment. (p. 31) 
A national family-planning program was started by the Ministry of Health and Social 
Affairs in 1962, and family-planning counseling clinics were set up at 183 health 
centers (Kim and Ross, 2007). The family-planning program was linked to the overall 
development of maternal and child-care services in the second economic development 
plan (Korean Government, 1966, pp. 131–132). The Planned Parenthood Federation of 
Korea (PPFK) was established as a voluntary organization in 1961 as a member 
association of the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and played an 
important role in processing foreign aid for family planning and delivering family-
planning programs to the public, including educating people about various 
contraceptive methods, providing contraceptive services and supplies, and conducting 
research.86 The PPFK’s statement of purpose indicates that the family-planning 
campaign was carried out not only in terms of limiting the number of children but also 
in terms of a broader modernization project: 
                                                 
86 Although it was a voluntary organization, it worked closely with the government. Its annual budget 
grew to 450,000 USD, 90% of which was from foreign grants and 10% of which was from the 
government (Kim et al., 1972, p. 77). According to Kim et al. (1972), over 3 million dollars of foreign 
contributions were made to the PPFK from 1961 to 1972, and the primary contributors are the 
Population Council and the IPPF, with the Pathfinder Fund, OXFAM, the Asia Foundation, and the 
Brush Fund providing smaller amounts. 
166 
The family planning movement aims at helping individual families maintain an 
ideal family size and thus guarantee a better life for all people. Accordingly, 
family planning is: a moral movement designed to respect a human life from 
the time of birth; a public health movement for maternal and child health, both 
physical and mental; and a cultural movement which helps all people have a 
worthwhile life through betterment of the individual and national economic 
standard. (Kim et al., 1972, p. 76) 
The plan of the family-planning campaign in Korea was highly centralized but its 
execution was decentralized. The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs deployed 
persons in charge of family planning to each city and province in 1963 (Kim et al., 
1972). The PPFK deployed two workers for family planning to medical centers 
nationwide, and fieldworkers were sent to 1,473 townships for enlightenment purposes 
(PPFK, 1975 in Hwang, 2005). A network of local women was mobilized by the 
PPFK. For example, approximately 17,000 mother’s clubs were organized in 1968, 
one for every two or three villages (Kim et al., 1972, p.93). Mother’s clubs were an 
information-sharing network and members encouraged other women in the village to 
use contraceptive methods, especially birth-control pills. This network later became 
known as the “New township women’s club” with the government’s rural 
development project, the “New township movement,” in the 1970s (Hwang, 2005, 
p.114). 
The Ministry of Health and Social Affairs took primary responsibility for family 
planning, but other ministries were also involved in this project. For example, in 1976, 
a family with two children enjoyed an income-tax reduction and priority treatment 
when it came to allocating public housing. Parents who had less than two children and 
obtained a sterilization operation enjoyed priority treatment for loans and medical 
services (Kim, 2006). The government used mass communication networks including 
radio, television, films and exhibitions for family planning campaign. The Office of 
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Public Information under the Ministry of Culture and Public Information had 118 
mobile vans, which showed films in the villages (Kim et al., 1972, p. 91). 
As a result of the family-planning campaign and the rapid socioeconomic changes that 
occurred, the total fertility rate in Korea decreased from 6.3 during the period 1955–
1960 (Kwon, 1981, p. 25), to 3.47 in 1975, and to 1.67 in 1985, which is below the 
replacement level (Cho, 1996, p. 23, Repetto, 1981, p. 144). As vital statistics data 
show, the fertility rate continued to decrease.87 (See Table 7.1) However, Kim (1981) 
noted that the impact of the family-planning program plateaued around the mid-1970s 
and, hence, the Fourth Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1977–1981) included 
more indirect population policies, such as those involving education and health care. 
Also, at this point, the challenge became dealing with the population dynamics that 
were caused by previous economic development programs such as rural to urban 
migration (Kim, 1981). The total fertility rate had fallen below the replacement level 
by 1983, but it was around the mid-1990s that family planning campaign was stopped. 
Table 7.1 Trends in Vital Statistics, 1970–2005  
Trend 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 
Total Population* 31,922** 34,707 37,436 40,448 43,411 44,609 46,136 47,870** 
Total Fertility Rate 4.53 3.47 2.83 1.67 1.59 1.65 1.47 1.08 
Sex Ratio at Birth 109.5 112.4 105.3 109.4 116.5 113.2 110.2 107.7 
Life Expectancy 64** 63.82 65.09 68.44 71.28 73.53 76.02 82** 
*including foreigners, unit: thousand 
** UN Population Prospectus 2006 
(Source: National Statistical Office) 
                                                 
87 In 2007, the total fertility rate (TFR) increased slightly to 1.26. According to the National Statistical 
Office, this is because of the popular belief that according to the Chinese horoscope 2007 is a fortunate 
year.  
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7.1.1.2 Population Quality and Pronatalist Policies (1996–present) 
In 1994, the “Committee for Development of Population Policy” was organized as an 
advisory committee for the Minister of the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs 
(currently Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs),88 and this committee 
recommended abolishing the “population control policy” and promoting a “population 
quality and welfare policy” (Kim et al., 2004, p. 106). The Population Policy Inquiry 
Council89 also suggested that policies to lower fertility were no longer desirable based 
on population projections for 2021. According to the projections, Korea will 
experience a decrease in the labor force and an increasing burden in supporting the 
aging population. Accordingly, the general ideas of the new population policy of 1996 
are as follows: 1) maintaining the current fertility rate,90 which is necessary for 
sustainable development and improving the mortality rate; 2) promoting family health 
and welfare; 3) balancing the sex ratio at birth; 4) promoting women’s labor force 
participation and welfare; 5) improving the health and welfare of older adults; and 6) 
balancing the geographical population distribution (Cho, 1996). 
Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea (PPFK) changed its focus and announced a 
new population policy for population quality in 1996. The new population policy 
refers to raising fertility and improving the conditions required to do so. The shift of 
the focus can be read easily from their slogans and posters. In the 1970s, the best-
known slogan was “raise two kids regardless of their gender,” and this slogan changed 
later in the 1980s to “one kid regardless of gender.” In the 2000s, the whole discourse 
                                                 
88 Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, http://epic.kdi.re.kr/epic/epic_view.jsp?num=26596&menu=2, 
accessed on 2009-10-07. 
89 It was established in 1976 within the government in order to plan comprehensive population policies. 
The Minister was the chair of the committee (National Archive, 
http://contents.archives.go.kr/next/content/viewMain.do, accessed on 2009-10-07). 
90 The total fertility rate in 1996 was 1.7. 
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moved in the opposite direction, and the slogan stated, “it is better to have two kids 
than one, three than two.” With this change in the direction of population policy, the 
major focus also extended to other areas, such as family/maternal health, marriage 
projects, aging society projects, youth projects, sexual culture projects with a focus on 
encouraging more births. For example, the PPFK runs marriage-support programs for 
single people since it is clear that the low marriage rate contributes to low fertility. 
The PPFK website does not specify whether it encourages international marriages per 
se, but the marriage support center website has a banner in the Vietnamese language, 
as seen in Illustration 6.1 (www.Match.kr). This suggests that the PPFK also 
recognizes cross-border marriage between Korean nationals and foreigners, in 
particular, Vietnamese, as a solution to the current low marriage rate. It also provides 
extensive information about childbirth and child care, including government policies, 
information on medical centers, child care and maternal health knowledge, and so on 
(www.aga-love.org). The Planned Parenthood Federation of Korea changed its name 
to the Population, Health and Welfare Association in 2006. 
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Illustration 7.1 PPFK Posters from the 1970s to the 2000s 
 
 
1970s 
 
Way to $1,000 GNP per capita in 1981 
 
Raise two kids regardless of their gender 
1980s 
 
One well-raised daughter is 
better than 10 sons. 
 
Even two are too many! 
2000s 
 
Marriage and Procreation are 
the greatest gifts for human 
beings 
 
It is happier to have two kids 
than one, three than two. 
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While the population-quality policy helped encourage women’s labor force 
participation and establish the health and welfare system for society’s underprivileged, 
it did not prevent the total fertility rate from decreasing (Cho, 2006). In 2004, the 
presidential committee on low fertility and a future society was established. One of its 
mandates was to work on the mid- and long-term population policy. Cho (2006) saw it 
as a transition towards a pronatalist policy. According to Cho (2006), the purpose of a 
pronatalist policy is not to increase the population size but to delay a population 
decrease that would be caused by a rapid low-fertility trend and to maintain the 
population structure for sustainable development. Concerns about the pace of the 
population change seem prevalent among population scholars. Many population 
studies predicted that the speed towards an aging society in Korea will be 
unprecedented.91 Because the pace of fertility reduction was extraordinary in Korea, 
the pace at which its society ages is expected to be extraordinary as well. The real 
concern regarding this population change lies in the economic arena, with a decrease 
in the productive population and an increase in the dependent population, including 
the burden of caring for the elderly population (Kim, Y 2006; Kim, J 2006; Cho 2006; 
Koo 2006). Other state policies including those for labor, welfare, education, family, 
and so on are all potentially implicated given concern over Korea’s changing 
demographics. 
                                                 
91 According to the projections, Korea would take 18 years to reach an aged society with more than 
14% of population is older than 65 and 8 additional years to reach an super aged society with more than 
20% of population is older than 65, compared with 71 years and 15 years for the United States 
respectively (Kim Y, 2006, p. 3, Kim, J 2006; Cho 2006; Koo 2006). 
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“Speed Dating Festival for single men and women, with the support of Ulsan 
Metropolitan City !!” 
 
Illustration 7.2 Website of Marriage Support Center run by PPFK. 
(Source: www.match.kr assessed 2009-02-08) 
The quantitative nature of the family planning policy moved towards more a 
qualitative policy in the context of low fertility. Although the numerical concern about 
the population remained, the solutions were designed to address the formation of the 
family, the improvement of public child care and education system, which has been 
the important function of family, and work–family reconciliation. While the solutions 
for reducing population growth are standardized and well developed, the solutions for 
increasing population growth seem more flexible. Hence, the notion of population 
policy became broader and fuzzier. From the mid-2000s on, a series of population 
related national laws including the “Framework Act on Healthy Families” (Act. No. 
7166) in 2004, the “Basic Law on Low Fertility and an Aging Society” (Act. 
No.7496)” in 2005, and the “Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea” (Act. 
No.8442) were passed. At the local level, various population policies were 
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implemented even before low fertility became a national concern, but more 
population-related policies were implemented in the mid-2000s. For example, 26 bills 
supporting marriage for rural bachelors were passed between 2006 and 2007. 
7.1.1.3 Decentralization and Population Policy at the Local Level 
Concerns about population growth became more acute after the decentralization of the 
governmental system in 1991 in the rural areas. The basic idea of decentralization 
(“Local Autonomy System”) was that local governments and councils have political, 
economic autonomy in their region and that this autonomy will enhance grassroots 
democracy. However, the level of autonomy has remained very low because local 
governments are highly dependent on the central government both economically and 
politically. The scale of the central government’s support for local governments varies 
depending on the population size and the level of administrative classification of the 
local government. Furthermore, administrative classifications are also based on 
population size. For example, in order for a county to become a city, it must have a 
certain number of residents. Hence, the number of residents is very important to the 
local government not only administratively, but also economically. Local governments 
that lack industry to attract people tend to be more vulnerable when it comes to 
maintaining the population within their administrative territory. Local governments 
may lose funding as a result of a decline in the local population, and in extreme cases, 
a population decrease may lead to integration with another administrative unit (Kim Y, 
2006). Hence, every local government tends to promote the development plan of its 
own unit and its own population policy. 
The average population growth rate of counties was −1.65 in 2003, and some counties 
faced a −10.7% population growth rate (National Statistical Office). Under these 
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circumstances, local governments actively implemented various actions to deal with 
their own population issues within the available legal frameworks and resources, while 
the central government addressed more general concerns about low fertility. Although 
the level of autonomy for local governments is low and, therefore, the contents of their 
welfare policies are not very different from that of the central government, there are 
some variations in population policies. Some local governments, which faced serious 
population problems as a result of a combination of low fertility and an aging 
population, began implementing population policies before 2005 when the Framework 
Act on Low Fertility and an Aging Society (Act. No.7496) was implemented at the 
national level. Among 234 units including cities, counties, and districts, 97 units are 
classified as “aged societies” (the percentage of people who are older than 65 is more 
than 14%), and 60 units are classified as “very aged societies” (the percentage of 
people who are older than 65 is more than 20%) (National Statistical Office). In 
particular, the more aged areas tend to have weaker economic foundations to attract 
in-migration. Hence a natural increase of population is important for the governments 
in those areas; however, natural increase is not very promising either given local 
population structures. Also, the more aged areas tend to need to spend more on the 
welfare of the elderly. Promoting marriage among local residents seems very rational 
for those local governments because family formation can solve both the population 
and care provision problems at the same time. Indeed, 18 out of 26 local councils that 
passed bills to support the marriage of rural bachelors have elderly populations of 
more than 14%. 
The population policies of local governments vary from providing financial support 
for giving birth and raising children to arranging dating events for single men and 
women. According to the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs, in 2008 
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there were 1,710 population policies at the local level, including 54 for marriage 
support, 504 for pregnancy support, 383 for birth support, 432 for child care, 95 for 
consciousness raising and public information, 83 for the support for marriage migrants 
and “multicultural families,” and 159 for others92 (Ministry of Health, Welfare and 
Family Affairs 2008). The policies are largely geared towards procreation and child 
care. However, the support for marriage and marriage migrants is also included as an 
important part in local population policy. Marriage support includes education and 
free medical examinations for (prospective) couples, free collective weddings, and 
matchmaking services. Support for marriage migrants includes a social adaptation 
program, child-care support for multicultural families, and medical support for 
multicultural families. 
A number of local councils devised bills to support the international marriages of local 
bachelors in 2006 and 2007. Although the titles of the bills vary, their primary intent 
was to allocate local government funds to rural bachelors who attempt to marry. In 
most cases, bills specifically indicated support for the international marriages of rural 
bachelors. These bills can be understood in the context of local population issues. 
7.1.2 The Family-Dependent Welfare Regime in Korea 
The Korean welfare regime is family-dependent in that wealth is distributed through 
the wages of individual families and managed at the level of the family unit. The role 
of state welfare has been rather nominal as shown in Figure 7.1, although it has been 
                                                 
92 Pregnancy support includes providing vitamins, various supports for medical examinations for 
pregnant women and babies, running classes, and funds for celebrating pregnancy. Birth support 
includes providing funds to support birth, providing necessities for newborns, and supporting health 
insurance for newborns. Child-care support includes providing funds for child care, nighttime child-care 
facilities, and medical support. Consciousness raising and public information includes pronatal 
campaigns, fostering birth- and child-care-friendly environments, birth-friendly company awards, and 
population education. 
176 
increasing over time. The changes in family patterns accumulated from the 
industrialization period and the economic restructuring in the 1990s undermined this 
kind of welfare regime. Reorganization of the welfare regime was inevitable and this 
happened with strengthening state welfare and restoring family welfare 
simultaneously.  
 
Figure 7.1 Social Security Budget93 
Source: Yearbook of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs Statistics, Ministry for 
Health, Welfare & Family Affairs 
The family wage system is an important link among the institutions of the care 
provision including state, market and family. The family wage and male-breadwinner 
system are argued to have played an ideological role in the economic structure with 
regard to wages, taxes, and so on (Hartmann 1981). However, whether a family wage 
was realized, in other words, whether one person’s income has fully supported an 
                                                 
93 The social security budget is divided into three items: public assistance, welfare services, and others. 
“Social Security is a basic means for building a welfare society by providing an opportunity for all 
citizens to realize themselves through helping out people who cannot support themselves, such as the 
elderly. Public Assistance is for the lower-income class or the poor who cannot support themselves. It is 
funded by the government and the government selects its beneficiaries. Welfare services refers to the 
institutional facilities for the elderly, the handicapped, the homeless, children, and women. Most of 
them are run privately, but they are funded by the government as well” (Yearbook of Health, Welfare 
and Family Affairs Statistics, Ministry for Health 2008, Welfare and Family Affairs).  
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entire family, is a different question. It is generally agreed that the idea of the family 
wage and the male breadwinner have been prevalent in Korea (Lee, J 2005; Ma and 
Lee, J 2007), and that the family wage was realized among a segment of the 
population during the 1980s with the emergence of middle class in Korea (Kang 
2007). The extent to which the decline of the family wage and the male-breadwinner 
system in Korea contributed to the increase in women’s labor force participation is not 
certain, however. I explore the changes in the family, women’s labor force 
participation, and the wage in the following sections. 
7.1.2.1 Changes in the Family 
The form of families has diversified with rapid industrialization in Korea. Two-
generation households are the most prevalent form even though their contribution 
within all forms of households decreased from 68.5% in 1980 to 55.4% in 
200594(KWDI, 2006). More specifically, the proportion of households with a married 
couple and their children was quite consistent between 1985 and 2000 (57.8% in 1985, 
58% in 1990, 58.6% in 1995, and 57.8% in 2000), but it dropped sharply to 42.2% in 
2005 (KWDI, 2006, Table 7.3). This is partly because of the decrease in marriage and 
the increase in divorce. In addition, there has been a decrease in three-generation 
households and an increase in one-generation households and single-person 
households over time (KWDI, 2006). As is shown in Table 7.2, the proportion of 
three- or more-generation households decreased from 17% in 1980 to 7% in 2005, the 
                                                 
94 Census data on households distinguish between family households and nonfamily households. The 
categories of household data are as follows: one-generation households, two-generation households, 
three-generation households, four- or more-generation households, one-person households, and 
nonfamily households. Two-generation households are subdivided into “couple and their children,” “a 
father and his children,” “a mother and her children,” “a couple and their parents,” “a couple and one 
parent,” “a couple, their children, and their siblings,” “grandparents and grandchildren,” and “others.” 
According to 2005 census data, 76% of two-generation households fall under “a couple and their 
children.” 
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proportion of single-generation households increased from 8.3% to 16.2%, and that of 
single-person households increased from 4.8% to 20% (KWDI, 2006). This trend is 
even more acute in the rural areas because of the out-migration of the younger 
generation (KWDI, 2006).  
Table 7.2 Households by Generation (KWDI, 2006, p. 74) 
Year 
Single- 
generation 
households 
Two-
generation 
households 
Three-
generation 
households 
Four- or 
more-
generation 
households 
Single- 
person 
households 
Households 
of 
unrelated 
persons 
1980 8.3 68.5 16.5 0.5 4.8 1.5 
1985 9.6 67 14.4 0.4 6.9 1.7 
1990 10.7 66.3 12.2 0.3 9 1.5 
1995 12.7 63.3 9.8 0.2 12.7 1.4 
2000 14.2 60.8 8.2 0.2 15.5 1.1 
2005 16.2 55.4 6.9 0.1 20 1.4 
(Source: Census, National Statistical Office) 
Table 7.3 Households by Family Type and Composition  
Year 
Nuclear family Directly extended family Other types 
Married 
couple 
Married 
couple with 
child(ren) 
Father or 
Mother 
with 
child(ren) 
Married 
couple 
with 
parents 
Married 
couple with 
parents and 
child(ren) 
 
1985 7.8 57.8 9.7 0.8 9.9 14 
1990 9.3 58 8.7 0.9 9.4 13.8 
1995 12.6 58.6 8.6 1.1 8 11.2 
2000 14.8 57.8 9.4 1.1 6.8 10.1 
2005 14.2 42.2 8.6 1 4.5 29.5 
(Source: Census, National Statistical Office) 
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Table 7.4 Female Heads of Households by Marital Status 
Year Married Widowed Divorced Never married 
% of total 
household 
1980 22.3 58.1 3.9 15.7 14.7 
1985 22.7 52.2 4.3 20.7 15.7 
1990 17.7 56.3 5.6 20.4 15.7 
1995 15.7 56.1 7.1 21.1 16.6 
2000 16.6 50.5 11.6 21.4 18.5 
2005 17.9 44.4 14.4 23.2 21.9 
(Source: Census, National Statistical Office) 
The percentage of female headed household increased from 14.7% in 1980 to 21.9% 
in 2005 (KWDI, 2006). By marital status, the percentage of divorced female heads of 
household increased from 3.9% in 1980 to 14.4% in 2005, and the percentage of 
never-married female heads of household increased from 15.7% in 1980 to 23.2% in 
200595 (KWDI, 2006, Table 7.4). The increase in female heads of household has three 
major causes: 1) the decrease in the marriage rate; 2) the increase in the divorce rate; 
3) longer life expectancy. These changes in the form of families intersect with 
women’s labor force participation and care provision. I want to emphasize that the so-
called standard family of a married couple and their children, which is assumed when 
the family wage and male-breadwinner system are discussed, has been the prevalent 
form, but it is worth noting that it has represented less than 60% of all families at least 
since 1980, and recently decreased to 42.2%. In addition, while the male breadwinner 
has been prominent in Korea, female headed households are visibly increasing. 
7.1.2.2 Changes in Women’s labor force participation 
Women’s participation in the labor market in Korea has increased steadily since the 
1960s. For example, women’s labor force participation rate (ages 15+) was 39.3 in 
                                                 
95 Yet the percentage of widowed female heads of household is prominent: 58.1% in 1980 and 44.4% in 
2005. Among female heads of household, 34% were older than 60 in 2005. 
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1970, 42.5 in 1980, 47 in 1990, 48.6 in 2000, and 50 in 2005 (Economically Active 
Population Survey, National Statistical Office). These changes coincide with the 
industrial structural changes and demographic changes that have occurred such as low 
fertility, higher education, and postponed marriages (Jang 1998). The female labor 
participation rate by age shows an interesting pattern (the M shape, pattern shown in 
Figure 7.2). As I have mentioned earlier, women’s labor force participation drops 
dramatically between the ages of 25 and 29, when reproductive activities are greatest, 
and takes about a decade to reach the previous labor participation level. Table 7.5 
shows that the women’s employment drops after marriage and drops further after the 
procreation, and recovers with the primary school enrollment of the last child. This 
suggests that women continue to take primary responsibility for child care in the 
absence of social institutional support (Lee, J 2005). Indeed, the fertility rate by age 
matches overall changes in female labor force participation by age, and cohort 
analyses of female labor force participation have supported this argument (Jang, 
2005). Furthermore, the data on average time spent on household affairs by marital 
status and gender in 2004 show that married women spend far more time on household 
chores, including food preparation, child care, cleaning, laundry, shopping and 
household management, than any other groups including married men, single women, 
and single men. Married women thus continue to take responsibility for overall 
activities of reproduction in addition to child care (Time Use Survey, National 
Statistical Office, 2004, Figure 7.3). 
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Figure 7.2 Female labor participation rate in Korea, 1980–2008. 
(Source: Economically Active Population Survey, National Statistical Office) 
 
Table 7.5 Married Women’s Employment by Life Stage (Kim et al., 2007) 
 Life stage Employed Unemployed Total (number) 
Before marriage 74.8 25.2 100 (7324) 
After marriage 37.3 62.7 100 (7324) 
before the birth of the first baby  29.7 70.3 100 (6751) 
after the birth of the first baby 21.3 78.7 100 (6751) 
before the birth of the last baby  25 75 100 (6729) 
after the birth of the last baby 21.8 78.2 100 (6729) 
before the primary school enrollment of 
the last child 44.6 55.4 100 (4557) 
after the primary school enrollment of the 
last child 47 53 100 (4557) 
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Figure 7.3 Average time for household affairs by gender and marital status. 
(Source: National Statistical Office, Time Use Survey 2004) 
The pronounced M-shape trend of women’s labor force participation was prevalent 
during the 1980s and the 1990s. Overall participation rates have continued to increase, 
however, and the sharp drop has eased. In addition, the drop has shifted to later ages 
with the greatest exit from the labor force occurring among women. One may 
speculate that there will have to be significant institutional changes to support 
reproductive activities and child care. However, the number of day-care centers is 
extremely small relative to the number of children despite its dramatic increase 
beginning in 1990, as Figure 7.4 shows. At present, women continue to postpone 
marriage or opt not to get married at all. The average marriage age has increased from 
24.8 for women and 27.8 for men in 1990 to 27.7 for women and 30.9 for men in 2005 
(KWDI, 2006). The crude marriage rate decreased from 10.6 in 1980 to 6.5 in 2005, 
and the crude divorce rate increased 0.6 in 1980 to 2.6 in 2005 (KWDI 2006). The 
proportion of never-married women ages 25 to 29 and 30 to 34 was 11.8 and 2.1 in 
1975, 14.1 and 2.7 in 1980, 18.4 and 4.2 in 1985, 22.1 and 5.3 in 1990, 29.8 and 6.7 in 
1995 and 40.1 and 10.7 in 2000 (Korean Census in Lee, J, 2005). The relationship 
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between postponement of marriage or of non-marriage and women’s labor force 
participation is reflected in the data for female heads of household, as noted earlier. 
 
Figure 7.4 Number of children (age 0–5) and number of children in day-care 
centers. 
(Source: Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs, Childcare Survey 2009; 
National Statistical Office, Population prospects 2006) 
7.1.2.3 Wages 
The increase in wage has been steady both for men and women, as Figure 7.5 shows. 
Male wages remain higher than female wages, although the percentage of female 
wages compared with male wages has increased from 44.2% in 1980 to 63.2% in 
2000. The gender difference in wages is generally explained as the result of the gender 
segregation of occupations; men tend to occupy the upper strata of occupations with 
high productivity, high wages, and high stability, while women occupy the lower 
strata of occupations with low productivity, low wages, and low stability (Keum, 
2002). Furthermore, the gap between single men and married men is tangible, whereas 
the gap between married women and single women is insignificant. This is partly 
because women’s wages have been lower than men’s as a result of structural 
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discrimination. In addition, that women tend to leave the labor market after marriage 
or giving birth and reenter the labor market later continues to disadvantage women’s 
wages and careers. In addition, highly educated women, who are likely to occupy the 
upper strata of the occupations, tend to leave the labor market upon marriage and 
childbirth.  
 
Figure 7.5 Wage by gender and marital status (Wage Structure Survey;96 
Ministry of Labor) 
 
In 2001, the labor force participation rate of females with a college education or more 
was 84.4% between the ages of 20 and 24, 69% between the ages of 25 and 29, 50.5% 
between the ages of 30 and 39, 52.7% between the ages of 40 and 49, and 40.5 
between the ages of 50 and 5997 (Keum, 2002, p. 17). Keum (2002) explains that the 
spouses of highly educated women are likely to have sufficient income to support a 
whole family, and that these women tend to stay at home to care for their child and 
manage the household after giving birth. The lack of other child-care options and the 
                                                 
96 Sample survey of 5,400 companies that have more than 5 employees. 
97 Keum (2002) explains three reasons for this trend: 1) spouse’s high income; 2) child care and 
household management; 3) low expectations for a future career, such as income and promotion (p. 19). 
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low future career expectations for income and promotion due to women’s family care 
responsibilities contribute to this decision as well (Keum, 2002, p.19).  
The data presented in Table 7.6 suggest that women’s labor force participation is high 
when their husbands’ income and education levels are low. It is also worth noting that 
labor force participation is relatively high for women who do not have children or who 
live in an extended family. In most cases, the idea of the male breadwinner and the 
family wage are not expressed explicitly today, for example, as “married men should 
earn more because they are breadwinners,”  is instead remains implicit.  
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Table 7.6 Married Women’s labor force participation by Husband’s 
Characteristics (Kim et al., 2007) 
Household 
Labor 
participation rate Husband 
Labor 
participation rate 
Total 53 Total 51.3 
Household size Education 
2 or less 63 Primary 65.2 
3–4 50.2 Junior high school 70.4 
5 or more 55.2 High school 52.1 
  University 47.3 
Generation  Employment  
1 61 Employed 50.9 
2 50.4 Unemployed 59.3 
3 or more 64.4   
Number of children 
Monthly  
household income 
None 57.8 990,000- 73.9 
1 46.8 1,000,000–1,990,000 59.1 
2 or more 54.1 2,000,000–2,990,000 52.9 
  3,000,000–3,990,000 44.7 
  4,000,000–4,990,000 40.2 
  5,000,000+ 36 
Total number of 
responses 7,334  6,772 
 
7.1.3 Growing Concerns about the “Crisis” and Policy Responses 
Increased concerns about low fertility appeared in the public discourse in the early 
2000s. In 2001, newspapers highlighted the fact that the total fertility rate was 1.42 
and expressed concerns about low fertility and the aging population. Policy debates 
ensued from the anti-natalist to the pro-natalist. The alarmist voices became stronger. 
For example, news articles have increasingly used the term “national catastrophe” 
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recently.98 In addition, the slogan of the 41st women’s rally of the Korean National 
Council of Women in 2005 was “giving birth is patriotic behavior” (2006-4-12 Korean 
National Council of Women Press Briefing). This is an interesting contrast to the 
slogan during the family-planning period, “being a patriot through contraception” 
(Hwang, 2005). Critical feminists have identified the current situation of low fertility 
as “a crisis but an opportunity” for the feminist movement (Hwang 2005) and 
criticized the pro-natalist population policy in the early 2000s for failing to take into 
consideration individual women’s contradictory situations, such as the fact that 
women’s participation in the labor market has increased, while the gender division of 
household work has not changed. Feminist scholars have argued that this deficit of 
care has led to the low fertility, and that gender equality and work-family 
reconciliation should therefore be taken into account in policy responses to the 
problem of low fertility99 (Bae 2006). This critique is reflected in the language of the 
policies on the healthy family and low fertility and an aging society to a certain extent. 
However, it is not incorporated coherently into the population policies across the 
nation and the counter-ideological effect of this policy seems bigger than its actual 
implication. 
7.1.3.1 The Healthy Family 
The “Healthy Family Campaign” deserves attention because it represents the 
government’s solution to the identified crisis in the mid-2000s. In 2004, the 
Framework Act on Healthy Families” (Act. No. 7166) was passed. The purpose of this 
                                                 
98 “Population catastrophe is coming” (MBC 2005-1-19), “TFR 1.08, we face population catastrophe” 
(Dongailbo 2006-05-09) “Low fertility should be tackled” (Seoulsinmun 2006-05-15), “Population 
catastrophe already begun” (Seoul Economy, 2009-07-30)  
99 Bae (2006) wrote that this point is reflected in the Plan for Low Fertility and an Aging Society. 
Folbre (1996) offers more theoretical discussion on this. McDonald (2006) discusses low fertility, state 
policy, and gender equality extensively. 
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law is “outlining the rights and responsibilities of people, the local and the central 
government for maintaining healthy family life, developing and sustaining families, 
realizing healthy family by finding appropriate solutions for family problems, and 
strengthening the policies to support the welfare of family members” (Framework Act 
on Healthy Families 1.1). This law clearly indicates that “all the citizens should 
recognize the importance of marriage and procreation” (8.1). According to the first 
Basic Plan for Healthy Families (2006–2010), the backgrounds of family policy can be 
summarized as follows (Ministry of Gender Equality and Family, 2006). First, the 
Korean family plays an important role in reproduction, welfare, and human 
development, but the increase in women’s labor force participation and small families 
has helped weaken the function of the family. The family faces a functional overload. 
As a result, the younger generation tends to avoid marriage, which translates into low 
marriage rates and low fertility. The weakened functions of the family, especially 
reproduction and care, are the new “social danger.” Second, the traditional male-
breadwinner model has changed to a dual-earner / dual-career model. To smoothe this 
transition, the social environment should be changed to one that is gender-equal and 
family friendly. Finally, the state should play an active role in imposing the vision and 
values of the family and provide conditions to realize the vision because “the 
happiness of the family is the essence of state competence.” The plan directly 
highlights the problem of care provision that accompanied women’s labor force 
participation and family changes, as well as that of population reproduction. Policy 
tasks were identified as follows:1) socialization of family care; 2) work–family 
reconciliation; 3) support for the diverse family; 4) constituting a family-friendly 
environment; 5) new family culture and relationships among family members; 6) and 
expanding infrastructure for family policy. 
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The implementation of the “Framework Act on Healthy Families” (Act. No. 7166) 
indicates that there are certain levels of crisis that the Korean government concerns 
itself with, and this crisis is believed to be resolved by restoring the family100. One 
concern is population reproduction, and the other is care provision within the family. 
The emphasis on the family can be understood in this context. The Korean 
government’s analysis of the current situation and the emphasis on family seem 
logical. However, restoring the family does not resolve the tensions around women’s 
unpaid domestic labor and women’s participation in the labor market. While the 
proposed policy tasks such as socialization of family care and work–family 
reconciliation seem appropriate, what remains unsettled is the notion of the “healthy 
family.”  
The law suggests forming “healthy family committees” at the national, provincial, and 
city levels and establishing a “Basic plan for healthy family” every five years. This 
law also includes the thematic areas of healthy family support programs and 
designates a governmental structure in charge of conducting this policy from the 
Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs to the section of district administration 
and suggests establishing “healthy family support centers” at the district level. A 
Central Committee for Healthy Family Policy has also been established within the 
government. The Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs leads the 
administrative structure, and family welfare departments within the local 
administration are in charge of executing policies, which is similar to the family-
planning campaign structure. The Healthy Family Support Centers were newly 
established in 2005. Under the central healthy family support center, there are centers 
                                                 
100 The official English Translation came out as “Framework Act on Healthy Homes” (Act.No.9932) 
with the amendment in 2010 
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at the city and province levels and at the county and district levels. Local Healthy 
Family Support Centers work closely with township-level authorities, welfare centers, 
medical centers, and various nongovernmental organizations. Local Healthy Family 
Support Centers tended to be run by local nongovernmental groups with funding from 
government, and promote a family-friendly environment and services for family life 
including counseling, education, and child-care support. Multicultural Family Support 
Centers, which I mentioned in the previous chapter, operate under this organization. 
7.1.3.2 Low Fertility and an Aging Society 
In 2005, the “Framework Act on Low Fertility and an Aging Society” (Act. No.7496) 
was passed. Based on this law, a “Presidential Committee for Low Fertility and an 
Aging Society” was established and the “Board of Low Fertility and an Aging 
Society,” which consisted of 12 relevant ministries and departments, was established 
as well. It provided a set of plans for dealing with low fertility and an aging society in 
2006. It outlined its focal points of low fertility as follows: 1) reduce the 
socioeconomic burden on family with children; 2) increase the child-care 
infrastructure; 3) extend the support for pregnancy and birth; 4) reconcile work–family 
conflict; 5) strengthen public school education; 6) establish cultural conditions for 
family life; 7) provide a safe environment for children and adolescents; and 8) 
establish the support system for children and adolescence (Korean Government, 2006, 
p. 15). Detailed action plans were widespread across the ministries because increasing 
fertility requires substantial economic and social change. That is why the outlined 
focal points are broad and include the family, child care, education, labor, and health. 
The language of this legislation is almost identical to that of the Framework Act on 
Healthy Families (Act. No. 7166). 
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Despite this legislation’s focus on the socialization of care, other population policies 
do not necessarily present the same language. For example, a prominent government-
related population study, which was published as a guidebook for government officials 
and NGO workers in the field of low fertility and an aging society by the Korea 
Institute for Health and Social Affairs, a governmental research institute, suggested 
that the major factors that have brought fertility to current levels were declining 
fertility rates from 1950 to 1989 and falling marriage rates during the 1990s (Cho 
2006). Hence, it suggested that 
in order to recover the fertility rate, a policy to increase the marriage rate 
should be implemented. Support for forming a family should be pursued as a 
key policy at the level of city and province as well as district and county. This 
project should be carried out in cooperation with health centers, marriage 
brokerage companies, and health-related nongovernmental organizations 
within each administrative unit. Small and medium-size companies within the 
administrative district should come up with policies to increase the marriage 
and fertility rates, the cost for this policy should be reimbursed by the 
government, and high-performing companies should be rewarded by the 
government. Both central and local governments should allocate funds to 
encouraging marriage each fiscal year, and this project should be fostered with 
high priority (Population Research Institute, 2005 in Cho, 2006, p. 68). 
At the local level, a number of local councils came up with bills to support the 
international marriages of local bachelors in 2006 and 2007. These municipalities 
tended to have rural townships. I looked up the minutes of local councils that passed 
these bills. The minutes of local councils showed that the arguments in support 
express a mixture of concern about population and the welfare of rural bachelors. 
Most of the bills are based on the “Framework Act on the Rural and Fishery Areas.” 
One bill in Yeongi County was based on the “Framework Act on Low Fertility and an 
Aging Society” (Act. No.7496). According to the minutes of the Geoje City Council, 
the rationale for this bill is that “women do not want to stay in the rural areas and the 
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marriage of rural bachelors became a social issue. This bill encourages the marriage of 
rural bachelors in order to prevent them from leaving farming (yinong) and to guide 
rural settlement and vitalize the rural community.” According to the minutes of the 
Yeongi County council, “the bill was proposed in order to prepare for low fertility and 
an aging society by solving the sex-ratio imbalance of people of prime marriage age, 
pursuing sound family, will for life, and the vitality of the local society through 
international marriage” (Minutes of Yeongi County, 2006-12-06). Considering that 
these bills were established after a series of policies on low fertility and an aging 
society were established at the central level and that the guidebooks mentioned above 
had already been circulated, we can guess that their passage may be somewhat 
influenced by the discourse around low fertility at the central level. Indeed, the 
minutes of the Yeongi County Council noted, 
It has been only a year since the Framework Act on Low Fertility and an Aging 
Society (Act. No.7496) was implemented but there is incentive depending on 
how much legislation for low fertility and an aging society were implemented 
at the individual local government level. . . . This bill is the one that will win us 
points when the Ministry of Health, Welfare and Family Affairs evaluates the 
local welfare policy. (Minutes of Yeongi County, 2006-12-06) 
In addition, there is the possibility of some influence from the marriage brokerage 
industry, as discussed in an earlier chapter. It is not clear to what extent the brokerage 
industry lobbied for the establishment of these bills; however, in many cases, local 
governments selected an international marriage brokerage company to facilitate their 
international marriage projects101. In addition to lobbying by the marriage brokerage 
agencies, and in light of the text of the guidebook that encouraged cooperation with 
local entities including marriage brokerage companies, the idea of working with 
marriage brokerage agencies at the local level may not have sounded so unreasonable. 
                                                 
101 See chapter five for the more discussion and evidence. 
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7.2 Contextualizing Cross-Border Marriage in the Crisis of Population and Care 
The efforts to reorganize the welfare regime in Korea are twofold: strengthening state 
welfare and restoring family welfare. As discussed above, the increase in welfare 
expenditures, in particular, for child-care, women, and family, can be an indicator of 
strengthening state welfare. The language of state welfare is very prominent in overall 
population and family policy. For example, policies on family, in particular work–
family reconciliation, outline the state’s responsibility. However, these policies oddly 
imply the other strategy of reorganizing reproduction and restoring family values. The 
“multicultural family,” which arises through cross-border marriage, is an important 
site to observe the care provision of the working class. 
7.2.1 Socio-demographic Characteristics of Multicultural Families 
The typical demographic characteristics of couples made up of Korean men and 
Vietnamese women are revealed by a survey conducted by the Ministry of Gender 
Equality and Family (Seung-Kwon Kim et al., 2010). This is based on a survey of the 
total number of foreign spouses of Koreans. Based on the completed responses, the 
authors weighted the values. The data include 120,146 women and 11,557 men of 
various origins. Among women migrants, 36,051 are Korean Chinese, 32,926 are 
Chinese, 25,561 are Vietnamese, 4,996 are Japanese, 8,616 are Filipina, 2,623 are 
Cambodian, 1,800 are Mongolian, 1,703 are Thai, and the rest are of other ethnicities. 
The average age of the Vietnamese women is 24.3, and of their Korean husbands is 
41.3. These couples reside in both rural areas (46.8%) and urban areas (53.2%). 
Further, if we look at the socioeconomic status of multicultural families, they belong 
predominantly to the lower socioeconomic strata. Of them, 38.1% earn between 
1,000,000 won and 2,000,000 won, and 22.5% earn less than 1,000,000 won. This is 
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less than the average income among Korean households. For example, the average 
monthly income for all Korean households in 2009 was 2,816,000 won. In addition, 
given that the average household expenditure in 2009 was 2,437,297 won, the average 
income of households with marriage migrants was less than the average expenditure 
for all Koreans. 
However, in contrast to the conventional wisdom on the low-income families that 
suggests that both spouses tend to work if the breadwinner’s earnings are not sufficient 
to support his or her family, the majority of Vietnamese women in these marriages do 
not participate in the labor market. The National Fertility and Family Survey reveals 
that only 21.1% work outside the home. This rate is significantly lower than that for 
lower-income Korean–Korean couples.102 See Table 7.7 for these and other 
comparisons. 
                                                 
102 According to the 2009 National Survey on Fertility, Family Health and Welfare in Korea, 71% of 
women whose husbands’ monthly income is less than 990,000 won (approximately 990 USD) work, as 
do 57.3% of women whose husbands’ income is between 1,000,000 won (approximately 1,000 USD) 
and 1,990,000 won (approximately 1,990 USD). 
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Table 7.7 Demographic and Economic Characteristics of Multicultural Families 
Characteristic 
Korean men and 
women with 
foreign origins 
Korean men and 
Vietnamese women 
Korean men and 
Korean women 
Age gap  10 years 17 years 2.9 (2009) 
Urban residence  70.30% 53.20% 80.3% (2005 Census) 
Monthly income 
(less than ￦2,000,000)  
60.10% 60.60% NA* 
 
Women’s labor force 
participation  
36.90% 21.10% 49.2% (2009) 
Child(ren)  61.60% 72.90% 74.9% (2005 Census) 
1.15 (TFR in 2009) 
Living with in-laws  27.50% 45.50% 4.36% (2005 Census) 
Registered as a person with 
disability within the family  
17.90%  4.60% 
(Source: 2009 National Survey on Fertility, Family Health and Welfare in Korea, 
Korea Institute of Health Affair and Social Affair) 
*Average Monthly Current Income (2009) is ￦3,293,928 
 
Why the labor force participation of these women is relatively low despite the 
insufficient income of their families is an important question. The survey data show 
that in the case of Vietnamese migrant women, working outside the home is not often 
an option. The survey data also show that 89% of Vietnamese women who are not 
employed at present do show an interest in working. Therefore, the question may be 
why Vietnamese women do not work despite their apparent financial insecurity. 
According to the survey, the reasons for this are as follows: child-care needs (54.2%), 
poor grasp of the Korean language (17.4%), no job opportunities (9.7%), objection of 
family members (4.8%), household chores (7.5%), and other reasons (6.4%) (See 
Figure 7.6). Given the insufficient public support for child care, it may be a more 
sensible decision for these women to stay at home to take care of their children. 
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The other critical point is that Vietnamese women tend to live in extended families: 
45.5% answered that they live with their in-laws,103 whereas 28.4% of other marriage 
migrants reported living with their in-laws.104 Only 4.36% of Korean families live 
with their in-laws (Census 2005; National Statistical Office). Given that the average 
age of Korean husbands of Vietnamese women is 41.3 years old, the men’s parents are 
likely older than 60. The fact that Vietnamese women live with their in-laws also 
indicates that they take responsibility for caring for older adults in addition to child 
care and household chores in a traditional extended family role. 
 
Figure 7.6 Why Vietnamese women do not participate in the labor market. 
Source: 2009 National Survey on Fertility, Family Health and Welfare in Korea, 
Korea Institute of Health Affair and Social Affair 
                                                 
103 The total number of answers is 23,423. 
104 The total number of answers is 105,646. 
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7.2.2 Having a Child: Securing Marriage and Citizenship 
The data suggest that a multicultural family that is composed of husband, wife, 
children, and sometimes the children’s grandparents often manages to survive on an 
insufficient income. Vietnamese wives tend to stay home to take care of children, 
household chores, and possibly older adults. During my fieldwork, I found that most 
Vietnamese women have a child within a couple of years after they marry105 because 
most husbands or in-laws want the couple to have a child as soon as possible because 
the husbands are older. Furthermore, marriage brokers tend to advise couples that 
having a child is the best way to secure the marriage (interview with a Korean 
marriage broker in Vietnam). Having a child secures not only the marriage but also the 
wife’s citizenship. It currently takes two years for marriage migrants to be able to 
apply for citizenship. In cases where the marriage is dissolved within two years, 
marriage migrants cannot apply for citizenship. One exception is when a marriage 
migrant has had a child with a Korean national (Nationality Law 6.2.4)106. This 
suggests that the citizenship of marriage migrants is defined not as an individual right 
but in terms of their roles within the Korean family. 
The other intriguing observation is that these families manage their livelihoods with 
apparently insufficient income. As the data suggested, a significant number of married 
Korean women with husbands having lower income participate in the labor market. 
However, the data also show that in the case of Vietnamese women, working outside 
the home is not often an option. As mentioned above, having a child at the beginning 
of the marriage life keeps Vietnamese women from participating in the labor market. 
It seems that having a woman stay at home is essential to the care of children and 
                                                 
105 Unfortunately, the survey doesn’t provide information about the timing of childbearing.  
106  The other exception is when the cause of dissolution of marriage was not caused by marriage 
migrant (Nationality Law 6.2.3). 
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older adults in some cases. How these families manage to earn a sufficient livelihood 
is another important question, but one beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
Nevertheless, the given circumstances indicate that there must be some form of hidden 
labor to manage living with insufficient resources, and the labor of Vietnamese 
women at home seems indispensible in this case. 
7.3 Politics of the Multicultural Family 
I have discussed how family became an important policy agenda in the context of the 
“crisis” of social reproduction in Korea and how the policies and discourses around 
cross-border marriage have served to manage the social reproduction crisis. The ways 
in which cross-border marriage can serve as a solution for this crisis are more 
obviously revealed in the early discourse of the “rural bachelor’s marriage problem,” 
which epitomized the rural crisis in Korea in the 1980s and 1990s when the 
liberalization of agriculture was carried out. Korean farmers faced global pressure to 
liberalize their markets for agricultural products and to commercialize agriculture in 
order to survive in the arena of global competition. A chronic labor/population deficit 
in the rural areas and the rural bachelors’ marriage issues indicate that the 
reproduction mechanism in rural areas needed to be reorganized. In this context, cross-
border marriage became a popular solution for population, labor, and care provisions 
rather than long-term structural changes for sustainable rural development. I began 
this chapter with the excitement about “multicultural Korea” which was covered in the 
newspapers. When cross-border marriage is combined with the discourse on 
multiculturalism, the implications of cross-border marriage become even more 
complicated. 
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The term “multicultural” has been one of the most popular terms in the Korean policy 
arena since the mid-2000s. The term “multicultural family,” which refers to a family 
created through cross-border marriage, has been a major site for manifesting 
“multiculturalism.” The term “multicultural society” was initially used in civil society 
but was later adopted and appropriated by the government. Many of the policies for a 
multicultural society are the same as those for multicultural families. Despite the 
popularity of the term, there has been little in-depth discussion about the actual 
substance of multiculturalism. Only a small amount of critical literature exists on this 
subject in Korea. The common take on the subject is that the state-sponsored discourse 
on multiculturalism overruled the reality in Korea (Eum, 2006; Yoon, 2007; Cheon, 
2004).107 Multiculturalism in Korea vaguely implies a society in which different 
people live together. It also carries the positive connotation of being cosmopolitan or 
global, derived from the characteristics of leading global cities. A cosmopolitan 
society presumes mobility, and mobility is associated with power. If a certain place 
becomes a destination, it may mean that it has something important with which to 
attract these flows. 
The notion of the multicultural family is contradictory and yet a brilliant invention in 
which a powerful mirage is created of an affluent, sophisticated, and cosmopolitan 
society. However, the fact that the multicultural family became a site for celebrating a 
multicultural society is an irony, because these multicultural families are 
predominantly located in the lower socioeconomic strata. What constitutes a 
multicultural family is the presence of a woman of foreign origin. In a way, 
multicultural families are not those who have benefited the most from the global 
                                                 
107 The level of analysis varies from policy analysis to critiques of the notion of multiculturalism itself. 
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circuit of mobility; rather, they belong to the counter geography of globalization,108 in 
Sassen’s terms (2002). Both marriage migrants and their working-class husbands are 
mobilized under the illusion of the multicultural society by being labeled a 
multicultural family. At the same time, this mirage effectively obscures the 
socioeconomic structural issues that initially created its global flow. 
As mentioned earlier, there has been broad population policy reform in the 2000s. The 
major problem of low fertility is often identified as a problem, both as it is associated 
with a labor deficit and with an increasing old age dependency.109 In this case, 
allowing more immigration can be a reasonable option. However, Korean immigration 
policy has been very selective. For example, Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in 
Korea (Act. No.8442) specifies the treatment of individual groups including marriage 
migrants, permanent residents, refugees, expats and Korean diasporas (Chapter 3). 
This act doesn’t include the treatment on unskilled laborers and undocumented 
workers. Even within the discourse of multiculturalism, scant attention has been paid 
to migrant workers in Korea. Indeed, the most aggressive repression of undocumented 
workers occurred at the same time that multicultural Korea was celebrated. This 
situation indicates that the identified “crisis” of reproduction is more than the number 
of people in the territory and the supply of labor needed in the field. Marriage 
migrants are invited to the discourse on multicultural Korea because they are part of 
the Korean family. They are the wives of Korean farmers and working-class men and 
the mothers of Korean children. Their presence is meaningful only in terms of the 
                                                 
108 Sassen (2002) characterizes the relationship of “the alternative circuits for survival” to the global 
economic restructuring as “counter geographies of globalization” because they are “associated with 
some of the key programs and conditions that are at the heart of the global economy, but they are not 
represented as connected to globalization and often actually operate outside and in violation of laws and 
treaties, without being exclusively embedded in criminal operations as in the case with the illegal drugs 
trade” (p. 104). 
109 Kim Y., 2006, p. 3; Kim, J., 2006; Cho, 2006; Koo, 2006. 
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family. This tendency is revealed in the nationality policy. For example, one must wait 
two years after a marriage is performed to apply for citizenship. In the case of a 
marriage being dissolved before two years, a woman can apply for citizenship only if 
she has children fathered by her Korean husband110. 
Furthermore, the Support for Multicultural Families Act (Act. No. 8937) passed in 
2008, which was based on the Framework Act on Healthy Families (Act. No. 7166) 
and the Act on the Treatment of Foreigners in Korea (Act. No.8442). This is a good 
example of how the “multicultural family” is perceived in the policy arena. The policy 
indicates that it is the responsibility of state and local governments to provide 
institutional conditions for family members of multicultural families to maintain a 
stable family life. Significant parts of the outlined supports in this law are counseling 
on family issues and domestic violence and education including social adoptability; 
vocational training; family life; couple relationships; parenthood; health and nutrition 
during pregnancy and after giving birth; and child rearing.111 The language of 
education is intriguingly dominant in this law. Perhaps it is a general liberal tendency 
to think of education as a silver bullet, but also it can mean that this law assumes that 
members of multicultural families, precisely marriage migrants, are objects of 
education. A family formed though cross-border marriage is known as a multicultural 
family because of the presence of a foreign spouse, but the way to support the 
multicultural family is through education about the Korean way of family life, which 
is discussed above. Given that culture and identity are not fixed ideas, the process of 
putting together the contents of the curriculum becomes another contested concept for 
forming the idea of the Korean family and what it means to be Korean. 
                                                 
110 The other exception is when the marriage was not dissolved by a marriage migrant (Nationality Law 
6.2.3) 
111 Laws for support of multicultural families (6, 7, 8, 9, 10). 
202 
The politics of the “multicultural family” serves for the reproduction of the totality of 
society in this sense. Celebrating multiculturalism is the flipside of restoring Korean-
ness. It is important to acknowledge that the “multicultural family” has become a site 
of celebrating multiculturalism because the practice of multiculturalism in Korea is 
highly selective. Marriage migrants are enthusiastically invited to participate in this 
discourse because they are the mothers of Korean children and the wives of Korean 
men. The support program for multicultural families is another contested site for 
defining “Korean-ness,” and often this support program works by way of 
unidirectional education. The entire process creates a powerful mirage of an 
economically affluent, politically sophisticated, cosmopolitan society, but it obscures 
the actual political economic conditions of the multicultural family’s presence. 
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CONCLUSION 
This project started from the observation of the increasing trend of cross-border 
marriage in Korea and the overwhelming media and policy responses to marriage 
migration. This made me raise questions about why cross-border marriage increased 
dramatically at the moment in Korea and why it gained so much attention in the media 
and policy arena. I started with exploring several descriptive questions; what are the 
patterns of cross-border marriages? What are the conditions of cross-border 
marriages? How did cross-border marriages happen? As I answered these questions, I 
found that cross-border marriages cannot be divorced from recent demographic and 
economic changes in Korea.  
Cross-border marriages between Korean men and foreign women started as a solution 
for the rural bachelor’s problem which was central to the issue of rural sustainability. 
Rapid industrialization in Korea coincided with rural to urban migration, the decline in 
fertility, and the increase in women’s labor force participation. Consequently, it led to 
the rapid decline in rural communities and changes in family patterns.  The rural 
bachelor’s marriage problem epitomizes these changes. The recent dramatic increase 
in cross-border marriages is rooted in Korea’s complex structural context. The 
emergence of marriage brokerage industry from the 1990s is directly linked to this 
trend. Also policy interventions may have created an environment that is favorable for 
cross-border marriages. This led me to investigate further structural considerations. On 
one hand, there were the crises of population and care which have accumulated since 
the industrialization period and have been decried by the government since the mid 
2000s. On the other hand, the neo-liberal restructuring that took place in the 1990s 
influenced the labor market and family wage system. Population dynamics and the 
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care crisis are linked to low fertility, which has resulted from the family planning 
campaign, which was a part of economic development plan, and from the recent 
decline in marriage rate. At the macro level, it concerns the dependency of the older 
population. At the micro level, it is linked to the question of who takes care of the 
older citizens?   
Women’s labor force participation has increased since the economic development 
period and is also relevant to the care provision. It undermines the function of family 
as an institution of care provision, which is based on the ideal of male bread winner 
and housewife as a care provider by displacing women from home to the labor market 
thereby reducing this form of families. In the case of Korea, a woman’s role as a care 
provider has remained important even after the increase in women’s labor force 
participation. Women have double burdens and the insufficient institutional support 
makes this burden heavy. In turn, it contributes to the declining marriage rate.   
I have attempted to encompass the discussion of economic changes, demographic 
changes, changes in the care provision and the welfare regime with the framework of 
social reproduction. I took the family as a site where all these changes intersect. In 
connecting these different dots, I took a historical approach. “Historicity” and 
“relation” are the two terms most important to understanding the general 
methodological approach of this research. This is not something that I imposed from 
the beginning. Rather, it became important while I conducted this research and 
processed the information. The meanings of the words and categories that I once used 
have been reconceptualized and reconfigured. Even the meaning of social 
reproduction as I use it here became clear only during my field research and the 
dissertation-writing process. 
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I have discussed the feminist debates on social reproduction that took place in the 
1970s in some depth because they offered an important account of the relationships 
among different categories and their historical and regional specificity. The debates 
shed light on various dimensions of social reproduction including population, labor, 
and the totality of the society. The importance of the debate surrounding social 
reproduction lies in recognizing the changing relationships among various sets of 
categories, and their sensitivity to historical and regional specificity. Feminists have  
reconceptualized the ways in which  economic process and women’s labor plays out in 
the private and the public spheres. The discussion ranges from the level of the 
household to the global economic structure. Feminists’ studies on women’s labor are 
largely based on a historically specific context. For example, the discussion of 
feminization of labor emerged in the context of the international division of labor, 
arguing that women’s labor in the developing countries was both cheap and easily 
mobilized for the industrialization of the developing nations and accumulation of the 
capital. The recent discussion on feminization of labor migration is aligned with the 
decline of the welfare state and the pressure for lowering the cost of care provision. 
The recent increase in cross-border marriages in Korea overlapped with these two 
processes. The fundamental cause of the cross-border marriage in Korea is the 
economic and demographic changes during its rapid industrialization. This is linked to 
the broader concern of the re-organization of the family-dependent welfare regime in 
Korea, which appears to emphasize the state welfare, on one hand, and family values 
on the other.  
The current increase in marriage migration is not just limited to Korea. It happens 
widely in East Asia and Southeast Asia. There have been cross-border marriages 
throughout history and there may be many similarities in the forms of this practice in 
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terms of patriarchal power relations. However, I would like to highlight the specificity 
of the context rather than the more universal characteristics: why is marriage 
migration happening at this point in time in East Asia? I found that marriage migration 
happens in other East Asian countries in a similar manner and that this trend is 
conspicuous if we take into consideration the global trend of marriage migration. 
These destinations share relatively similar economic development experiences. I 
developed the idea that the current trends of cross-border marriage may be relevant to 
the mode of economic development of these countries. For this thesis, I explored the 
case of Korea and Vietnam. Based on the research, I came up with the following 
thesis: the increase in marriage migration in Korea represents a reorganization of 
social reproduction, which was largely based on the family, in the context of rapid 
economic development, while the feminization of labor migration on a global scale 
represents the reorganization of mechanisms of social reproduction in the context of 
the decline of the welfare state and the privatization of social provision. 
In order to explore the changing relationships among categories and the modes of 
production and social reproduction, I examined the areas of population, welfare, 
family, and women’s labor. Exploring changes in policy and trends in the critical 
processes just mentioned requires a wide range of archival research and secondary 
statistical data research. I relied on government policy papers and newspapers for 
archival research because they are the site where the public authority articulates its 
ideas at any given moment. Ultimately, I wanted to show the intertwined relationships 
among social policies of these arenas, which are less highlighted in discussions of 
economic changes. This entailed more than reviewing policy papers and statistical 
data. It required engaging in the different bodies of literature on which these policies 
rely. Each body of literature has been developed along certain intellectual traditions, 
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logics, methods, and languages. Navigating through different languages and 
assumptions, and bringing them together into one piece, was indeed challenging work. 
How to rearticulate them was the biggest challenge throughout the dissertation-writing 
process, and it is indeed an ongoing challenge. 
By combining the field research with the archival research, I attempted not to lose the 
sense of the real lives of those who enter cross-border marriages. As I interact with 
marriage migrants and their families, the numbers in the statistical data were revealed 
as individuals, each of whom bears a history. Meeting various group of people 
including marriage migrants, their families and neighbors, NGO workers, government 
officials, and marriage brokers in the rural and urban areas in Korea and Vietnam 
changed my understanding of conceptual categories such as the rural / the urban, the 
economic / the political / the cultural, and the public / the private. The categories were 
in fact intertwined, and the relationships among them were fluid. I would have 
described these relationships more vividly if this project was more devoted for writing 
ethnography. My sociological imagination tends to remain at the more structural end, 
however. This fieldwork experience rather drew my attention to the macro structural 
changes that have occurred. For example, when I heard the story of the marriage 
between a Korean man, who used to work for a big steel company in the 1980s and 
who now worked in a smaller factory after the economic crisis, and a Vietnamese 
woman, who dropped out of school and worked in a factory in Vietnam, I wondered 
more about what kinds of social changes had happened in these societies than about 
what their married life is like. In this sense, my dissertation is not a study of cross-
border marriage but a study of the social changes that have facilitated the growth in 
the practice of cross-border marriage. 
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I sought to explore the changes at the structural level and how they are intertwined. 
Incorporating the individual narratives with discussion of the macro-structural changes 
that have taken place was an ongoing challenge. This challenge makes me re-think the 
various fronts in the academic debate. Is the counterpart of the macro-structural 
analysis the individual level of analysis? Is the counterpart of the economic the social, 
the political, and the cultural? Are one and the other fixed, separate, exclusive 
categories? For example, there have been many ethnographic studies on cross-border 
marriage as an alternative to the mail-order-bride approach. I think that this is a valid 
approach and it sheds light on the complexity of the phenomenon. However, the focus 
on the individual narratives of these studies is not entirely satisfactory to me even 
though some of them incorporated structural accounts. My primary interest is in 
figuring out the mechanisms of what is often vaguely called “globalization,” or the 
“global power hierarchy.” The macro-structural concern is indispensible in this regard 
and the challenge is to reidentify the most critical problems of macro-structural 
analysis. The problem with the mail-order-brides approach is not its macro-structural 
level of analysis per se but its association with the narrow definition of the economic. 
I pursued a broader definition of the economic, which is based on a understanding of 
its relationship to other categories, by incorporating feminist discussion on labor and 
family. 
As I noted earlier, the changes in political economic and demographic conditions that 
have taken place cannot be thought of apart from their political-cultural implications. 
In particular, the political-cultural implications cannot be discussed without exploring 
the political economic underpinnings. Hence, I focused on presenting data 
representing these demographic and economic changes. For example, I focused mainly 
on the aspects of population reproduction and labor reproduction, that is, care 
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provision, in Korea. I often juxtaposed statistical trends and political economic 
discourse at each beginning of the discussion because they are mutually linked and 
influenced. If there is a gap between these two, it is where politics comes in. For 
example, the discourse of “rural bachelor’s marriage” and its association with cross-
border marriage shows clearly whose interests are at stake, but it takes more effort to 
figure out that it is a kind of symbolic representation of the rural crisis in the 1980s 
and 1990s. On the other hand, the discourse of “multiculturalism” and the 
“multicultural family” indicates the presence of people of foreign origin, but it is less 
clear whose interests are at stake and what the context is. It obscures the fact that 
increasing numbers of people who are involved in cross-border marriages are working 
class men. Also the potential problem of trafficking in women which is associated 
with commercially arranged marriage is dissolved in the discourse of multicultural 
family in Korea. In a similar manner to the rural bachelor’s marriage problem, the 
increase in urban working class men’s marriage may signify a certain problem of 
social reproduction that members of the urban lower class experience. 
New areas of research have emerged in this research process. The bridge to the 
discussion of social reproduction of the totality of society needs to be explored further. 
I believe that citizenship is a potential linkage of this discussion. I briefly discussed 
the political implications while I discussed population reproduction and labor 
reproduction: how the citizenship of marriage migrants relies on the family; how the 
support for marriage migrants is designed to cultivate Korean mothers, and how 
Korean-ness became important in this process. Citizenship needs to be discussed in 
terms of the social reproduction of the totality of a society, and not merely as a bundle 
of rights. What constitutes the idea of citizenship and how it has been realized in 
South Korea are important question to explore. The contractual relationship between 
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the citizen and the state and state welfare based on the social contract has been rather 
an ideal in the context of South Korea. It is ironic that the notion of citizenship has 
gained increasing currency with the influx of migrants. While it illuminates the 
common ground for claiming basic rights as a member of a community, it also 
disregards the ways in which membership in Korean society has been reproduced. The 
odd mixture of strengthening state social policies and restoring the function of the 
family at the moment reflects the transitional status of the welfare regime. The 
discussion of citizenship needs to be grounded on these political economic conditions. 
Also, its relation to the discourse of national identity needs to be discussed further.  
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